Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-96-084 *30 April 1996*

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OSCE: 'Key Problems' Remain on Disarmament in Ex-Yugoslavia

AU2904165096 Paris AFP in English
1626 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, April 29 (AFP)—Disarmament talks for the former Yugoslavia have made progress since opening here in January but key problems remain, the western official overseeing the discussions said Monday [29 April].

"There are key issues left, key for the overall agreement," said Norwegian General Vigleik Eide, who is presiding over the talks on behalf of the Organization for Security and Cooperation [OSCE] in Europe.

Among the problems is an inspections regime which will allow each of Bosnia's former warring parties to verify each other's weapons stocks under the Dayton peace agreement.

"We have more work to be done on defining the practical content of verification," Eide told reporters during a break in the talks, due to wind-up on June 6.

The delegation chief for the rump Yugoslavia, Dragomir Djokic, told journalists last week that the differences centred on the type of forces to be subjected to inspection.

Radomir Lukic of the Bosnian Serb entity created under the peace accord said at the same time that the talks were "wide open."

"If you want to have a lasting agreement, it's very important that we have the necessary elements in there, like the verification regime, and an agreement not only on principles, but also on all details of an intrusive verification regime—with inspections—but also in a way that can be accepted in the long term by all the parties," Eide said Monday.

The disarmament talks have drawn together the five parties of the Bosnian conflict: the rump Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia, the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity, known as the Republika Srpska.

The negotiations, which opened January 5, are modelled on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty talks.

"The whole process should be much shorter than the CFE process," Eide said. The CFE treaty was agreed between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries after a marathon 40-month session.

An agreement in Vienna will limit the former belligerents' holdings of tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.

The OSCE negotiator said he was "cautiously optimistic," that an accord would be initialled on June 6, in keeping with the Dayton agreement, and signed on June 11 by ministers.

Failure to reach an agreement by that date will mean the imposition of an arms control regime by the international community, and hit arms imports which would otherwise go ahead.

Inspectors would use the rump Yugoslavia's current stocks as the "baseline" for the ratio-based reductions, with its holdings reduced to 75 percent of its current levels, while Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina would be set at 30 percent of the baseline.

The level of Bosnia-Herzegovina's weapons stocks will be set according to a ratio of two-to-one between the Moslem-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska.

"We depend very much on the overall situation, the progress of the Dayton package," the general said.

Once signed, the accord would come into immediate effect, allowing for inspections of current weapons stocks held by the former belligerents.

However, this initial period is still the subject of what the general called "minor differences of opinion on the (duration of) the baseline validation period."

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Albania: PD Opens Electoral Campaign in Fier; Berisha Takes Part

AU3004101996 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Party [PD] opened its electoral campaign in the Fier city stadium in the presence of 10,000 Fier residents. President Sali Berisha and PD Chairman Tritan Shehu took part. Seven PD candidates for Fier district were presented at the meeting.

The PD officially opened the 26 May election campaign at a meeting with the electorate in Lushnje city. PD Chairman Tritan Shehu was there to present the party candidatures for single-member constituencies and for lists of electoral subjects nationwide.

The PD branch for Kavaje today presented its candidates for deputy for four constituencies and those on the lists of electoral subjects nationwide. The candidature of PD Chairman Tritan Shehu is among those presented.

Albania: Legality Movement Party Declares Electoral Campaign Open

AU3004103796 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Legality Movement Party [LL] today declared open its electoral campaign in a rally in Burgajet village in Mat district. Residents from the constituency and representatives of the LL branches arrived from various districts, including those party members who had put their candidature in this constituency.

LL Chairman Guri Durollari said: We are optimistic that we will be represented in the future parliament with dignity. We promise the Albanian electorate that we will be honest and will concretely accomplish what we have already undertaken.

Albania: Daily Considers Reasons for Killings in Kosovo

AU3004103896 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 30 Apr 96 p 1

[Commentary by D. Gashi: "Pressure on the Peaceful Movement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Of the culprits for the seven people murdered and eight wounded in one week in Kosova, only the Serbian murderer of student Armend Daci has been identified—that is, the culprit in a case that, under normal circumstances, would not necessarily carry political connotations, but that cannot escape them now, when the Serbian occupying power has turned the Albanians into targets to be bagged even out of season. The exceptionally complicated situation in Kosova that has lasted for seven years has now reached boiling point, and there are even reporters who call it semiwar. The murder of Daci must be counted as the first in a vicious chain, followed by six others, even if there is no real connection between them. It was immediately followed by five murders of Serbs and Montenegrins in order to close (if, one wonders, it can ever be closed) this new cycle of violence, and a seventh, most painful murder, involving the death of one Albanian child and the wounding of three others through explosives.

Even though the Kosovar prime minister, the Democratic League of Kosova, and other political forces in Kosova say that the Albanians have no weapons or armed formations and that the Albanian movement is determined to confine itself to peaceful means, observers cannot exclude at least the hypothetical possibility that the murderers of the Serbs may have been more radical Albanians exacting vengeance for the dead student, or because they are finally fed up of the incessant Serbian repression.

It is nevertheless difficult to imagine that Albanians could have murdered the Serbs, because the incidents took place on the same night, even almost within one hour of each other, in different Kosova towns, which means that they required a meticulously planned operation. Meanwhile, Albanians are automatically ruled out from having cruelly murdered the child at Lum i Madh [Velika Reka].

Even though studying these murders without any data about the culprits is an extremely ungrateful task, these acts with their whiff of terrorism, however they are considered, have the common denominator of pressure against the policy of peace.

First, in that they were plotted precisely at the time when the European Parliament is calling for the issue of Kosova to be solved at an international conference, it could be that their authors pin onto the peaceful movement the methods of terrorism that Europe rejects, thereby making dialogue impossible, or delaying it. In this context, the term used by Euronews for thieve murders, that they were committed by Albanian separatists, seems highly significant. Although this may have been a case of misinformation or a standardized report, one cannot exclude the possibility of intentional disinformation.

Second, their purpose may have been to create such a tense situation as to force the leadership of Kosova to accept any kind of dialogue, without meeting certain preconditions and without any serious and capable mediator from the international community, thus taking advantage of the moment when several European states

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seem to be standing on the side of Serbia and want to see the issue of Kosova solved merely as a question of human rights and of minorities.

Third, their purpose may have been to show that the peaceful movement in Kosova may be threatened by radicals among the Albanians themselves, who could embark on unpredictable adventures.

Although it may seem incredible, all these things at the same time may be said to be raising the stakes of the peaceful movement, which remains the most acceptable policy not only for the outside world, but for the Albanians of Kosova too, and which still preserves its determination to solve the question of Kosova on the basis of the will of the people. The outside world must press more urgently to put a fair solution for Kosova on the agenda. Meanwhile, Albanian political forces and influential individuals must be more united and must stand by the movement and Kosova's legitimate leadership. This is a precondition for making the peaceful movement in Kosova more active, as some demand.

Albania: Commentary Gives 'Grim Forecasts' for Kosovo

AU3004112996 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 30 Apr 96 p 5

[Commentary by B. Reka: "Mysterious Terrorism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A child murdered and several of his playmates wounded in a bomb explosion. This is not a routinely tragic report from the Middle East, but from Kosova. The murdered Albanian lad, Nexhat Hetemi, thus continues the morbid cycle begun one week ago with one Albanian student killed and five Serbs murdered, confirming grim forecasts for Kosova in the days to come. However, yesterday's incident differs from the previous cases in many ways: The fact that the murderers' targets were children, a bomb was their chosen means, and the crime was quick and anonymous shows that organized terrorism has begun to take root in Kosova and spares not even children. While the most recent murders have worn the guise of terrorism, the failure to discover the authors and also those who threw bombs in different Kosova towns one month ago makes the wave of violence in Kosova even more mysterious, posing more questions and encouraging a high degree of speculation. It could be that the culprits in the cases of both Armend Daci and Nexhat Hetemi were extremist Serbian forces who wish to impose a grim atmosphere on Kosova before the possible start of Albanian-Serbian negotiations and then to negotiate, not on the status of Kosova, but about ending the murders and pacifying the situation! It is not impossible that, regardless of who is responsible for these operations, the Serbian regime will politically exploit the situation in its own favor, using as a ploy in possible talks with Kosova's legitimate representatives arguments on the lines of, "Look what other Serbian forces are offering Kosova!" The most recent acts of terrorism could be part of a broader scenario amd may have an entirely independent authorship: The purpose of raising the tensions in Kosova to boiling point could be to achieve definite strategic goals; either to bring to a head the problem of Kosova, making it worthy of an international settlement or to further destabilize the southern Balkans without the prospect of a solution for Kosova. Such hypothetical speculation is undesirable in politics, but cannot be excluded in the absence of firm facts and official confirmation. Now that even Albanian children have been swept up in the latest wave of murders in Kosova, any answer to the question of what will happen tomorrow is also hypothetical.

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Bulgaria: Videnov Comments on Russia, NATO Expansion

AU3004063496 Paris AFP in English 0113 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, April 30 (AFP)—Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov said Monday that Russia could not be allowed to "veto" moves by its former communist satellites to join NATO.

"We don't see Russia as a potential threat to our national security... That is why we don't motivate our position on NATO enlargement with such reasons, as do some European countries.

"On the other hand, it is obvious that the enlargement of NATO, the building of a new European security architecture, is a process in which no country should veto anything or set decision of its own.

"Our countries in central Europe and in the Balkans, such as Bulgaria have their own motives to prepare their own position on the future of European security structure and take free decisions of their own," he said.

The Bulgarian leader, flanked by Chancellor Franz Vranitzky was answering questions from members of the private Bruno Kreisky forum, shortly after arriving for a 36-hour visit.

"The NATO enlargement should be very well thought beforehand. It shouldn't at any stage create a deficit in security or new tensions, it should be calculated very carefully," he said.

Videnov said there was no prospect of Bulgaria one day joining countries like Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in a new process of association with Russia.

Such an idea was "totally unrealistic." There was no point in creating "new blocs" after doing away with the old ones, Videnov said.

Bulgaria: Pavlov Clarifies NATO Policy, Solana Visit

AU3004120996 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 30 Apr 96 p 3

[Staff report: "Cabinet Will Not Retreat From Position on NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "There is no change in the cabinet's policy regarding NATO," Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov said on 29 April. During the visit of NATO Secretary General Xavier Solana to Bulgaria, we will adhere to the 1995 statements of our prime minister and foreign minister regarding our willingness to participate in an intensified dialogue with NATO. We received NATO's study about its eastward expansion, clarified the questions we would like to discuss, and by the end of the year everything will be clear. I do not think that we should coordinate our positions on joining NATO with the other Balkan states, which are outside NATO. We shall present to Solana our position on NATO—precisely as it stands now. From what I understand, all political forces and certain individuals have decided to most seriously inform him on their positions on this matter. It is not true that the government will try to prevent Solana's meeting with representatives of the opposition. I have not dealt with his visit's program. I will participate in the 2 May talks at the Boyana Residence and the working lunch, which will actually be the continuation of the talks.

Bulgaria: BSP Official Demands Early Cabinet Shuffle

AU3004120896 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 30 Apr 96 p 2

[Interview with Yanaki Stoilov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, by Iva Petroni; place and date not given: "Three Ministries Are Dangerous for the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Petroni] Mr. Stoilov, when you were in Kurdzhali, why did you demand changes in the Finance, Interior, and Economics Ministries?

[Stoilov] Because recently the problems in the government have been deepening. One already senses that we are not only short of time, but also have a shortfall in confidence.

[Petroni] Confidence in whom: the party or the government?

[Stoilov] In the administration, but this inevitably also has an effect within the party. Accordingly, it is high time to prepare short-term programs to implement in practice the tasks that were set last March at the joint meeting of the Democratic Left deputies and party leaderships of the Left's coalition partners.

I fear that without changes in the executive—in its economic team, in the financial sphere, and in connection with the fight against crime—the present situation will not be overcome.

[Petroni] Does this mean that you want a change of ministers?

[Stoilov] The problems I have mentions concern a number of ministries. They can be resolved by changes at various levels, but the main responsibility lies with the ministers, to the extent that they have failed to do what is needed to surmount the problems. These expectations are addressed to them.

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[Petroni] When should the shuffle take place?

[Stoilov] The time for such actions and changes is now, before the spring is over, and no later, so that we avoid having to face a government crisis.

[Petroni] What will a government crisis mean?

[Stoilov] It may either test the stability of the entire government or deepen the crisis processes.

Bulgaria: Videnov Pressured To Make Cabinet Changes

AU3004105796 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 30 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "KONTINENT team": "The Left Will Pressure Videnov on 12 May To Make Cabinet Changes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—On 29 April, the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Executive Bureau decided that the BSP Supreme Council and the Left's National Assembly deputies will hold a plenum on 12 May to adopt a political concept on the structural reform in the national economy. Members of the Socialists' leadership claim that the issue of personnel changes in the cabinet will also be raised again at this forum.

On 28 April, Yanaki Stoilov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, said at a BSP municipal conference in Kyustendil that three ministers will have to be sacrificed now, or at the latest by the end of the summer. In Stoilov's opinion, personal changes are needed in the Interior, Economics, and Finance Ministries. They are needed to halt the falling away of the BSP membership and to overcome the growing crisis of confidence in the ruling Left. At the BSP Supreme Council plenum last March, which made an analysis of the government's first year in office, Videnov was advised to make changes in the Agriculture Ministry as well as in the above three ministries.

"No changes, which includes the cabinet, however important they may be, can be discussed before June," Prime Minister Zhan Videnov declared last night before flying off to Vienna. Prior to this, he said, the BSP has to resolve the problem of financial stabilization and start its active campaign to win the presidential elections.

Whatever the media may be told, Ministers Rumen Gechev, Dimitur Kostov, and Lyubomir Nachev are on their way out, a source at the BSP headquarters told KONTINENT. According to sources in the Left, Nikolay Kamov, chairman of the Parliamentary National Security Commission, will head the Interior Ministry and will be given the rank of deputy prime minister. Rumor has it that Dobrev has already declined to take Nachev's post, and a candidate is still being sought. Within the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group, the names of Socialist Deputies Tosho Mukhtanov and Stefan Stefanov are being mentioned in this connection. Deputy Prime Minister Rumen Gechev has reportedly been blamed for the great confusion, as a result of which 106 state companies with huge accumulated debts are only now to the liquidated with great delay. Professor Ivan Angelov is reportedly being groomed for his post, but most of the Socialist deputies do not approve of his candidature. Sources close to the prime minister claim that he has categorically refused to part with his Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov. However, when almost half of the banks go into insolvency, as is expected, Videnov will have no other choice.

If Zhan Videnov decided to be obstinate and postpone the cabinet changes until after the presidential elections, he may be signing his own resignation, sources in the Left say.

Bulgaria: Growing Criticism of Videnov Within BSP

AU2904124796 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 29 Apr 96 p 7

[Article by Mikhaela Vuzharova: "Hints Failed To Bring Videnov to His Senses; Now He Can Expect a Yellow Card"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During his year and a half as BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] leader, Videnov was unable to think of anything to consolidate the party and give it a sense of direction.

The BSP continues to waver between right-wing reforms and nostalgia, and the ideological rift is increasing between circles of friends and enemies of the party leader. The opposing camps exchange accusations of right-wing tendencies. Valentin Vatsev and other persons who act as Videnov's informal spokesmen accuse the former pro-perestroyka party leadership of having become a business elite that has plundered former state property. They retaliate with revelations concerning the "Orion octopus, which is constantly increasing its riches." As for the rank and file party members, over 60 percent of whom are pensioners with minimum monthly incomes of $20-25, they can only await the finale of the dispute at the top and the issue of the next stimulating party document.

The last document of this kind has this to say about pensions: They may be increased next year, "and by more than the rate of inflation," if the death rate is higher than expected. Under his other, prime-ministerial hat, Videnov has failed even more abysmally. His failure is even worse in view of the fact that he has a degree in economics.

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The lev is rapidly losing its value. The banks are disintegrating. The financial market is in a state of collapse. The state's dollar reserves are approaching the critical minimum of $500 million. There is now no shadow of a doubt that the budget will have to be revised, probably as early as May. The macroeconomic framework, cobbled together to please the international financial institutions, will disintegrate, taking with it all illusions about receiving stabilizing loans from abroad, although the prime minister's hostile attitude to the IMF and the World Bank (see the white paper) is now a thing of the past. Today, the government even pawns the state's gold reserves.

In all this confusion, Videnov cannot reiterate in his own justification the statement that until recently he found convenient to quote in disputes of all kinds, namely the claim of "minimal, but sustained economic growth" by such and such a percentage, because even accordi..g to the official statistics issued by Zakhari Karamfilov [director of the National Statistical Institute], different sectors of the economy reported declines varying between 5 and 9 percent in the first quarter.

Foreign investors, who in any event are harder to find than a needle in a haystack, have decided to pack their bags and leave our land. Rover has departed. The British evidently had little faith in the ability of Videnov's trusty lieutenant Rumen Gechev to give them advice about marketing. The government's comic explanations about the Rover affair perhaps go to show that only the cabinet has failed to grasp the situation.

Only the government, it seems, fails to grasp the ridiculousness of the term "economics-based foreign policy," which has been documented for future generations in the cabinet's administrative program. Precisely what business successes have been achieved in our relations with our neighbors, with the European Union, and with Russia?

The key goal of the program is still pending, namely Bulgaria's European integration, while no one dares to utter a word any more about euro-atlantic integration. We have recently been informed by Bonn that we need not expect to be taken off the Schengen black list in the near future. However, Videnov, naturally, did not see any reason to inform the public about this. This is typical of his style which also includes blaming someone else for everything that he has not done. In the beginning, he used the opposition as a scapegoat. Now, it is the turn of the media and the president to bear the brunt of his attacks. The public already realizes that things are not going too well; however, the party and state elite surrounding Videnov do not appreciate this. The prime minister has not been affected either by the elegant warnings issued by Lilov's circle of a possible extraordinary party congress, or by the instruction that the March BSP plenum issued to him, which still left him with his authority, namely "to implement the necessary changes in the system of the executive." Accordingly, he has to be given more severe warnings.

Thus we came to the Granitski affair, a grotesque party television spectacle, which was followed two days later by Yanaki Stoilov's direct reminder of the need to replace specific ministers by fixed deadlines.

Nevertheless, we may hardly expect any favorable turn in events for Bulgaria very soon, however persistently the media continue to mount all kinds of dramatic scenarios. Perhaps even some members of the top elite may sincerely want an extraordinary congress, for it must be clear to them that time is running out. The party apparatus is not ready, and the presidential elections are drawing closer.

There is no real prospect of Videnov initiating any major cabinet changes. According to all wings of the 100-year-old party, he is not ready for personnel changes, especially in the post that is taking the most flak—that of Interior Minister Nachev. Videnov will find it very difficult indeed to decide on a change here, because everyone knows how important this law-and-order ministry is when there is ferment in the lower ranks and a whiff of a coup d'etat at the top.

The only formula that seems to have any real likelihood of being employed is the one that the Roman emperors have handed down to us, namely "bread and circuses." In the present situation, we may see an elegant dissociation from the Orion group; for example, the prime minister might throw one of his advisers to the lions to please the mob. Until recently, this would have been possible, but the prime minister did not do it, and now this move is no longer open to him. Why not? Yanaki Stoilov has given the answer by declaring that the BSP cannot allow a further falling away of the party's membership.

Bulgaria: BSP Actions in Kurdzhali Criticized

AU3004085196 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 30 Apr 96 p 3

[Commentary by Fikrie Salifova: "Collapse of Restoration Starts in Kurdzhali"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] leaders have made a laughing stock of their party by making a complete about-face in their assessments of Bulgaria's law-dispensing system. The decision to quash the local elections in Kurdzhali was taken by Georgi

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Purvanov and company as proof of the judiciary's independence. However, the counterruling of the Supreme Court was viewed by them as a cynical deal. Proclaiming itself to be a nationally responsible political force, the 100-year-old party has proved by its reaction to the reversal of the election annulment decision that it has not yet grown up and cannot yet accustom itself to the idea that the law is supreme. Its nostalgia for the good old days, when the party-state decided what was lawful and what not, is quite evident. Today, the BSP and its allies are planning to mount a protest march and hold a symbolic burial of the independence of the Supreme Court in front of Kurdzhali Town Hall. This act, which is unlikely to remain unnoticed by world public opinion, will yet again cast a blemish on our country's image as it advances along the road of democratic reform. When a political force that rules the country obliterates the independence of the Supreme Court, commentaries are simply superfluous, because this is not merely a case of showing off one's muscles, but a much more frightening and dangerous message.

The "Future of Kurdzhali" Movement that was formed by the BSP and its friendly parties has declared that it remains firmly united and will continue the power struggle in Kurdzhali. Socialist leaders deny that they need this movement for the presidential elections, and predict a short term in office for the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms]. It is rumored that in early 1997 the BSP plans to detach enough territory from Kurdzhali to form a new municipality to prevent the DPS from taking power in Kurdzhali again. This is a new action by the party following its defeat. According to forecasts, the Socialist scenario in Kurdzhali will lead to a serious government crisis that may provoke early parliamentary elections. Georgi Purvanov is again expected to be in charge of the action. Until the action starts, he will conveniently forget his statement that he will accept the loss of power in Kurdzhali as a personal failure.

The verdict by the Supreme Court judges, who again demonstrated the independence of the Bulgarian judiciary, was regarded by the democratic forces in Kurdzhali as a triumph of justice. In a special declaration, the local SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] organization voiced its conviction that the decision negates the ethnically based voting that the BSP has tried to impose, which only provokes hatred and confrontation. The SDS members can understand the losers' discontent, the statement continues, because the collapse of restoration of the old regime is beginning in Kurdzhali. The local DPS headquarters confirmed that the intention to have a politically and ethnically variegated mayoral team in Kurdzhali remains in force. The political force that legally won the municipal electrons now has a chance to prove that the municipality has a democratic administration that is a guarantor for preserving Bulgarian statehood in the region. With their joint administration, the local democratic forces can eradicate the seeds of hatred sown by the BSP and show the population that they can work in the people's interest.

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Czech Republic: Solana Discusses Issues Related to NATO Entry

AU3004085596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Apr 96 p 8

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana by Michal Mocek in Brussels; date not given: "Collective Defense Is Cheaper, Says the NATO Secretary General"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels—According to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, who will visit Prague on Monday [29 April], the cost of membership in the alliance is less than establishing an individual defense. The dialogue with the individual countries—to be held this year—should also contribute toward ascertaining the costs of enlargement.

[Mocek] The visit to Prague is part of your series of travels throughout Central and East Europe. What is their objective?

[Solana] I have found the time to visit all of these countries as soon as possible. It is my intention to say to them that NATO is with them and that we want to share their considerations and concerns. I would also like to thank them for the role they are playing within IFOR [Implementation Force]. It is very impressive, and, for us, it is very important to see that the partner states—among them, your country in particular—are taking part in it. We will never forget this contribution.

[Mocek] During your visit to Warsaw, well-informed Polish sources stated that you promised Poland that it would be the first country from Central and East Europe to be admitted to NATO. Do you think that, during your visit to Prague, some well-informed source will say the same thing in relation to the Czech Republic?

[Solana] I cannot promise anything to any country. You know that we have embarked on the procedure to open up the alliance to new countries. This process is now unfolding. I can tell you that the Czech Republic has a very good discussion document for the individualized dialogue we will be holding before the end of the year. I am pleased with the material your country has submitted and, of course, with the transformation that is taking place there.

[Mocek] The British newspaper THE OBSERVER wrote recently that the alliance is ready to admit new states and, at the same time, to commit itself to the nondeployment of nuclear weapons and foreign troops on their territory. Is such a method for enlarging NATO possible?

[Solana] The decision to open up NATO to new members, which the alliance made in 1994, assumes that this will concern states that are able to become full members of the alliance. This is what it wants, and I think it is also the wish of the partners who want to join the alliance.

[Mocek] There are studies that estimate that enlarging the alliance will cost a great deal of money. Do you have any idea how to come to terms with this financial dimension of enlargement?

[Solana] It is very difficult to estimate precisely the possible costs of enlarging the alliance, either for NATO or for the individual countries. We have to conduct the individualized dialogue this year in order to ascertain what kind of adjustment these countries will have to make and what NATO will have to do in case we decide to open ourselves up. Changes in certain things are very clear. In any case, the cost of enlargement, the cost of membership in NATO is much less than if you were to develop your own forces yourselves. The alliance is an instrument of collective defense, and it is always cheaper to establish a defense collectively than independently.

[Mocek] Let us assume that NATO has decided to admit two or three new members. What will they have to do to become full-fledged and real members of the alliance?

[Solana] To become real members of NATO means taking on part of all of the alliance's commitments associated with full membership. You will have to have the agreement of all 16 of the alliance's current members. We have to wait until these members decide which countries will be invited. In the meantime, however, we are cooperating very positively and constructively—especially with your country. I would like to emphasize once more how much we value the cooperation with countries such as yours in promoting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Mocek] Last week, NATO dealt with the reform of its unified military structure. What consequences could this reform have for the new members?

[Solana] As you know, during the past four years, the alliance has gone through a profound transformation process. This process will continue. NATO has to adapt itself because it has new missions—Bosnia is a very good example here. It also has to adapt itself because it will open up to new members and because we would like to establish a European defensive identity within the framework of the alliance. NATO will maintain its main role, its main functions, and the most important elements of its structure.

[Mocek] Following your visit to Moscow, you said that you would like to devote 1997 to a discussion with Russia that would dispel its concerns about NATO. But

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is it possible to discuss this with a country that rejects any idea concerning the full-fledged admission of new countries into the alliance?

[Solana] The alliance has always declared that it is not its intention to create new dividing lines in Europe. Russia is an important country for Europe's stability, and we do not want to isolate it; we do not even think Russia wants to isolate itself. However, my view is that countries like yours will be able to make the decision on entering to NATO freely as sovereign states.

Czech Republic: Klaus on Border Law, Defense, Party Financing

AU2904144296 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 26 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Tomas Chalupa; place and date not given: "The Nonapproval of the Border Is Equivocation and a Willful Act"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Chalupa] Mr. Prime Minister, have you registered any reaction to the nonapproval of the constitutional law on the state border with Slovakia?

[Klaus] I have not yet registered any signals from abroad. I am only aware of my own feelings, and these are indeed disagreeable. I am convinced that the nonapproval of the change in the border with the Slovak Republic is a great pity, equivocation, and a willful act. This is an unequivocal repercussion of the absolute irresponsibility of our opposition parties.

[Chalupa] What kind of consequences will it have for the Czech Republic's international status?

[Klaus] I do not think it should have any measurable consequences. It will also not be manifested immediately. It is certain, however, that the Czech Republic has all of a sudden been pushed among the countries that have problems with their borders. You see, the world is incapable of telling whether this is a matter of a couple of square meters or whether it is well nigh a struggle over extensive territory. The basic thing is what is important: The border has not been defined definitively. [passage omitted]

[Chalupa] Minister Holan claims that the issue of defense has remained outside the government's interest. Has the government paid sufficient attention to this department?

[Klaus] First and foremost, it is necessary to state that each minister promotes himself the way he knows how. He presents as many materials as he is able to present, and he defends as many materials as he is able to defend. It is, unfortunately, true that, in the case of the materials from the Defense Ministry, we have had to contend more with their quality throughout this electoral period.

[Chalupa] The political parties have made public their economic performance and who made contributions to their coffers. This is certainly problematic. Do you think that the nonpublication of the details on the sponsors has provoked speculation that could, as a consequence, harm these parties?

[Klaus] I think this probably requires a change in the law on political parties and their financing. Unless this law stipulates something else, it is beyond doubt that each political entity will only do expressly what the law enjoins it and nothing more. So, I would incline toward a change in this law, and as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

[Chalupa] In connection with the visit by the Chinese foreign minister, the issue of this country's attitude toward human rights was again thrashed out. Do you think it is more effective to put forward our stance on this issue in public or in discreet diplomatic talks?

[Klaus] I personally would chose the second option. That is, I think that the more the circumstances of these talks are made public to the media, the less scope there is for such—I have to say—extremely delicate talks. So, in my opinion, the second option is more suitable.

[Chalupa] This visit became, in connection with human rights, a target of public criticism from several sides. Were these opinions not directed more toward our preelection plenum than toward China?

[Klaus] It is quite logical and normal that, at this time, every politician and political party is trying to feather his own nest. In brief, this is how it is, and it is impossible to prohibit someone from doing so.

Czech Republic: ODA Admits Not Knowing Identity of Major Sponsor

AU2904173396 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[Article by "(km)": "Like the ODS, the Alliance Does Not Know Who Its Main Sponsor Is"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] admitted yesterday that it does not know absolutely who its biggest foreign sponsor is. Last year, this sponsor sent it more than 3.3 million korunas [Kc].

ODA has now asked this donor to provide more detailed information about himself. It wants to avoid a potential scandal of the kind that has affected its coalition partner,

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the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], this week. The ODS's two biggest sponsors have turned out to be false.

"We are turning to our sponsor, whose details we specified in the annual financial report, to ask whether he will consent to publishing more information about himself," confirmed ODA Deputy Chairman Libor Kudlacek yesterday.

The ODA stated in its disclosure for parliament that its biggest sponsor is the TMC, Trade Management Company, firm from Vaduz in Liechtenstein. It deposited a sum of Kc931,560 in ODA's account at first, and later deposited a further Kc2,387,700.

Following a more thorough analysis of the information in ODA's annual financial report, however, it became clear that the TMC firm sent the money not from Vaduz, but from the distant island of Tortola in the Caribbean Sea. It is described as a tax haven because of its advantageous taxation rates. Tortola is part of a British-administered archipelago near Puerto Rico.

From the information that banking circles in Zurich in Switzerland have provided, it is clear that the TMC firm is an absolutely unknown company. If it exists at all, it is, according to their hypothesis, only registered on Tortola as the administrator of an account that in fact belongs to some businessman, probably in Liechtenstein.

The Alliance had problems with its donors last year. Apart from the Austrian Asamer-Hufnagl firm, whose details were also concealed and which donated a record Kc8.0 million to the Alliance in 1994, ODA also listed among its donors the Breda department store in Opava and the Ceska Lipa-based businessman Frantisek Rigo. Two years ago, the two sponsors donated Kc2,183,000 to the Alliance. In the case of Breda, however, it later turned out that one of the officials in Minister Dlouhy's department had unjustifiably granted the purchaser of the Opava department store, Kamil Kolek, a discount. Frantisek Rigo was, in turn, accused by the police of fraud because of machinations from the sale of cars.

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Slovakia: NATO's Solana Arrives, Hold Talks With Schenk

LD3004103096 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0500 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] NATO Secretary General Javier Solana arrived in Slovakia last night from Prague. [passage omitted] After a working dinner given by Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk, our colleague Jan Baranek asked Juraj Schenk for an interview:

[Begin recording] [Baranek] I asked Minister Juraj Schenk briefly to assess his meeting with Javier Solana last night.

[Schenk] I must say that before dinner we had an interesting one-on-one for almost half an hour in which we clarified some important issues. Then at the working dinner, which was also attended by Slovak Defense Minister Jan Sitek, we were able to come back to these issues and discuss their foreign political and military implications.

[Baranek] Did you also discuss Slovakia's chances for joining NATO? I am thinking of the problem regarding the U.S. Congress which has been recently discussed in the press.

[Schenk] I have already said on several occasions that NATO enlargement is not based on the same logic as the arguments used by our media and foreign media, nor is it based on prepared or intended law amendments in individual NATO countries. We did not discuss this at all today. Mr. Solana's attitude is well known; that is, with regard to the intended NATO enlargement, it is an organization prepared to accept everyone who applies for membership on the basis of an individual assessment of the applicant's degree of readiness.

[Baranek] Have you also discussed the objections of Russia to NATO expansion eastward?

[Schenk] We noted that no significant change has taken place. Neither NATO nor the Slovak Republic is interested in isolating Russia in any way or creating dividing lines. On the contrary, we want to persuade Russia that NATO enlargement does not pose a threat to Russia, that it is not an anti-Russian alliance or coalition, and that cooperation between NATO and Russia must be maintained. In this respect our positions are absolutely identical. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Migas Urges Respect for Russia's NATO Concerns

AU2904134996 Bratislava SME in Slovak 29 Apr 96 p 1

[Interview with newly elected SDL Chairman Jozef Migas by Jana Pankovcinova and Juraj Hrabko; place and date not given: "The Interests of Slovak Neighbors to the East Should Also Be Considered in Joining NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [SME] You have also worked in the diplomatic services under the present government of Vladimir Meciar, and many people consider you to lean toward the government. The SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] is, however, in opposition to this government.

[Migas] The delegates to the party congress were also interested in these questions. I presented them with a clear position—I am neither a Meciarite nor a representative of the prime minister. As ambassador, I worked as a representative of the state and of the president of the Slovak Republic, and I have implemented this type of policy, not a party one. Another issue is that I returned to the area of domestic policy, accepted the nomination, and declared my party position. Every person has the right to his world view and to enter politics.

[SME] A guest at the congress, J.F. Vallin, a member of the European Parliament, stated that Vladimir Meciar is an obstacle to Slovakia's entry into the EU. How do you interpret his statement? How do you feel about Slovakia's joining the EU and NATO?

[Migas] That is the opinion of a representative of the socialist faction in the European Parliament, and his interpretation. I believe that every Slovak political party is evaluated according to the politics it practices. On the question of integration into the EU, we will attempt to prepare our own idea of this process, and in doing so, will utilize all our foreign contacts.

[SME] Does this also apply to NATO?

[Migas] I accept the fact that the program documents show an orientation toward joining NATO. My personal position is that this cannot be done if it would mean deploying nuclear arms in our territory, because that would be a backward step and is not a solution acceptable at our level of civilization. It is necessary to master the economic and social aspects of this process and respect the interests of our eastern neighbors, so that it does not lead to a new partition of Europe.

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Slovakia: Official Views 'Debt-for-Equity Swap' With Russia

AU3004074596 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 27 Apr 96 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Secka, economic adviser of the National Property Fund vice president, by Pavol Vitko; place and date not given: "New Method of Unfreezing Russian Debt"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Engineer Vladimir Secka, economic adviser to the vice president of the National Property Fund [FNM], is, on the Slovak side, in charge of preparing a new plan for repaying the Russian debt. We asked him how the new system of payment would differ from the present one, which is based primarily on deliveries of Russian military equipment.

[Secka] It would be unreasonable if we compensated our claims with Russia only through the receipt of special equipment. There are three methods of unfreezing [deblokacie] a debt. Financial unfreezing means that the Russians would repay their debt in cash, on which we cannot rely. The second possibility is repayment with goods. The problem is that Russia does not want to supply to us with crude oil, for example, within the framework of debt repayment. It offers weapons systems, which we do not need right now. A third possibility remains—a debt-for-equity swap [kapitalizacia pohladavky]. This means that the Russian partner will enable Slovakia to obtain property stakes in companies it owns. The price of shares will be deducted from the debt.

[Vitko] What role will the FNM play in the financial unfreezing?

[Secka] When the Russian partner offers us shares in a privatized Russian company, the FNM will mediate this offer with selected interested Slovak parties. It must be emphasized that the initial acquirer of Russian firms' shares will be the FNM. Only after Slovak companies pay us for the shares will they become actual owners. The FNM must assure the Slovak Government that the unfrozen Russian debt will return to Slovakia's state budget.

[Vitko] According to available information, Russia owes us approximately $1 billion. What portion of this sum could Slovakia obtain through the debt-for-equity method?

[Secka] I would not dare state specific sums. I can only mention, for the sake of comparison, that the Czech Republic intends to capitalize $300 to $500 million of its claims in the Russian Federation. It is up to us how many projects we will be able to prepare. I believe that in our plans, we should come close to the volume planned by the Czechs.

[Vitko] In what areas does the debt-for-equity swap appear to have the best prospects?

[Secka] We see envision the export of Slovak goods as promising. We would therefore like to acquire in Russia, within the framework of the debt-for-equity swap, large-capacity storage facilities and medium-sized and large retail facilities to serve Slovak exporters of food and consumer goods. The debt-for-equity swap in the industrial sphere is more complicated because it depends directly upon the ability of Slovak companies to expand their operations. A breakthrough in this respect is the founding of Matador-Omskshina, a joint Slovak-Russian tire-manufacturing plant in Omsk, Siberia. This joint venture is outright revolutionary because the support of government structures in implementing this project was minimal. We have to do thei properly. We want to help major Slovak companies establish themselves in the Russian economy.

Slovakia: Bugar Explains Language Law, Ties to Opposition

AU3004100796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Bela Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, MKDH, by Nora Sliskova; place and date not given: "We Need Legal Guarantees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sliskova] You protested against the law on the state language on the grounds that it would violate ethnic minorities' rights. Do you have any specific signals that this has actually happened?

[Bugar] In its initial articles, the law states that it does not deal with the languages of minorities, but elswhere it defines areas in which the state language must be used. The languages of ethnic minorities are thus being pushed out of the levels at which they were proviously considered. We do, of course, have specific signals. The Ministry of Education is issuing circulars, with reference to the language law, which reduce the level of rights that we had until 1989, for example. According to a Ministry of Education decree, pupils from schools with Hungarian as the language of instruction will not be able to take admission tests for secondary schools in their mother tongue but only in the state language. There will no longer be bilingual report cards. The director of the Komarno school administration has issued a circular in which he warns that he would consider the spreading of untrue, alarming, or misleading reports as a gross breach of labor discipline. We do not know what kind

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of alarming reports to which he is referring. This simply creates an atmosphere of fear.

[Sliskova] The ethnic Hungarian parties have made no secret of their intention to turn over this matter to Strasbourg [Council of Europe]. Would it not be more reasonable if you tried to resolve it at home?

[Bugar] We are active at least on two levels. The possibility exists of appealing to the president, who had promised that in the case of a violation of minority rights, he would submit the language law to the Constitutional Court. Together with the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], we are preparing a separate submission to the Constitutional Court. On the other hand, the law is being enacted and we have a specific negative experience. This is why we want to inform the Council of Europe. We will turn, first and foremost, to the Council of Europe and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] experts who come to Slovakia to monitor the observance of minority rights.

[Sliskova] Are you going to Strasbourg to defame Slovakia?

[Bugar] Certainly not. Recently, we initiated a meeting with the prime minister, at which the use of minority languages was raised, apart from other issues. I can tell you something about the level at which these talks were held. The prime minister simply told us a joke, and with that he justified the necessity of passing the language law. What I want to say is that when we cannot find a partner on domestic soil ready to listen to our arguments and to discuss problems, we have to look for other solutions. Likewise, it is the obligation of international institutions monitoring developments in Slovakia to take an interest in how democratic principles are being applied. After all, we want to get into the EU, and it follows that we must adjust our legal system.

[Sliskova] The policies of ethnic Hungarian parties smack of a certain separatism. They are oriented only toward the Hungarian minority; that is, to the Hungarian parties' own membership base. This essentially separates citizens of Hungarian nationality from citizens of Slovak nationality. Do you not consider this is against integration?

[Bugar] You are right. We realize that such an opinion exists in Slovak society. There are, however, two sides to every coin. When no one puts his hands on what we have, we are silent. It is a question of action and reaction, in fact. It would be very good for us if we had partners for cooperation—opposition parties, for example, with which we would be able not only to discuss the affairs of the Hungarian minority, but also to resolve them. An artificial atmosphere has recently been created here, mainly through Meciar's government's influence, as though, on the one side, there were Hungarians who only take care of themselves and wish this country ill, and, on the other, Slovaks. The Slovaks, in turn, are being divided into good and bad. I consider this dangerous. According to a survey, 7 percent of our voters in the last elections were Slovaks, which shows that they consider our party's policy good. We also participate in joint opposition meetings. We do not want to separate ourselves but, unfortunately, sometimes our steps look as if we are emphasizing the minority issue excesssively. But I repeat—when our rights are violated, we have to react.

[Sliskova] You mentioned the opposition. Recently, severe criticism was addressed to it from your ranks. Was it not a result of the opposition parties' failure to support some of your steps?

[Bugar] We want cooperation. It requires, however, that everyone compromise on something. Political parties must realize that we need legal guarantees in education and culture. We are not going to retreat on this because we have nowhere to retreat to. When the opposition parties have a certain opinion on some issue, we are expected automatically to support this opinion. On the other hand, the opposition parties did not support some of our steps; for example, regarding the administrative and territorial arrangement. We explained to them that if they want cooperation, they must realize that its concept must also include our ideas. It therefore hurt us when, during the passage of the language law, some parties simply were scared of being branded as enemies of the Slovak nation. The Democratic Union, for example, now claims, on the basis of its own analyses, that it should have voted differently.

[Sliskova] The opposition parties give the impression of being parties at variance. On what principle should they unite, in your opinion?

[Bugar] We jointly reject the authoritative method of executing power, the present privatization methods, the government's course of action in foreign policy. I could go on and on. In the citizens' perception, we are uniting on the basis of our opposition to Meciar. This is not true. We want more, and must give more; that is, we must prepare an alternative showing which individual steps we would take in all areas, including minority policy. We must join forces today because, later on, the voter will not know for whom to vote. It is necessary to convince the voter that his vote will not get lost. As I travel across Slovakia, I hear calls for cooperation everywhere. The opposition parties should simply sit down and prepare a concept for each area because D day will come one day and must not catch us unprepared.

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[Sliskova] You speak about the need for unity. On the other hand, however, one can see disagreements even among the ethnic Hungarian parties. You, for example, want cultural and school self-administration, while the Coexistence Movement wants public administration autonomy [verejnospravna autonomia]. What is the citizen supposed to think about this?

[Bugar] At a meeting of the Hungarian Coalition Council, we agreed to work out a joint autonomy concept before the year is out. It is not good when everyone has a different idea. We should then submit this concept to individual parties and to citizens for them to know what we actually want. We know that fear of autonomy exists in Slovakia. We must simply put this fear out of their minds.

Slovakia: Hungarian Group Sends Kovac Letter on Language Issue

AU2904162496 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 27 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "ns": "It Is the President's Turn Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The parties of the Hungarian Coalition yesterday sent a letter to the president of the Republic in conjunction with the law on the state language, in which they ask him to keep his promise and turn this matter over to the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic.

After signing the language law in November, Michal Kovac declared through his spokesman that he regards this piece of legislation as the enactment of the article of the Constitution stating that the Slovak language is the state language on the territory of the Slovak Republic. At the same time, however, he is convinced of the need to pass a law that would regulate the use of other languages in dealings with the authorities and expects the government to submit such a law to parliament as soon as possible. Should this not happen or should ethnic minorities' rights be violated after the law on the state language becomes effective, the president is prepared to submit the law to the Constitutional Court.

According to recent statements by representatives of ethnic Hungarian political parties, the valid language has repeatedly violated the rights of the Hungarian minority, which is why they decided to turn to the president. Together with the Christian Democratic Movement, they are also preparing their own submission to the Constitutional Court. They will also inform the Council of Europe about the violation of their rights.

Slovakia: SNS Disagrees With HZDS Proposal on Elections

AU29041602796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 27 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "ao": "Majority System Is Premature"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Replying to a question from PRAVDA at yesterday's briefing of the Slovak National Party [SNS], Deputy Bartolomej Kunc described the intention to change the current proportional electoral system into a majority or a combined system as a certain shift in the opinion of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] on this important political issue. No coalition consultations on this issue have been held thus far, which is why the SNS does not intend to issue any official statement on it. According to B. Kunc, however, the time is not yet ripe for a change of the electoral system because our political scene has not become stable yet. He said that Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar is an optimist when he believes that two large political entities will be formed in a short time. This process cannot be accelerated. As regards amending the law on local elections, the National Council of the Slovak Republic deputy said that the amendment would still be prepared this year. Its aim is to solve the unbearable situation in areas with an ethnically mixed population where one ethnic community has already twice usurped self-administration without making it possible for representatives of other ethnic groups to participate in it.

Slovakia: Bratislava Rally Protests Amendment to Penal Code

AU2904091896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Josefina Kassova: "Totalitarianism Again Lies it Wait"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The organizers of yesterday's evening rally for freedom of expression at the Bratislava Slovak National Uprising Square decided to do more than just voice their protest against the Penal Code Amendment. There were four tough looking men standing on the platform in leather coats, black hats, and glasses. They had everything under control. Their colleagues walked through the crowd next to the barriers with a cardboard TV camera marked LEXA VISION. They also had, as every proper TV crew should, a microphone and a recorder. They almost gave one lady a heart attack. The speakers—a former Zilina prosecutor, black baron [member of the "politically unreliable" army units under the former regime, not allowed to serve with arms] V. Kolnik among them, as well as V. Pavlik, P. Marianek from the HUMAN movement, B. Uhlar from

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the Stoka theater, and others—unanimously rejected the adoption of the controversial articles of the amendment dealing with the protection of the Republic. The nearly 2,000 participants called for protests—"while there is time." According to Kolnik, "totalitarianism again lies in wait in this country. It is rubbing its hands and spreading fear." Pavlik compared the present situation with the regimes of Hitler and Gottwald [first communist president of Czechoslovakia]. An elderly lady, who described the speakers as scum, attempted in vain to shout them down. All the speakers were escorted from the platform by the men in leather coats. A message was sent from the meeting to those who intend to misuse the Penal Code and the low level of legal awareness: "Do not expect us to help you in the disassembly of the democratic legal state. The storm that you want to raise against the opposition will sweep you away. This is what happens to tyrants."

Slovakia: Approved Version of Foundations Bill Criticized

AU2604083096 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 25 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Lubos Jurina: "Third Sector Board's Objections to the Government's Bill on Foundations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Third Sector Board has fundamental objections to the bill on foundations that the Government of the Slovak Republic approved at its meeting on 23 April. Helena Wolekova, a member of the Board, informed NARODNA OBRODA about these objections. According to Wolekova, the proposed law does not deal with the support of foundations' activities, but contains a number of strict provisions that restrict their activity and the use of their property. "At the same time, their chances of acquiring property have not been improved, by means of amending provisions of the tax legislation, for example. Quite the contrary, the bill discourages donors from becoming involved," H. Wolekova said.

The proposed law makes it incumbent upon foundations to prove from which sources they acquired their property, as well as its origin. "Founders, donors, and contributors are being placed a priori in the position of cheats. We cannot imagine how a foundation will actually establish cooperation with a businessman when, simultaneously with the request to support a certain project of benefit to the general public, it will have to ask for evidence of the origin of the donated money," Wolekova said.

Equally contentious are the articles regulating the issue of foundations' donors. On the one hand, the bill protects the donors' anonymity, on the other, the foundation is under the obligation to hand the list of donors over to the internal revenue office. "We do not understand why. He who wants to use it as a tax-deductible item will do so in his tax return, for which he will have a record from the foundation confirming the receipt of the donation. The internal revenue office will get the confirmation. If someone does not want to use it as a tax-deductible item, it is his business. We see therein an endeavor to obtain lists of donors and, so far, no one has refuted this view," Helena Wolekova said.

The Third Sector Board also objects to the foundations' obligation to avail themselves of basic assets (paid in by the foundation's founder] of at least 100,000 korunas [Sk], without being able to use these assets as collateral in the event of temporary shortage of funds. Moreover, the proposed law does not permit foundations to constitute more freely their bodies and to draw funds for running costs according to the diverse activities they perform.

The Third Sector Board will therefore carry on its SOS campaign, declared in mid-January. Within the framework of this campaign, it is preparing, among other things, discussions with National Council of the Slovak Republic deputies.

[The government-approved version of the bill on foundations is also subject of a 400-word interview with Pavol Demes, "spokesman" for the Third Sector Board, by Ivan Ceredejev in Bratislava PRACA in Slovak on 25 April on page 2. The place and date of the interview, published under the headline "Protest Campaign Will Be Directed at Parliament," are not given. Demes says, among other things: "I must say that, contrary to Minister Liscak's words, no one from the Board cooperated on this version of the bill, which had been prepared by the Ministry of Justice. Our comments have not been accepted either. The changes that the ministry's version underwent in the government's Legislative Council on the basis of our draft were quite insignificant. The government bill contains a number of provisions that do not stimulate the foundations' activity and make it more transparent but, quite the contrary, are of a very restrictive nature and do not facilitate, but complicate, their activity." Asked about specific objections to the bill, Demes replies: "The greatest objections concern the issue of registration. Although the originally proposed two-tier system (registration by the responsible department and, subsequently, by the Ministry of Interior) has formally been changed (foundations are to be registered only by the Ministry of Interior, but the ministry can request an evaluation from the responsible government department), we have from the beginning been proposing registration by a nonstate agency, that is, by an independent court."]

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Slovakia: Tank Manufacturer's 1995 Results Noted

AU2904123796 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 26 Apr 96 p 3

[Report by TASR: "ZTS TEES Martin State Enterprise Wants To Double Production"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Martin—The production volume of ZTS [Heavy Engineering Works] TEES [Turcianske Engineering Works] Martin state enterprise, one of the most important engineering companies in Slovakia, totaled 2 billion korunas [Sk] last year. The enterprise produced 774 tractors, 172 wheeled forestry tractors, 189 BELAZ engines, 1,441 Lombardini engines, 39 building machines, and special equipment worth Sk484.8 million. It employs a staff of 4,674, of whom 2,800 are production and blue-collar workers. The average monthly salary is Sk6,796.

ZTS TEES wants to achieve a production volume totaling Sk4 billion this year; that is, double last year's output. Last year the company halted its decline in production, although some of its operations are running at only 50 percent capacity. In the machine and Lombardini divisions, two-shift operations are being introduced again. Favorable trends have also been making themselves felt in the volume of sales, economic results, and cost-intensive production methods. This allowed the company to reduce the loss to Sk545.486 million. According to Jaroslav Balogh, deputy director in charge of production, ZTS TEES Martin expects a profit of Sk42 million next year. After the year 2000, the annual profit should exceed Sk500 million.

Slovakia: Unauthorized Grain Exports Result in Shortages

AU2904154096 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 27 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Jozef Sedlak: "We Must Import Grain at Sk5,000 Per Metric Ton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To be on the safe side, we will import 100,000 metric tons of feed grain, Minister of Agriculture Peter Baco told members of the Club of Agricultural Journalists operating under the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists at a working breakfast yesterday. This insurance policy should also provide some security in the event of possible mistakes in statistics or record-keeping. The imported grain will not be cheap. Until 15 May, 1 metric ton of feed wheat will be sold for 5,000 korunas [Sk] and 1 metric ton of corn for Sk5,700. After this date, imported grain will be more expensive. Just for comparison, the free market price of domestically grown feed wheat is now around Sk4,000 per metric ton.

In the opinion of Minister Baco, enterprises that are short 5-10 percent of grain will have no great economic problems paying world market prices for grain. Producers with minimal feed stocks will be worse off because expensive grain will reduce their ability to compete on the market of animal products. The minister also said that 260,000 metric tons of grain had been exported without the state's consent. Why this happened is now being examined by the Supreme Inspection Office and the Government Office. Strict sanctions will be imposed against the culprits.

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Hungary: Kovacs: Ties to Slovakia Not Helping Integration Efforts

LD3004094596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0800 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs has denied speculation that Richard Holbrooke will mediate between Hungary and Slovakia.

It is true the U.S. diplomat left Budapest for Pozsony [Bratislava] and asked Hungarian leaders about the situation of the basic treaty, but mediation is out of the question, Laszlo Kovacs told the TV program "Daybreak."

Also, the foreign minister believes the present relationship between Hungary and Slovakia does not improve either country's chances for European integration. According to Laszlo Kovacs, however, relations are not problematic on the whole; there are positive signs such as improving trade and economic cooperation and the opening of new border crossing points.

Hungary: Poll Assesses Popularity of Politicians in Apr

AU3004094896 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 Apr 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Gyula Horn Is Going Up, Jozsef Torgyan Down"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The most interesting—we could say, sensational—result of the Szonda Ipsos company's public opinion poll on politicians' popularity in the first half of April (survey date: 5-15 April 1996) is the fact that Jozsef Torgyan [chairman of the Independent Smallholders Party, FKGP] took a deep plunge and Gyula Horn rose on the popularity list. Horn gained 10 points and Torgyan lost 10 points in one month. Mostly the voters of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] and the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] turned away from Torgyan: His score dropped by 18 to 20 points among them.

Torgyan's popularity index has not been this low since the 1994 parliamentary elections. As a results of his 14 March speech, he lost as much from his popularity in a month as he managed to gain in six months when his popularity was going up in the second half of 1994. The current change is mainly due to the fact that the proportion of those who find him very unfavorable (giving grade 1) increased a lot, but the fact that the proportion of those who find him favorable (grade 5) decreased has also played a role in his fall. In March, some 32 percent of the population gave an explicitly negative assessment on Torgyan, and this figure was 43 percent in April. At the same time, strongly positive feelings were expressed by 19 percent a month ago and 12 percent now.

His assessment became less favorable in all strata of society and, interestingly, the strata that formed his voting basis—people with the basic level of education, skilled workers, and those living in villages—was even more critical than the average. People with university degrees have the worst opinion of him; their mere 16 points indicates this. Only the antagonistic feelings of the Alliance of Free Democrats' [SZDSZ] and Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] voters can be compared to this, he received 13 points from the former and 15 from the latter group. Views on Torgyan differ mostly according to party sympathies: Government party voters firmly reject him, the opinion of the opposition parties' voters is moderately negative (30 to 35 points), and the FKGP voters virtually adore Torgyan (84 points).

Horn has returned to the level he was at before the announcement of the Bokros package. We have only seen such a large increase of sympathy from one month to another in connection with Mrs. Magda Kovacs Kosa, on her resignation; the changes are usually minor. A number of direct and indirect factors were needed for this: a victorious congress, a new finance minister, an interview with a popular television personality, and a Torgyan rally. In March, some 22 percent found the prime minister very unfavorable, but this decreased to 17 percent by April. At the same time, the number of those giving a positive assessment has increased, the proportion of those expressing much favor grew from 10 percent to 19. The opinion of people with low level of schooling and of elderly people changed more than the average. The MSZP voters have a very good opinion of Horn (84 points), he has a medium-level popularity among SZDSZ and Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party voters (49 points each), while antagonistic feelings are dominant among voters of other parties (35 to 40 points).

Popularity of Politicians

	Confidence	Recognition	Change
1. Arpad Goncz	76	96	1
2. Gabor Demszky	63	90	1
3. Gyorgy Keleti	61	82	- 2
4. Peter Medgyessy	61	82	- 1
5 Gabor Kuncze	60	92	0

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	Confidence	Recognition	Change
6. Magda Kovacs Kosa	58	79	0
7. Ivan Peto	54	90	3
8. Viktor Orban	54	91	3
9. Tamas Deutsch	53	82	- 1
10. Gyula Horn	53	96	10
11. Zoltan Gal	52	74	1
12. Imre Szekere	49	73	4
13. Sandor Nagy	49	80	2
14. Jozsef Szajer	48	57	1
15. Sandor Csintalan	46	68	2
16. Gyorgy Giczy	44	65	- 2
17. Sandor Lezsak	43	76	- 1
18. Tibor Fuzessy	43	51	- 3
19. Tamas Isepy	43	50	- 2
20. Agnes Maczo	40	80	- 5
21. Ivan Szabo	40	84	0
22. Lajos Fur	39	87	- 4
23. Peter Boross	35	90	0
24. Jozsef Torgyan	33	96	- 10

Hungary: 'Tough Winter' Upset Foreign Economic Balance

AU3004125196 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 30 Apr 96 p 1

[Unattributed report on Central Statistical Office data on economic performance in the first months of 1996: "Winter Has Upset the Foreign Balance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the economic processes experienced in 1995 continued more or less at the beginning of 1996, the foreign economic balance deteriorated, and the increase in exports lagged behind the increase in imports in the first months of 1996. Consumer prices in the first quarter of 1996 increased by 27.6 percent compared with the same period in 1995. At the same time, the Central Statistical Office report points out that the constant increase in industrial production can be regarded as a result of last year's economic stabilization.

The Central Statistical Office report also shows a drop in domestic demand for industrial products, but exports are increasing, so the growth in this sector of the economy took place as a result of the dynamic 14-15 percent increase in exports. With the exception of the energy and chemical industries, domestic sales dropped in all industrial sectors. The drop is particularly big in the engineering industry; the outstanding increase in exports made the engineering industry the most dynamically developing industrial sector.

However, the export dynamics do not overcome the increase in imports. As the Central Statistical Office points out, the economic balance showed a contradictory state in the first quarter of 1996: The foreign economic balance has deteriorated, but the domestic economic balance has improved. The foreign trade balance showed a deficit of $629 million in the first two months of 1996, because exports increased by 5.5 percent while imports increased by 11 percent. The import of energy played a considerable role in this deficit, and this is connected with the tough winter rather than with the state of the Hungarian economy.

The Central Statistical Office report thinks that the continued improvement in industrial productivity is a positive trend, because this growth took place with decreasing personnel, so production per capita of employee grew by 10 percent in January and February 1996. The real wages of industrial employees dropped by 6 percent. In February, unemployment benefits and benefits paid to unemployed people starting their careers increased by 4 percent compared with the same period last year. In real value, this means a drop of close to 25 percent.

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B-H: Former PM Silajdzic Views SDA, Chances for Peace

AU2804193596 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 24 Apr 96 p 14

[Interview with Haris Silajdzic, former Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister and opposition leader, by Lidija Soldo in Sarajevo; date not given: "The SDA Wants To Create a Small State for Muslims, Which in Fact Would Only Harm Muslims Very Much. I Am Not Playing a Political Game With Izetbegovic Because the SDA Now Behaves Like the Communists Did Earlier"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently, Haris Silajdzic, former Muslim prime minister, officially registered the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in that way confirmed his break with the ruling Party of Democratic Action [SDA]. The Bosnian public, but also analysts of political events, are in a dilemma—is this merely a clever political maneuver of former partners Haris Silajdzic and Alija Izetbegovic, or has the disagreement with the hard wing of the SDA forced Silajdzic to this radical move? We talked with Haris Silajdzic in the offices of his new party in Sarajevo, in the building of the "Unis" company.

[Soldo] Your party's registration is interpreted as an attempt to "collect" the votes of that part of the Muslim people which does not agree with radical changes in the SDA, which sees Islam as the primary interest of the people. Is your breakup with Izetbegovic only a political game?

[Silajdzic] No, it is no political game! I do not do that sort of thing. There are other ways to collect votes. There was certainly no agreement, which of course does not exclude the possibility of future cooperation with Izetbegovic and the SDA on issues which concern the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as, for example, the Declaration for the Undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was signed recently. We will cooperate with all parties, including the SDA, which have something in common with the program of our party.

[Soldo] What preceded the signing of the Declaration on Undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Silajdzic] There arose a question with regard to the disintegration processes which have been going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether Bosniaks, i.e., Muslims, are in favor of Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining undivided. There are, of course, right-wing forces within the SDA which are in favor of the creation of a small Muslim state here. That would only harm—even materially harm—the Muslim people, because that way of thinking is precisely the reason that no money arrived here. The world simply asked itself why they should send any soldiers at all if we are divided into three parts. I am convinced that Bosnia cannot be divided, although it does look divided today. At that, it is certain that Muslims are the cohesive element which will significantly influence the survival of the unified Bosnia. It will be hard, but the messages from Pale, that they would give us a little space because we multiply too much, will not come true.

[Soldo] Besides advocating an undivided Bosnia, what are the principles and the program of your party and in what points are you different from the SDA?

[Silajdzic] First of all in the widening of the democratic basis of decisionmaking in institutions. The sort of democracy which will come from below, and not from above, the way it was done in the SDA, where decisions were made and presented only by a few people. This party will bring about a "Europeanization" of Bosnian politics in a positive sense. The complete depolitization of the army is also in our party's program. And, of course, the most important principle—the effort to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unified state. Simply, that is the historical task of all of us in this region, because now disintegration processes are taking place, and these need to be stopped. If not, the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina will remain only on paper, whereas in practice a definite division will occur. We Bosniaks will never agree to that.

We have once again been brought into a situation in which the smell of war can be felt, because such stalemate positions can only be solved through war. If the principle of division on the basis of ethnicity is introduced in this region—and, as you can see, in Bosnia that can only be carried out with a lot of blood—then tragedies will happen again. And this time, I am convinced, they will not stop at the borders of this country. So, if it comes to a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three parts, which is taking place now, if it comes to a cultural, geographical, and political homogenization of the three entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is a total division, then we will come into a situation in which we will no longer be able to talk about the common, unified state.

[Soldo] Analysts of Bosnian circumstances warned before the breakout of armed conflicts that forming national parties would result in war. Since at that time you were in the Muslim SDA, you obviously thought differently than you do today. Do you feel responsible for everything that has happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Silajdzic] First, at that time the SDA was something different compared to the party it has become today. I joined that party at that time in order to fight against

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the one-party system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because at that time the rule of communists was an obstruction for individuals and led us into collectivism. Unfortunately, it seems that it has all happened once again and that today we have the SDA, which behaves exactly the way the communists did earlier. That is, we have the one-party system! What caused war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was prepared aggression; its goal was to divide the country, and the instrument for its implementation was the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army].

[Soldo] When you mention the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, do you believe that the initiative and responsibility for that are only in Belgrade, or was a similar concept made in the Croatian political leadership as well?

[Silajdzic] I am convinced that that famous Karadjordjevo agreement [on division of Bosnia, from 1991] between Tudjman and Milosevic is being implemented now, but I am also convinced that they will not manage to realize it. That is where the new danger lies. Nobody can divide Bosnia, and if those forces do not realize that, war will break out again. In that case, I am not sure if the people in Serbia will remain untouched, and if they will still hear about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in coffee houses only, as they have done up to now.

[Soldo] It is a fact that Belgrade did raise its voice against the war in Bosnia. How much do people know about that in Sarajevo?

[Silajdzic] I know that there have been some honorable people, and we know who those people are. But it is appalling that the intellectual circles in Serbia practically did not say a word about the genocide which the Muslim people experienced. And those who did react had little response. For example, do people in Serbia know about the existence of Serb concentration camps, about the participation of numerous "weekend" soldiers from Novi Sad, Uzice, Belgrade, some of whom we captured, and who were killing our people here in Bosnia? The result is 200,000 dead people. That is why Muslims cannot be driven into a corner, because in that way they would lose all their advantages, their spirit, and spirit is what has brought victory in this war.

[Soldo] You only speak about Serb crimes. It is indisputable that all sides in this war had their fanatics.

[Silajdzic] Of course, the Croat right wing has done its part, and at this moment we have a widened Croatia on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I always repeat that. Not because I have forgotten the danger which threatens from Serbia—I never forget that for one moment—but because within the federation we are political partners, and yet the reality is such that the parts which are under the control of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] more resemble Croatia, with all the symbols of the Croatian state, than they resemble Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Soldo] The position of Serbs in Sarajevo, but in other places as well, which have been under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, has not been envious during the four years of war. Do you agree?

[Silajdzic] There have probably been some extremists among Muslims as well, but it is a fact that, after the horrible cataclysm which the Serbs under the control of the Pale leadership have inflicted upon us in Sarajevo, such things were inevitable. Of course, I do not think that they are justifiable. Although I expected that one day the Bosniak people would explode, after all the suffering they have gone through, and that they would say "we also know how to kill and to rape," that did not happen. I am happy that Bosniaks, and of course a part of Croats and Serbs, have remained the civilizing factor in this region.

It is a fact that Serbs lived and still live in Sarajevo and in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and nothing has happened to them, although it could have. It is a fact that Orthodox and Catholic objects have been preserved here, and damages were repaired at the initiative of my government. Not one mosque has been preserved in the Serb entity. They have all been destroyed. They have been destroyed by people who have no spirit.

[Soldo] You speak about undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina all the time. However, it is a fact that it is divided; it has, after all, been divided by the Dayton agreement as well.

[Silajdzic] The Dayton agreement has two aspects. One is oriented towards integration, and the other one towards disintegration. The international community has in a way accepted the results of genocide. On the other hand, it has also admitted the fatal mistake it has made in relation to Bosnia, namely, that all the time we had the embargo on the import of arms, which now, fortunately, has finally been lifted. The events at Bijeljina, or at Zvornik, the suffering of our people, will never happen again. Because now we are in a situation to strike back.

[Soldo] Do you think that among Bosnian Serbs there are political parties and individuals with whom you can cooperate?

[Silajdzic] A few days ago I was in Tuzla, and I met Miodrag Zivanovic and Milorad Dodik. Those are people with whom it is possible to talk and to cooperate. I am certain that there are many more such people, and that those people will make it possible for Bosnia-Herzegovina to become a democratic country.

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[Soldo] You have stayed on the political scene, and one can expect to see you as a candidate in the coming elections. Do you think that it will be possible to carry out a democratic preelection campaign?

[Silajdzic] The most important thing is to prepare a good atmosphere for the elections. Today it is a one-party atmosphere, and radio and television are under the absolute control of the ruling SDA.

[Soldo] Still, you were one of those who refused the international community's and Carl Bildt's offer to enable equal treatment of all parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Silajdzic] I believe that it is much better, if they are really ready to give us means, to invest those means, in forming the second channel of the Bosnia-Herzegovina television which could be seen throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, this offer was not accepted, because that would turn out to be the second television of IFOR [Implementation Force] or of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], which nobody would watch. I wonder why they should be the ones to make our television programs.

B-H: SDA Official Certain of Election Victory

AU2904205196 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 96 p 5

[Interview with Husein Zivalj, SDA deputy chairman and Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador in Austria, by Faruk Cardzic in Sarajevo; date not given: "Examples in Modern Western Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the last session of the Main Committee of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], Husein Zivalj, Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Vienna, was elected its new deputy chairman.

We spoke about current developments and the problems facing our diplomatic corps with Zivalj in the new building housing the SDA headquarters.

[Cardzic] How do you see the situation in the party of which you are deputy chairman? Is it stable, mobile, or what?

[Zivalj] When it comes to the SDA in this post-Dayton period, that is probably one of the most expected and delicate questions. In my view, the situation in the party is mobile, although it could be described in other terms.

[Cardzic] The first part of the struggle for an independent and unified Bosnia-Herzegovina is over. With what results is the SDA entering the second part of the struggle?

[Zivalj] I am not sure that the party managed to find all the right answers within its ranks in the first part of that struggle for the survival of Bosnia.

Party Qualities

[Cardzic] Unless some unexpected problems crop up, elections should be held soon.

[Zivalj] The period prior to the elections and everything else that the Dayton creators had worked out are very fraught with uncertainties for us, and I am afraid that they could have very negative consequences in the future, particularly after the elections.

[Cardzic] How is the SDA prepared to enter the rest of the struggle for Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zivalj] I think that everything that we had done up to Dayton, when the people mobilized to the full mostly thanks to the SDA, astonished both the military and political analysts in the West. However, it seems to me that for this second part of the struggle, we have neither the energy nor the enthusiasm, no wisdom or craftiness, I would say, to respond adequately to the challenges and hidden traps of the Dayton peace.

[Cardzic] What would you single out now as SDA qualities?

[Zivalj] That it is a fact that the SDA is still the political party with the largest following in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it is the party that led the people, that provided the logistics, formed and organized the army, and finally entered the Dayton agreement decidedly and readily so that it can now in peacetime do what it did not manage to do in battle.

[Cardzic] What did the SDA fail to do?

[Zivalj] I think that, during these four or five years that have seen the struggle for the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the party has not managed to organize itself from within, to stabilize its ranks, and to resemble modern European parties.

[Cardzic] So that is not one of the party's qualities. How do you explain that?

[Zivalj] The party simply did not have the time. A lot of will, effort, and work will indeed be needed to make certain corrections in this short period.

Putting the Skeptics Right

[Cardzic] Is the formation of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina an epilogue to the inner disorganization?

[Zivalj] I think commentaries to that effect are wrong. The formation of that party hides a struggle for power.

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[Cardzic] Was the rally in Zenica, which was addressed by President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Muratovic, SDA's answer to the convention of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zivalj] No. President Izetbegovic had been calling for such a rally for a long time. That was delayed, primarily owing to the president's illness. However, it was time the president appeared in public to prove wrong those skeptics that believed that he had withdrawn from public and political life.

[Cardzic] You are ambassador to Vienna. What kind of a diplomatic and consular apparatus does Bosnia-Herzegovina have?

[Zivalj] From the day we formed the Foreign Ministry, we have not managed to set up the kind of embassies and consulates that would promote the interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the extent of its needs.

[Cardzic] Bosnia-Herzegovina for the first time has a foreign minister from the ranks of the Croat people.

[Zivalj] I had been warning that such a choice could cause certain misunderstandings and shifts, even destabilization in areas that are very important to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The post-Dayton period has just complicated things further. I think it is high time that all the regional work is systematized and the right people selected. [sentence as published]

Ambassadorial Heritage

[Cardzic] Does Bosnia-Herzegovina have such people?

[Zivalj] No, we do not have such people. Considering that we also have to meet the Dayton provisions, the problem becomes much more complex. I am not a great optimist in that respect.

[Cardzic] You replaced Hadzo Efendic as ambassador to Vienna. Have you really inherited all the problems created by Efendic during his Vienna mandate as the Bosnia-Herzegovina media have been suggesting?

[Zivalj] You have to know that Vienna is the center of European diplomacy but also the center of European espionage. It is really hard to meet all the complex challenges of Vienna. I think Efendic tried to do the best he could.

[Box, p 5]

There Is No Doubt We Will Win

[Cardzic] Mr. Zivalj, who will win the elections?

[Zivalj] There is no doubt that the SDA will win; the only question is with what result. For me, the most important thing is that the Bosniak people after the elections enter the parliament with an absolute majority. That is the only way the Bosniak people can capitalize on the achievements from the times when we fought for Bosnia-Herzegovina with guns in our hands.

B-H: Tuzla Parties Threaten Election Boycott Over New Rules

AU2904174196 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 27 Apr 96 p 4

[Report by M. Mukic: "Boycott Threats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One by one, the political parties are voicing dissatisfaction with the election rules, either in general, or just with particular sections of the document. The Social Democratic Party [SDP] is no different in this respect. Moreover, it fiercely opposes the proposal of the Temporary Election Commission headed by Ambassador Frowick. "The rule that says that refugees who have been forced to change their places of residence are to register with the municipal authorities where they are currently living and vote there, effectively legalizes the actual situation on the ground, created through crime and ethnic cleansing, which our party cannot accept," Sead Avdic, deputy chairman of the SDP of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"All people, in compliance with the Dayton accord, have the right to return to their homes, no matter where they are now," Avdic adds. These rules ignore this right.

The SDP is also dissatisfied with some other rules and particularly with the part referring to the role of the media in the election campaign and the elections. According to the election rules, the media are to behave according to the currently existing code, while nothing is further specified. The code existed before, but we know how the media and journalists behaved.

"The election rules do not guarantee equal media treatment to the political parties, which is unacceptable to us. This must be regulated in a serious agreement and not be left up to the media and their conscience and professional awareness to abide by certain standards of reportage. If the election rules are not applied, at least in this region, the SDP will probably not run in the elections. Still, we shall make a final decision at the party's convention scheduled for May in Tuzla," the deputy chairman of the SDP of Bosnia-Herzegoviona says.

Other parties are also announcing a boycott of the elections, or at least an abstention, which can be interpreted as a response to the election rules, which are, in their opinion, quite inappropriate. In Tuzla, the SDP is in a coalition with the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, the Muslim Bosniak

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Organization, and the Liberals, so their boycott of the elections could seriously affect the balance of power vis-a-vis the ruling Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Community, and thereby also contribute to the national parties' final victory in this town.

B-H: Republican Party Opposes OSCE Election Rules

AU2904202096 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Apr 96 p 4

[Report by M.D.: "To Change the Election Rules"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 28 April—Adnan Dizdar, member of the Senate of the Republican Party [RS] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said that the latest rules and regulations by the Temporary Election Commission to be observed in the coming elections would only legalize the existing ethnic structure in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. "All the principles for which we were struggling in the war will be devalued, because in reality we see that the return of refugees to their homes is not possible," Dizdar said at a recent RS news conference in Sarajevo.

"The legalization of the existing ethnic structure of the population is confirmed by the election rule that citizens may vote in the places where they are currently living," he added.

The RS is insisting that the international community should show willingness to facilitate the restoration of the ethnic structure of 1991 or to change the system of voting so as to introduce the identification of voters. That would mean that a person from Foca may vote in Sarajevo, but he has to state that he is from Foca. According to Dizdar, in the election campaign the mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe should secure equal access to the media for all political parties.

B-H: Prlic Comments on Outcome of Reconstruction Conference

LD2904223296 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Great Britain's Department of Trade and Industry was the organizer of the Donors' Conference on the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina held in London. More than 200 British businessmen took part in the conference. Soon after the conclusion of the conference, chaired by Baroness Chalker, minister for overseas development, we spoke to Dr. Jadranko Prlic, the Bosnia-Herzegovina foreign minister.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Sanela Fazlic, on telephone] Mr. Prlic, could you tell us something about the results of the conference held today in London?

[Prlic] The conference has succeeded in full. We will be able to judge the results when the people from England, from Great Britain, come to Bosnia-Herzegovina and try to conduct business there. More than 200 businessmen from Great Britain participated in today's conference, organized by the Department of Trade and Industry; the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation was present.

I spoke in the morning session, together with the minister, with Baroness Chalker who is at the head of ODA [Overseas Development Agency]—well known to us in Bosnia—and Dame Neville Jones who spoke on the civilian implementation of the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was a series of questions on the current situation. During the afternoon session those questions were answered by the Federation representatives and the representatives of the Serb Republic.

It is important to stress that this is the first conference to be held on such a high level in one of the European capitals. We expect a whole series of similar conferences to be held, as well as previously agreed arrivals of businessmen from the Federal Republic of Germany, from France.

So, we can expect very intensive economic activity during this year in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Fazlic] You also met today the British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind.

[Prlic] Yes, we met today. We noted a high degree of unanimity in very important aspects of the agreement implementation. What is important for our viewers is that we agreed on the signing of a whole series of state agreements between Great Britain and Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the ones necessary to kick-start business in both directions.

[Fazlic] Can you elaborate on these agreements?

[Prlic] Those are partly routine agreements on protection of investments—something rather important if we want English businessmen to come to Bosnia-Herzegovina; the agreement on avoidance of double taxation and a whole series of agreements in other fields—air traffic, transport, etc. [end recording]

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B-H: UBSD: Serbs, Federation Openly Violating Peace Accord

AU2904192796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats [UBSD] accused today the leaders of the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina of not implementing the peace agreement on the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Giving the example of the people of Doboj and Teslic, who have banned the Bosniaks and Croats from visiting their cemeteries and homes, UBSD Deputy Chairman Sejfudin Tokic said that this was an open violation of Annex 7 of the agreement. According to him, the part of the agreement referring to the return of refugees is not being observed on the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina either, since the Serbs were recently prevented from visiting Glamoc, which is under the control of the Croat authorities.

B-H: Results of Bonn Conference on Federation Considered

AU3004071296 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Apr 96 p 2

[Commentary by N. Basic: "A Bonn 'Injection'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the Conference on the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina held in Bonn recently, the declaration was adopted on implementation of the provisions on the federal police force and on organization of commissions for human rights at the canton level. The agreed upon strategy on the police has very tight deadlines. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, the host of this conference, let the federal partners know that, this time, failure to implement what has been agreed will no longer be tolerated and that those who continue to ignore this will face major sanctions.

The number of policemen in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be reduced by 50 percent, while their uniforms, including their caps, will be gray-blue.

According to the agreement on the police force, persons who are not chosen to serve in the federal police will not be allowed to carry arms or to maintain order and to enforce the law. The fact that the conference was attended by some of the highest representatives of the Federation, international arbiter Christian Schwarz-Schilling and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, added weight to the meeting. Before such an audience, Kinkel warned that any postponements of the agreed upon deadlines will no longer be tolerated, and that all consequences of their possible extension or avoidance will have to be taken by the side that is denounced as an obstacle to implementation of the Federation agreement. Of course, in addition to the fact that the Bonn meeting has given a strong impulse to the Federation, and that Germany, being Croatia's strongest ally, has made it quite clear that Zagreb will also face possible consequences for nonimplementation of the agreement, the agreement on the designation of officers for the supervision of human rights in cantons is also considered to be one of the most significant results of this meeting. True, they will not have executive power, but they will inform representatives of the international community about any cases of the violation of human rights in the field. It remains to be seen whether the Bonn meeting will fare like the previous one or whether the agreements will finally be realized.

B-H: Croats Deny Ganic's Statements on Bugojno

LD2904181296 Sarajevo Radio Hajat in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Commenting on the latest statements made by Ejup Ganic, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation vice president, on how he had personally solved all problems relating to the federation implementation in the area of Bugojno, the Bugojno Municipal Council with headquarters in Livno issued a denial of Ganic's statements, in which he states that those problems had been solved in Bugojno, HABENA reports.

In line with the Dayton agreement, 20[illegible] Croat families should have returned to Bugojno. In reality, only three people have returned, the statement says, and adds that in the last few days the looting and destruction of Croat property in Bugojno have intensified. At the same time, while negotiations on the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation were being held in Petersberg, Germany, as well as on the set-up of the four controversial municipalities, including Bugojno, the security of Croats in Bugojno is more and more precarious, and the infringment of freedom and human rights increasingly frequent. There are even incidents of Bosniaks from Prozor, who have settled in Bugojno, physically maltreating Croats, the statement said.

B-H: Zenica: Continued Mujahidin Presence Disturbs Croats

LD2904170796 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In his report from Zenica, Zvonimir Cilic will tell us something about the mujahidin in Zenica municipality.

[Begin Cilic recording] Contrary to claims by Muslim leaders, mujahidin are still to be found in central Bosnia. This is borne out by a group of members of the allegedly

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disbanded El Mujahid unit that is still deployed in the Zenica suburb of Podbrijezje. According to the Vitez-based Coordinating Committee of the [Croat] refugees from Zenica, a group of about 20 of these people has turned Ante Tavic's house in Podbrijezje into a real military fortification. They continue to operate as a military formation. They are dressed in traditional tunics and have arms at ready to use against anyone who tries to get near the fortification. There are no signs of their alleged desire to become part of Zenica's civilian life, the Coordinating Committee says, and goes on to stress that, by its very presence, the group threatens both physical and psychological stability of about 800 Croats remaining in Podbrijezje and the Croats of Zenica, in general.

On Sunday, the Podbrijezje Croats were particularly disturbed by the behavior of these foreigners and a group of several local Muslims. They marked the biggest Muslim holiday, Bairam, in a very unusual way. Despite a large number of mosques in Zenica, the group decided to pray in the center of Podbrijezje yesterday at 1300. In other words, this was not a ceremony to mark the holiday, but a provocation and an attempt to pressure the remaining Croats in Podbrijezje and Zenica.

That the Croats will never have peace and security in Zenica is confirmed by a report from the same source on an incident yesterday morning outside St. Elijah church in Zenica when, during the morning mass, a group of unidentified people threw in two explosive devices. Fortunately, except for disquiet and indignation among the believers and the Croats of Zenica, the explosions had no serious consequences. [end recording]

B-H: Muratovic Comments on IFOR's Role in Bairam Crossings

LD2904214996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to IFOR's [Implementation Force] official report, yesterday was a very successful day as thousands of Bosniaks and Croats carried out their arranged visits to cemeteries and homes on territory under Serb control. [passage omitted]

The differentiation between the issues of freedom of movement and return of refugees, that is, choosing the path of least resistance, was commented on by Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic.

[Begin recording] [Muratovic] It is IFOR's duty to secure freedom of movement on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, people going on visits should not be expected to announce their visits if IFOR fulfills this first condition.

Second, we are expecting a concrete plan for the implementation of the right of refugees to return to their homes. They should not be going there to visit, but should be returning to their homes there. We are expecting such a plan.

[Unidentified correspondent] You also received a letter from Admiral Leighton Smith, IFOR commander, in which he tried to stem the tide of returning refugees, to influence this through the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In other words, we have heard accusations that this return is being orchestrated. What can you tell us about that?

[Muratovic] In my view, orchestrated means organized. It is certainly better to have this organized than to let it proceed chaotically. If this is what IFOR believes, I think it is unjustified, but we will certainly continue synchronizing our activities with them.

In all 12 cases of crossings—of which only two were successful—we worked together with them.

[Correspondent] Since only two cases were successful, do you think that something should be changed in the way things are being organized?

[Muratovic] This is something we must analyze after the Bairam holidays. We must create complete freedom of movement, no announcements should be necessary. If those Serb mobs had not known of these arrivals, there would not have been any resistance on the roads, movement would have been completely normal. Freedom of movement should be guaranteed, as well as freedom to stay there on arrival, period.

[Correspondent] You do think that IFOR will respect the letter of Dayton?

[Muratovic] We will sit down and analyze this. They have been honoring everything so far and I expect them to honor everything in this case as well. [end recording]

B-H: Muslims Accuse Russian IFOR of Taking Serb Side

LD2904173096 Sarajevo Radio Hajat in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In the last seven days, since the residents of Dugi Do returned to their homes and stayed there, the provocations by the Serb police and the residents of Serb nationality have not ceased. They are fully supported by the Russian IFOR [Implementation Force] soldiers whose zone of responsibility is there, the Zvornik municipality head said in the letter he sent to Carl Bildt, the high representative of the international community, and Admiral Leighton Smith.

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The letter adds that the fact that the members of the Russian brigade were not taking any steps to prevent these provocations is worrying. Instead, they have aimed the barrels of their armored vehicles toward the local residents of Dugi Do.

Instead of implementing the Dayton accord as it was signed, the Russian soldiers are increasingly becoming the interpreters of the Dayton accord as the Serbs see it. In line with this, on 27 April, they announced, together with the Serb police, that they will settle residents of Serb nationality in Bosniak houses in Dugi Do.

We are asking whether this is in line with the IFOR mandate or is it a case of arbitrary Russian behavior, and whether there is anyone who can explain and interpret the Dayton accord to the Russian IFOR soldiers and who can order them what to do in its implementation and the reason for their presence there.

Also, how to explain a Russian officer's statement that Dugi Do went to the Serb Republic and that the Serbs should live there, in spite of the fact that this village is Bosniak and that, according to Annex 7 of the Dayton agreement, its residents have the right to return to their homes—something they have done, the letter said, and added that the Russian soldiers in this area were not neutral any longer and that because of their behavior a very serious situation could develop.

That is why in the future no patrols of the Russian soldiers should be sent without the presence of U.S. or some other IFOR soldiers; and, if possible, the Russian soldiers in IFOR should be replaced with soldiers from some other country, the head of the Zvornik municipality said in the letter sent to Carl Bildt and Adm. Leighton Smith.

B-H: Official: Russian IFOR Supporting Serb Provocations

AU2904190896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the last seven days—ever since the citizens of Dugi Brijeg returned to their village—the Serb police and citizens have barely let up in trying to provoke them. Here they have been receiving wholehearted support from the Russian soldiers of the Implementation Force [IFOR], whose theater of operations is in that very area. This is said in a letter that the Zvornik communal head has sent to High Representative Carl Bildt, Admiral Leighton Smith, and the international police force.

The letter states that it is disconcerting that the members of the Russian brigade have been doing nothing to prevent such provocations, but have instead turned the guns on their transporters on the Dugi Brijeg citizens.

B-H: Casualties in Serb-Muslim Clash in Serb Village

LD2904173296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1655 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 29 Apr (SRNA)—According to unofficial reports, people have been injured and killed in a clash today in the Serb village of Sjenina Rijeka, 17 km northeast of Doboj, when a group of Muslims moving from the direction of Gracanica attempted to cross into the territory of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic.

SRNA has learned in the Doboj public security services center that no full details have as yet been received from the spot, but that police patrols deployed in the area have confirmed that the Serb population confronted Muslim civilians as they tried to cross at a location not envisaged as a border crossing.

The command of the Nordic-Polish Implementation Force battalion has been reporting throughout the day on an attempt "by a group of 200-300 Muslims to forcibly cross the border between the two entities," but without any additional details.

NATO aircraft continue to fly over Doboj municipality where, according to Sarajevo media, Muslims have for days been trying to "visit their homes and cemeteries" left in the Serb Republic.

However, the Muslim side is observing no agreements on the checkpoints and crossings or on the number of people allowed to "visit."

B-H: Serbs Open Fire on Returning Bosniaks in North, Kill 2

AU2904175696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Apr 96

[Report by Rasida Djulic from Gracanica]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Just an hour ago, we witnessed yet another massacre.

After they agreed at a meeting recently held in Lukavica [words indistinct], today the expellees from Sjenina, some 200 of them, tried to visit their village in a peaceful way. Before that, as Sjenina communal head Midhet Okic said, everything had been arranged with the Doboj Istok police station, the Implementation Force [IFOR], and the Serb side.

After some hesitation on the part of IFOR to let the Sjenina citizens through, the people set off this afternoon to

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visit the village. Halfway there, at [word indistinct] in the village of Kapetani, armed Serbs opened fire on the unarmed expellees from Sjenina. There was panic as people started fleeing, while the wounded cried out for help. Rizan Okic and Ibrahim Osmanovic were killed on the spot, while two seriously wounded and one person with light injuries were brought to the Gracanica hospital at about 1730. [passage omitted]

B-H: Otoka Muslims Warn of Trouble Over Separation Line

AU2904190496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Net- rk in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Apr 96

[Report by Ibrahim Skenderovic from Bosanska Krupa]

[FBIS Translated Text] An incident occurred recently in Otoka near Bosanska Krupa. It could have had tragic consequences had it not been for the presence of the Implementation Force [IFOR], who opened fire in the air and thus prevented a more serious outcome of the clash between citizens. However, the tension has remained. The reason for this, according to the Otoka people, [words indistinct] the interentity borders on this territory. The borders drawn up in Dayton give the Serb entity—without any logic whatsoever—a part of Bosanska Otoka that was exclusively Muslim as is, after all, the entire municipality.

The Serb police are not allowing the Otoka people to move back into their homes but have allowed a large group of Serb citizens to move in. The Otoka people, who of course have a right to return home, tried to prevent that and IFOR intervened so everything ended with threats and exchanges of stones. That is, for the time being. The demand that this Dayton injustice be righted is in the hands of the subcommittees on the demarcation of the entities. Unless the [words indistinct] agreements, the peace agreement will only be a source of contention in Bosanska Otoka.

B-H: Serbs Renege on Agreement To Let Bosniaks Visit Doboj

AU2904184496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Apr 96

[Report by Mirudin Aldobasic from Tesanj]

[FBIS Translated Text] The expelled Bosniaks from Doboj have again been disappointed. The representatives of the Implementation Force [IFOR] and the international civilian police have again failed in realizing the agreement on the Bosniaks visiting the cemeteries in Pridjel, Sevarlije, and Potocani for the Bairam holidays. These are Doboj districts from which they were expelled four years ago.

According to the agreement, a group of about 100 Bosniaks was supposed to visit their districts. However, the representatives of the Serb entity in Doboj have been preventing an organized group from Tesanj from visiting this area using every method possible. The groups arrived at the access point to Doboj—that is, the district of Vila. But the Serb entity police prevented them from going any further. True, the representatives of IFOR and the international civilian police put in a lot of effort and time to implement the agreement earlier reached between the Bosniaks and Serbs living in the Serb entity in Doboj.

So this was another failed attempt by the Bosniaks to return to their homes after four years in exile and visit the graves of their dearest.

Also today, another agreement reached earlier failed. This one was for the Teslic people to visit their homes and cemeteries. As far as we know, over 1,000 Serb [word indistinct] halted some 150 Bosniaks yesterday at the access point to Teslic [words indistinct] and over 5,000 Serbs gathered in the town itself, protesting the visit by Bosniaks to Teslic. Today the Serb entity authorities in this town did not even want to participate in the negotiations [words indistinct].

Serb extremists are today again calling for an open conflict on the local radio stations, denying the right of the Bosniaks to enter the towns of Doboj and Teslic, in which they had lived for centuries, claiming that these two towns belong to the Serbs and that there is no room in them for the Muslims.

B-H: Tension in Sarajevo as Muslims Visit Cemeteries

LD2904201096 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Serb population today again expressed its revolt at Muslim attempts to enter the Sarajevo suburbs of Trnovo, Krupac, and Kotorac.

[Unidentified correspondent] The announcement of forcible Muslim crossings into the territory of the Serb Republic in the area of the Sarajevo suburbs of Trnovo, Krupac, and Kotorac was only partially carried out today. Several buses with several hundred passengers tried to—they said—only visit their ancestors' graves, the same ones they did not bother to visit during the war and before it.

[Begin recording] [Goran Sehovac, Serb commander of Ilidza police station] A large number of Muslims today arrived under IFOR [Implementation Force] protection and under the guise of visiting cemeteries.

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IFOR demanded that the Serb police provide guarantees; the police refused because it is not up to the police to offer guarantees in the Serb Republic entity; we cannot estimate the revolt of the population, we are responsible for the corridor.

The police did secure the corridor and the corridor was passable.

[Correspondent] Do you know how many of them crossed into Serb Republic territory?

[Sehovac] Six buses were heading toward Trnovo from the direction of Kotorac and Kijevo. Around 50 people to a bus—300 altogether.

[Correspondent] The Muslims did manage to enter Kotorac and visit their cemeteries.

[Sehovac] Yes, they entered Kotorac. One bus entered, the police were deployed along the corridor. We were able to control the situation due to the proximity of the corridor. However, the civilians protested, indignation is widespread. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Incited by such provocative behavior, the Serb population once again expressed its commitment to sovereignty and showed that those who had fallen in the struggle for freedom did not die in vain. [passage omitted]

B-H: Muslims Die in Minefield; Said Trying To Avoid IFOR

AU2904182796 Paris AFP in English 1811 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, April 29 (AFP)—At least two Muslim civilians are believed dead and up to five injured after they attempted to run through mined woodland to evade an IFOR roadblock, a IFOR spokesman said Monday [29 April].

"We believe four or five were injured and possibly two killed after several explosions and some firing" during the incident, Major Pasi Karonen said.

The incident took place seven kilometres (four miles) east of Doboj, in the Serb entity, Karonen said.

Swedish IFOR (Implementation Force) troops at the "Zulu 22" checkpoint heard several mine explosions, Karonen added. "We have also had confirmed reports of firing and some unconfirmed reports that one Muslim man might have been shot in the chest," Karonen added.

In Tuzla, 50 kilometres (30 miles) southeast of Doboj, staff at the city hospital said they had been told to expect several wounded during the evening.

Bosnian state-run television showed scenes of people running through the fields near the checkpoint, which had been set up to stop Muslims getting through to the Serb town in case their arrival provoked a violent confrontation.

Several people were shown being carried away on stretchers.

The dead and injured were among a group of some 75 Muslims who attempted to bypass the checkpoint, said another IFOR spokesman, Major Terje Myklevoll.

The Muslims, who were attempting to enter Doboj for the second successive day, were awaited on the other side of the checkpoint by around 30 Serbs armed with sticks, clubs and stones, Myklevoll said.

According to the UN refugee agency in Tuzla, two buses of Muslim refugees were supposed to visit Doboj Monday on a separate trip to allow them to see family graves.

But Myklevoll said he believed the visit had not been able to go ahead.

During a similar visit Sunday to Doboj, a group of around 100 Muslims were taunted and abused by Serb civilians, who told reporters that they objected to the presence of the non-Serbs in the town.

B-H: Police Report 2 Muslims Killed in Minefield

LD2904194096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1857 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Doboj, 29 Apr (SRNA)—Two people were killed and two seriously wounded in today's incidents in the village of Sjenina Rijeka north-east of Doboj, when Muslim civilians attempted to enter the Serb Republic bypassing the IFOR [Implementation Force] checkpoint.

According to Doboj police reports, unofficially confirmed by the international forces, the Muslim attempt was illegal and it provoked an angry Serb reaction and caused the death and injuries of "a certain number of people" in a minefield. [passage omitted]

B-H: District Leader Describes Serb Attack on Civilians

LD2904205196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Armed Serbs today again massacred innocent Bosniaks. Two people have died so far and several others were seriously wounded in an attempt by citizens of the village of Sijenjina, East Doboj municipality, to visit their homes in Sijenjina, on the territory of the Serb entity. Rasida Djulic reports.

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[Begin recording] [Djulic] [passage omitted] Mihret Oltic, the president of Sijenjina district, will tell us what happened.

[Oltic] Machinegun fire was opened from a civilian car, and bombs were hurled; those who were waiting there started throwing bombs. They fired from automatic weapons, pistols, everything.

[Djulic] How many of you were in the group trying to cross?

[Oltic] There were 413 names on the list, but not everybody left due to the rain and foul weather; around 150 people left altogether.

[Djulic] Was this an arranged visit, where were you actually going, and what did you want to visit?

[Oltic] We wanted to visit the cemetery and the village. It has been four years since we were there. We only wanted to walk down the main road and visit the cemetery, and then this happened. [end recording] [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb Man Killed in Serb-Muslim Incident

LD2904210496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2028 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 29 Apr (SRNA)—A Serb man was killed in today's incident near Sijenina Rijeka, northeast of Doboj, during the attempt by Muslims to circumvent an Implementation Force [IFOR] checkpoint and cross into [Bosnian] Serb Republic territory.

SRNA's reporter was told at Doboj's St. Luke hospital that at 2200 tonight an IFOR transporter brought in the body of a man whose identity has not been established yet.

The information on the death of the Serb civilian was confirmed by the information service of IFOR's Nordic-Polish brigade in Doboj.

The statement says that one Serb civilian and two Muslims were killed in today's incident near Sijenina Rijeka, and that there are seven seriously wounded people on both sides.

B-H: Radio Report Denies Muslim Woman Killed in Trnovo

LD2904224296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2200 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Two persons were killed and several wounded on the second day of the big Islamic holiday Kurban Bairam when the inhabitants of the Sjeninina village, in Gracanica Municipality, tried to cross into the Serb-held territory. A similar incident took place yesterday near Trnovo where three persons were seriously wounded and 15 suffered light injuries.

Dear listeners, we wish to deny the information issued by the head of Trnovo municipality, according to which in the aforementioned attack on the civilians, Hajrija Kasagic was killed.

B-H: Incident Reported at Checkpoint Near Lukavica

AU3004064596 Paris AFP in English 2339 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lukavica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, April 30 (AFP)—A group of rebel Serbs ambushed 75 Moslem men when they entered Serb territory near this northern Bosnian village Monday, shooting dead at least one man, Moslem locals here told AFP

Two men died in the incident which started late Monday afternoon when a crowd of 75 Moslems attempted to visit their former homes in Serb-held territory, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) said.

The Moslems from the village of Lukavica told an AFP photographer that around 100 Serbs had turned handgrenades, automatic weapons fire and 60-millimetre mortars against the Moslems who broke through a Swedish IFOR roadblock Monday afternoon to head across mine-strewn land to visit their former homes.

NATO said in a statement Monday that two people had been killed and five were injured in the incident which was the most serious clash here since Moslem refugees started returning to their former homes in territory now under Serb control.

The clash started when the 75 Moslems broke through the Swedish IFOR checkpoint near Lukavica, a few kilometres northeast of the Serb-held town of Doboj, NATO said.

NATO spokesman Major Pasi Koronen said in Doboj that the Swedish soldiers had heard five explosions and firing.

Arriving at the scene, an AFP photographer went with two local Moslems, two Swedish IFOR soldiers, a Norwegian IFOR medic and a photographer from the Associated Press news agency and discovered the body of one man.

The man, a Moslem, had died from a gun shot wound to the chest, Norwegian medic lieutenant Erik Hestvik told AFP. (IFOR said later that the man's wound appeared to be consistent with both gun shot and shrapnel injuries.)

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As the recovery party attempted to return to Lukavica with the body they were ambushed by a party of eight to 10 Bosnian Serbs who tried to drag off one of the Moslems. They only left when the Swedish IFOR soldiers threatened to fire.

As well as the two dead and five wounded, which were confirmed by IFOR, several people were slightly wounded, local people said.

Staff at Tuzla hospital, some 70 kilometres (40 miles) (eds: correct) southeast of Doboj, said one man had been brought to the hospital and taken into intensive care, suffering from injuries to his uppper body.

His injuries appeared consistent with a hand grenade attack, a medical source at the hospital said.

The incident cast a pall over a Moslem religious festival taking place Sunday, Monday and Tuesday.

It came after Serbs at Trnovo outside Sarajevo had stoned a convoy of Moslems in buses and private cars, smashing windows in the coaches and causing the convoy to turn back.

NATO Saturday announced that it had decided to stop Moslem convoys passing through Serb-controlled land unless their trip was arranged and agreed in advance with local Serb authorities.

NATO spokesman Major Simon Haselock said the policy would not immediately be changed because of one incident.

Another visit by Moslems to family homes in Serb-held land near Celic, north of Tuzla, was planned for early Tuesday.

Authorities in Celic told AFP Monday the visit would still go ahead.

In a statement late Monday, the northern divisional command of IFOR, based in Tuzla, said the incident Monday showed "the difference between legitimate movement across the zone of separation...and an event organized for and motivated by political agenda."

According to the UN refugee agency in Tuzla, two buses of Moslem refugees were supposed to visit Doboj on a separate visit Monday to allow them to see family graves.

But IFOR said the visit had not been able to go ahead.

Under the Dayton peace accords, all Bosnia's 2.4 million refugees and displaced people have freedom of movement throughout Bosnia, irrespective of ethnic group.

However the Serb leadership in Pale, the Serb "capital" outside Sarajevo is determined not to allow refugees to return, aid officials said in Sarajevo last week, adding that nine out of ten requests for refugee visits are refused across all of Bosnia.

Under the NATO mandate, IFOR is supposed to provide a secure environment for the refugees to exercise their rights.

B-H: Official Criticizes IFOR's Failure To Protect Civilians

AU3004152496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 Apr 96

[Interview with Amir Hadziomeragic, chairman of the Committee for Cooperation With International Organizations in the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Jadranko Kresic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following yesterday's tragic incident, when Serb extremists killed three and wounded several civilians, we contacted Amir Hadziomeragic, chairman of the Committee for Cooperation With International Organizations in the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our colleague Jadranko Kresic tried to find out what our authorities' view is on all that has happened and asked him to comment on the behavior of the international forces, which did not stop the extremists from the Serb entity. Asked about the view of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Hadziomeragic said:

[Hadziomeragic] The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina takes the view that there was a serious violation of the freedom of movement that was declared by IFOR [Implementation Force] before the expiry of the D+90 deadline and that should be strictly observed throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Yesterday, we saw many of our people being prevented from moving along the roads and their freedom of movement being seriously violated. We also take the view that IFOR's involvement was quite insufficient and that it should have played a more active part in protecting our people, who were even killed in IFOR's presence.

[Kresic] In its defense, IFOR has said that its mandate is to separate military forces and that armed groups of civilians are allegedly not under its authority. To what extent is this statement correct?

[Hadziomeragic] The situation is still somewhat confusing today, as different statements are coming from different sources. With regard to that, we suggested that a meeting of senior representatives of the international police force, IFOR, our government, and the [Serb] entity

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be held urgently today to analyze the situation and determine precisely who made mistakes and how to avoid such situations in the future.

Generally speaking, we take the view that IFOR should have been more involved and more prepared to protect our people from attacks by (?organized) groups from the Serb entity.

[Kresic] You have just mentioned the D+90 deadline. Even the D+120 deadline has expired and yet there is no freedom of movement. If the people from the Serb entity, that is, their local authorities continue to violate so radically the proclaimed freedom of movement, what will the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government do?

[Hadziomeragic] We will continue to follow and analyze the situation. We will be demanding that all the provisions of the peace agreement be absolutely observed. One of the most important provisions is the freedom of movement, which was obviously violated in a very drastic way yesterday. We take the view that IFOR's report on the existence of freedom of movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina was very clearly denied yesterday.

B-H: Tuzla Mayor Blames Sarajevo for Boundary Crossings

LD3004110596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0940 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Tuzla, 30 Apr (SRNA)—Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Muslim-Croat federation, is the main instigator of the Muslims' disorderly attempts to cross into the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, Tuzla Municipal Assembly President Salim Beslagic said today.

Speaking on Tuzla Radio, Beslagic, leader of the Independent Social Democrats, accused the Party of Democratic Action of "favoring the war option to attain its extremist goals without consulting other political parties."

"Instead of soldiers and politicians, innocent civilians are being forced onto the firing line. The outcome of this political orchestration is two dead and several injured civilians," Beslagic said.

He condemned last night's threat by Ganic that attempts to enter the Serb Republic will continue. "It is easy to sit in a comfortable chair in Sarajevo and issue directives without giving any thought to their possible consequences," Beslagic said.

B-H: Serbs 'Blocking' Bosniak Refugees Outside Celic

AU3004121496 Paris AFP in English 1202 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Celic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, April 30—A group of 400 Serbs armed with handguns, sticks and stones were blocking about 150 Moslem refugees from returning to their homes Tuesday in a tense stand-off outside this Moslem-held town as UN police warned of a possible outbreak of violence.

The Serbs were lying in wait on the Serb side of the boundary that runs just east of Celic and refusing to let the party of Moslems through to visit former homes in the Serb-held town of Koraj, UN and IFOR [Implementation Force] officials said.

UNHCR field officer Margarethe Prins said the situation was "extremely tense" and could develop into serious violence.

Some five to six hundred Moslems, mostly unarmed civilians, had massed from around 9 a.m. (0700 GMT) on their side of the boundary line which marks the divison between the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Serb's Republika Srpska [Serb Republic].

Four Russians IFOR tanks and several U.S. and Russian vehicules were blocking two roads at the site. An edgy Russian comander was refusing permission to anyone to cross the 100 metres (yards) of no man's land separating the two groups.

Fields on either side of the stand-off were said by local people to be strewn with mines.

Prins told AFP the group of Serbs has refused to negociate, either with her or with UN police, to allow any Moslems through.

Russian troops, who frisked one Moslem man who was dressed in the black uniform of a hard-line group, found him to be holding a hand grenade, but most of the crowd appeared unarmed—but angry and tense.

Sulejman Zenunovic, representative in exile of the Serb-held Koraj council, appeared doubtful that the three bus loads of mostly women, children and elderly people planning to visit Koraj Tuesday would be able to get through.

He said he was "attempting to control a difficult situation but temper is running high and it is not easy."

Bosnian Moslem-Croat Federation police were at the scene, repeatedly urging the crowd to keep calm and not to provoke an incident.

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At around noon (1000 GMT) the crowd from the Serb side moved forward slightly, then stopped.

IFOR troops have been braced for further violence after a group of Serbs ambushed 75 Moslem men as they entered Serb territory near the northern Bosnian village of Lukavica Monday.

Two men died in the incident which started when the Moslems tried to visit their former homes in Serb-held territory. Five others were injured after they attempted to run through a mined woodland to evade an IFOR roadblock.

The IFOR checkpoint was erected to stop Moslems crossing into Serb-held territory, despite clauses in the Dayton peace accord for Bosnia guaranteeing freedom of movement to civilians and the right of refugees to return to their former homes.

B-H: Muslims Fail To Enter Serb Territory in Zvornik

LD3004144696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zvornik, 30 Apr (SRNA)—Around 200 armed Muslims have on several occasions in the past seven days tried to violate the borders and territorial sovereignty of the Serb Republic in the Zvornik area, but the local population prevented all their attempts.

Muslims tried to enter the villages of Dugi Do, Pecina, and Boskovici; following a physical clash with the villagers, despite being armed, they had to return to their villages of Nezuk, Zaseok, Vitinica, and Kovacevici.

IFOR [Implementation Force] members did not try to prevent their incursions into the Serb Republic territory, and Muslim leaders are announcing new excursions into the territory of the Zvornik municipality.

B-H: Motives of Muslim Grave Mourners Questioned

LD2904172796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1502 GMT 29 Apr 96

[Commentary by Jovo Ajvazovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 29 Apr (SRNA)—When our people wish to stress that someone could not care less about something, they say: "He went by as if passing a Turkish cemetery." Not without reason. The Muslims always bury their dead immediately after death, and the funeral itself is very simple and swift.

The basic message is this: "Have all accounts with the deceased been settled?" Since we cannot collect worldly dues from the dead or return their hatred, the answer is always the same: "God will forgive!" Then some dirt is thrown on the burial shroud and the ceremony is over. The deceased is neither missed nor mourned. "Allah giveth, Allah taketh away." Muslims have never cared much for the dead. Never!

Suddenly, however, the latest fad is to visit graves and cemeteries, on Serb territory. But never, for example, in Sarajevo, where they have their own cemeteries in abundance. They do not need mourning parades there where—as some foreign reporters so aptly noticed—their graves are covered with vegetation, wanting for attention and remembrance. Exactly as prescribed by Islam.

It is symptomatic that Izetbegovic's Muslims are not launching forcible mourning marches into territory under Croat control. Their tombstones there do not seem to need any tears. With the Croats they at least have a phoney love affair dating back to the times of knotted flags, but their hatred for the Serbs even permits abuse of religious customs and feelings for political ends.

It is obvious—and Implementation Force representatives are beginning to realize this as well—that these alleged visits to cemeteries and demonstrations of piety for the dead are a masterfully conceived political farce which may well result in clashes with the local Serb population.

That is why freedom of movement is not implemented as specified in the documents of the Dayton agreement, but border crossings are undertaken by groups of several thousand people, many of whom carry weapons, but all of whom are armed with hatred for the Serbs.

Cemeteries and graves are only a front for provoking incidents for the benefit of Izetbegovic's fundamentalists. Many Muslims, extremely impassioned during the bloody civil war, have agreed to the manipulation of their own faith and have accepted these phantasmagoric visits to cemeteries; instead of devoting those moments to memories of dead relatives, they are using them for provocations and escalation of hatred against the Serb population.

However, the folk saying "Nine Days' Wonder" springs to mind, so the comedy with the cemeteries will come to an end, just as nobody in their right mind any longer even mentions fabrications about the rape of 60,000 Muslim women, mass graves in Srebrenica—where the "investigators" of the Hague inquisition managed to discover a dead pig and skeletons of mangy dogs—shells in Sarajevo's Markale [marketplace], and the dead in the bloody breadline in Vasa Miskin street.

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B-H: Krajisnik, Bildt Discuss Dayton Accord Implementation

LD2904221296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2105 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 29 Apr (SRNA)—In Pale this evening, Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and International Coordinator Carl Bildt discussed problems in implementing civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement.

After the meeting Bildt said that they had discussed incidents in border areas between the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation. He announced more talks on these issues at the government level in his Sarajevo office tomorrow.

"It is important that there is an organized way now for people to cross from one entity into the other," Bildt said and added that the international community "will do much more to facilitate the movement of civilians."

According to Krajisnik, the Serb Republic will fully respect and implement the Dayton agreement and there is no need to "politicize certain issues." "Freedom of movement as interpreted today is being abused and we are afraid that any abuse of the Dayton agreement can result in new conflicts," Krajisnik said and added that new incidents could make it difficult to preserve peace and establish trust.

He said it is feared that all conflicts have been stage-managed, and it was concluded that all interested parties had to strive to preserve peace and implement the Dayton agreement.

Krajisnik said that the Serb Republic is interested in full cooperation and development of economic relations with the other entity, and warned that this should not be violated by rash and unilateral acts.

B-H: Ostojic, U.S. Envoy Discuss Freedom of Movement Issue

LD2904192396 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Freedom of movement between the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation was today discussed in Pale byVelibor Ostojic, Serb Republic deputy prime minister, and U.S. Ambassador in Sarajevo John Menzies. Other aspects of the Dayton agreement were also covered.

[Correspondent Stjepan Zlikovac] The meeting raised a number of issues, but the focus was on the implementation of the Dayton agreement and Annex 7 relating to freedom of movement. The Serb side told the U.S. ambassador that the central part of the Dayton agreement has been abused in an attempt to politically manipulate the population.

[Begin recording] [Ostojic] We told Mr. Ambassador that, in our view, the Serb Republic is in the forefront of the struggle against terrorism and that some players wish to provoke incidents in order to blame the Serb Republic. We asked his excellency, Mr. Ambassador, to inform the U.S. government that the Serb Republic does not want any incidents, that the people behind the incidents must be identified, and that it must be established who is manipulating the population and creating the situation in which the implementation of the Dayton agreement has to be halted, all with the aim of putting the blame on the Serb Republic.

[Menzies, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I was very pleased to meet today with the deputy prime minister to discuss issues of freedom of movement. Freedom of movement is one of the central elements of the Dayton agreement, as is the right of refugees to return to the place of origin and reclaim their properties. This is central to Annex 7 of the agreement. [end recording]

B-H: Serb Leader Assails Muslim Designs on Serb Territory

LD2904163196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1449 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 29 Apr (SRNA)—Borijove Sendic, vice president of the Serb Democratic Party, today described the unannounced and illegal Muslim crossings into the territory of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic "as a special scheme to capture Serb territory, planned by the leadership of the Muslim-Croat federation."

"Those taking part in the raids now know that the raids will amount to nothing and that our people are prepared to show everyone who the boss is in whose state," Sendic said and added:

"We have our state and our laws and no one can ignore them and act illegally. Every delegation must announce the time, the place, and the reason for the visit."

"We will accept such visits as normal and everything else cannot and will not be accepted," Sendic said in conclusion.

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B-H: Serb Party Condemns Muslim Attempts To Enter Territory

LD2904162596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1502 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 29 Apr (SRNA)—Zivko Radisic, the vice president of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, has sharply condemned frequent attempts by Muslims to enter Serb territory.

"We see this as a serious threat to peace and the Dayton peace agreement, since this is an organized attempt by the Muslims who are supported by certain international forces that fail to realize that their behavior can jeopardize the peace process as a whole," Radisic told SRNA.

According to him, crossings from one entity to the other must be organized and carried out in agreement with relevant authorities, local IFOR [Implementation Force] commands and the International Police Task Force.

"What the Muslim side is doing, by invoking supposed humanitarian goals, is an attempt, with hidden agendas behind it, to manipulate its own people," Radisic said stressing that everyone, especially IFOR and the International Police Task Force, must ensure that they were up to their task.

B-H: Former Omarska Camp Prisoner on War Crimes

96BA0188A Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 14 Feb 96 pp 36-37

[Letter to the editor from former prisoner Muharem Eskic: "The Truth About the Locations of the Crimes"

[FBIS Translated Text] "8,000 Bosniaks Buried in the Pits of the Ljubija Mine," from LJILJAN No. 158, p 25:

The title "Mass Grave at the Ljubija Mine" led me to write you this letter. An article published by the NEW YORK TIMES has finally revealed the truth about the genocide at the Ljubija mine, after almost four whole years of war. Well, people, how is it that until now no one has heard of or seen the Ljubija mine and the truth about the genocide in the Prijedor area, when we numerous inmates from Omarska have provided the facts about everything that happened to us in our homeland?!

The liberating operation by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army last fall stopped just within reach of the Ljubija mine, just to avoid finding out about the genocide that the Serbs committed in Ljubija and the Prijedor area.

The murderers of innocent people concealed a lot of evidence during these four years of war, because this all happened on territory that they completely occupied, but a great deal can be found out if people want to.

Since I worked in the strip mines of the Ljubija mines for over 20 years, I would like to say something about the places where there cannot be mass graves. It is known exactly where the iron ore has already been excavated, and which places are planned for dumping the waste. It is only in those multilevel locations of the exploited fields that locations for mass executions can be designated. Those places could only be designated by the top people at the mine; they are the most familiar with the ore deposits. Those people are still at Ljubija today.

They are not "pits" at all, but rather abandoned multilevel flat areas and recesses in the waste dumps that were at Retko 1 above the Tomex factory, and then on the Retko 1 plateau, where there was a field for combining metal by explosion, and at the Litica 2 location near Zunske Kipe.

The few residents of the village of Zune of Croatian nationality who were still in their houses during 1992 said that there was a terrible smell of murdered people coming from the direction of Zunske Kipe and the Zune dam. At the Zune dam there is an enormous accumulation of iron sediment, which was transported here during the refinement of the ore by means of a sediment conduit from the wet separation. If the victims were brought here and thrown into that liquid mass like quicksand, it is now certainly almost impossible to find them underneath the iron sediment deposits.

There exists a probability, however, that even now the remains of the bodies could be dug out of the "pits" and thrown into that dam if no one prevented it. I think that this is the only place in the strip mines of Ljubija where the victims could be concealed.

In any case, the mining engineers from Ljubija who were involved in organizing the mass liquidations could say more about all of this.

As far as the genocide in the Omarska camp (about 40 km from Ljubija) is concerned, there as well the criminals have probably concealed a lot already, because they buried the victims in the enormous waste dumps of the BTO [conveyor-belt excavator-discharge chute] system, where it would be very difficult to find anything after four years. From time to time the corpses were also taken by trucks to Tomasica, a mine operation 12 km from Omarska, where they were burnt in the rotation furnaces for drying ore. Only ashes remained. The smoke rose from the chimneys of the dryer and was smelled for days in the villages around Tomasica in the summer of 1992.

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Among the numerous buses that took people through the Mine camp on a one-way trip, I think that there were also several buses with camp inmates from Keraterm and Omarska who left the Omarska camp on the night of 23 July 1992 after 2300. At that time, however, we did not know what direction the buses were heading in. It was precisely at the end of July 1992 that a man from the Stara Rijeka village (whose identity I cannot mention, unfortunately) found on Retko the ID card of Smail Zahirovic, for several years the director of the central ore deposit mine.

If that is really true, it could be concluded that many other people who disappeared or were taken from the nearby Serbian camps around Prijedor, no trace of whom has yet been found, were also murdered in Ljubija.

I was very surprised by the visit by the Croatian "humanitarian delegation" to Banja Luka and the "Republic of Srpska" in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, when they also negotiated about the delivery of ore from Ljubija to Croatia. It is very strange that this visit took place right after the fresh news about the mass grave of 8,000 people at the Ljubija mine. I just don't know whether this delegation previously informed anyone at all in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina about this visit, because the Ljubija mine is in the recognized Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The delegation could have waited a little longer, so that we could at least gather up the bones of the victims, among whom there were a lot of Catholics.

Respectfully yours, Muharem Eskic

B-H: Serb War Criminals Allegedly Work for UNHCR

96BA0188C Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 7 Feb 96 p 34

[Unattributed article: "Serbian Criminals in the Service of the UNHCR"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Salih Vatres currently lives in Adelaide. He is the former director of an elementary school in Zepa.

"We camp inmates will particularly remember Mrs. Margaret, the chief of the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] office in Belgrade, an Irishwoman by origin. When any of us complained to this lady or one of her colleagues, he would be beaten the next day. We quickly noted that we would be beaten and humiliated even more after the complaints. We are convinced that the UNHCR representatives in Belgrade were working in close cooperation with the Serbian police. Our people unloaded the food that was delivered by UNHCR. We knew that the warehouses were full. We saw that there was enough food and blankets and clothing, but we had to drink tea out of sardine cans, and divided the sardine itself among 10 people. We saw when the Serbian special forces at the Sljivovica camp loaded UNHCR food from the warehouses into their own cars. They constantly claimed to us that UNHCR was not bringing food to us. We could not believe that UNHCR was so impotent to control the use of that food.

"From 60 to 70 Serbian special forces were engaged in Sljivovica every day. Their administrator was named Rade Ojdanic. We asked the UNHCR representatives why they were paying them, and from whom they were guarding us. They said that they were guarding us against certain extremist elements. UNHCR was paying the special forces of Slobodan Milosevic to guard us with rifles aimed at us. UNHCR fed those special forces so that they could keep beating us up. The International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] representatives saw all this and knew about all of it. They were on our side. They helped us as much as they could, and sometimes even more than they were allowed to. We, for New Year's, they bought us some little packages with their own money. One should particularly emphasize Joanne Walters, the delegate and head of the ICRC office in Belgrade, and Joseph Cox, a field medic."

Osman Zimic, commander of the 1st Light Zepa Battalion, now in Perth:

"The Serbian special forces from Sljivovica and Mitrovo Polje are a special story in terms of their brutality and malice. A large number of policemen boasted to us about what they were like in Zepa and Srebrenica. One stepped on me with his boot and said, 'This boot was in Zepa.' We saw that he was quite familiar with everything, every village and every hamlet. They told us the heights and roads by name. Many of these special forces were actually the most prominent butchers in Zepa and Srebrenica.... They asked me how many Serbs I had killed, 100 or 200? They constantly repeated that. They asked me how I could become a commander if I had not killed hundreds of civilians.... We are certain that they were the most prominent butchers. They concealed their real names. They called each other by certain nicknames. 'Slavenko,' who is now a police commander in Srebrenica, is remembered for his infamy.

"They enjoyed giving us 'history' lectures. They demanded that we listen to them and tell them what they wanted—that we had originated in them and that this war would not even have been necessary if we had wanted to 'return' to Serbdom and Orthodoxy. The most important thing to them was for us to know when each Orthodox holiday was. They beat me savagely when I did not know when St. Nicholas's Day was. They said that we would remain there and that our bones would remain there...."

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Croatia: Interview With President Tudjman; Part I

LD2404200596 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1810 GMT 22 Apr 96

[First part of interview with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to several Croatian newspapers and HINA at the presidential palace in Zagreb on 20 April—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Tudjman] It is especially important that we, as one of the oldest European nations with a young, sovereign state, should solve problems successfully while not allowing the return of old quarrels and a situation which would push us again into [the stituation] we have been in.

[Unidentified correspondent] This thought is the basic message of a longer interview which Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic, gave to POLITICKI ZATVORENIK [Political Prisoner], Croatian Television and Radio, HINA, and VECERNJI LIST and VJESNIK on Saturday, 20 April. As we have already reported, on that day the president of the Republic received a delegation from the political prisoners society and later met the press.

The questions were open and journalistically provocative and covered numerous everyday, current topics which are talked about and written on. And—as President Tudjman's interview made it obvious—the questions were almost always closely connected to the events from Croatian people's recent past.

The achieved Croat reconciliation was the cornerstone of the whole interview.

[Tudjman] The policy of reconciliation, the policy which eliminated all traces of revanchism was a necessary condition for all our victories, both political and military and for our achievements with Croatia [as heard]. We have brought Croatia onto the international scene, not only as an internationally recognized state, but also—as they have assessed—as a regional power, which changed the strategic balance in this region.

[Reporter] As a statesman whose years-long scientific and political activity has laid the foundations for the modern Croatian state, Tudjman in his interview uses arguments and in a suggestive manner explains the laws of historical events that took place on our soil, the background of many political events and processes and the role of Macek, Pavelic, and Tito on the Croat political stage.

Should their remains be brought back home?

[Tudjman] I believe the bones of every Croat should be in Croatian soil. But while doing this, the possibilities to make some political capital should not be allowed, especially the capital which has no justification.

[Reporter] The journalists' questions covered many subjects which today the public maliciously interprets.

How and why are the former communists [members of the] HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] and the Army? What about theft and abuse of power? And the idea of Jasenovac [concentration camp in the Nazi Croat state in the Second World War] being transformed into a memorial site to all those killed—an idea violently opposed by some individuals both in our country and in the world. All these issues were widely covered in Tudjman's answer.

[Tudjman] Jasenovac could become the site for all the war victims which would remind the Croat people that at some point in their history they were separated, that they were brought into a state of internal conflict, something not to be repeated and [a site] of reconciliation of the dead, as we have reconciled the living.

Aware of the [significance] that the messages and lessons contained in President Tudjman's interview have for the stability of Croatia, Croatian Television will broadcast it in full, in two parts.

The first part will be broadcast tonight. The second will be broadcast on Wednesday, 24 April at the same time.

[Andrija Vucemil, POLITICKI ZATVORENIK] Mr. President, at the founding assembly of the HDPZ [Croatian Society of Political Prisoners] held on 17 February 1990, attended by over 1,000 political prisoners, the idea of all-Croat reconciliation and pardon to our prosecutors was unanimously supported.

Today, six years later, it is our impression that former party cadres still hold important positions in politics, Army, police, judiciary, and the media, while those who have suffered for the Croat state have been, in our opinion, marginalized, together with their children and grandchildren. What is your view on this?

[Tudjman] I think that in your question you have stated a historical truth. It is what I have been advocating—and not only advocating—and in Croatia we have realized the all-Croatian reconciliation among all social strata, among the people in the country and among the emigrants. Without that reconciliation we would not have had today an independent, democratic, sovereign state of Croatia.

The second part of your question reflects a widely held view, which alleges that former officials of the old Communist Yugoslav regime hold important positions in all spheres of state and political life—and that simply does not correspond to the truth.

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It is especially not true that political prisoners and victims, even their children and grandchildren, have been marginalized.

This question requires a thorough examination and is something to which we should give more attention.

If anything is true, then it is true that in creating an independent Croatia I relied primarily on the support of the people who lived and suffered for the freedom and independence of Croatia.

It is also true that there is some opposition to them, just as there is opposition against the immigrants. In spite of this, a statement expressed in such a way is not valid.

When we were formulating the HDZ program, and in the realization of the Croat state, we started from the positions that we must draw conclusions and lessons from the entire Croatian history. We must answer the question why the Croatian people had not realized its independence and statehood during the time from the 12th century onwards.

Starting from my personal life experience and from my thinking about the Croatian history and Croatian destiny, I reached the conclusion that it is not only the others, external factors and international circumstances, that are to blame. The reasons were also to be found in the very own Croatian national being.

That is why I aimed to avoid in the program of the creation and implementation of the Croatian independence, freedom, and democracy:

—a repetition of the situation we have had since the Pacta conventa [agreement concluded in 1102 between Hungarian King Coloman and Croatian noblemen whereby the noblemen recognize him as king and in return they keep their property] on, when we were left without our rulers, when Croatia fell under foreign rule.

—the repetition of 1671 when with the death of Zrinski and Frankopan [Croatian noblemen who organized a conspiracy against the Habsbourg Monarchy], Croatia was almost beheaded. During the feudal era, not only foreign rule but also foreign representatives, feudal lords in Croatia were imposed on our country.

—the repetition of 1871 when Eugen Kvaternic [Croatian Assembly deputy], starting from Starcevic [Ante Starcevic, politician advocating political independence of Croatia] views and later attempts, in entirely inappropriate circumstances, to create a Croatia and in doing this, seeks support of the Serb minority in Croatia.

—the repetition of 1928 when the Croat political leadership, Radic [founder of Croatian Peasants' Party] was killed in the middle of the Belgrade Parliament.

—the repetition of 1941-45 period, when the Croatian people used the disintegration of Yugoslavia to try to satisfy its desire for autonomy and independence and when the Croatian people became divided and torn by the internal conflict between the NDH [profascist Independent State of Croatia] and the [Tito's] partisan movement.

To ensure that there is no repetition, following the tragedies of the Second World War, of Bleiburg, of the ways of the cross [the withdrawal of profascist Croat forces via Austria], and all that happened after 1945 up to 1990; that all that caused the Croatian people's misfortunes could not be repeated, we could not embark on any kind of extremist action, we could not resort to revanchism. Instead, we had to come up with a program of general reconciliation. This was the only way of attaining independence.

You see, in recalling some of the points from Croatian history, I did not mention 1918, because 1918 should be examined in an historically objective, Croatian, political, commonsensical, and wise way. Many radical Croats totally condemn Supilo and Trumbic [Croat and Dalmatian politicians instrumental in the creation of the state of Yugoslavia in 1918] for taking the Croatian people into the Yugoslav community. You see, Supilo and Trumbic were among the most prominent Croats, they adored Croatia. However blasphemous this might sound, if their idea of unification had failed, it is debatable if we would be sitting here today. Why? Because this was done to stop the implementation of the London Treaty under which the western powers—France, England and the United States—promised Italy, for siding with them in the war, promised Italy not only Istria that was already in its hands, but also the whole of Dalmatia including Split. They promised Serbia, as a state on their side in the war, they promised Serbia Bosnia and a large part of Croatia's Slavonia.

So this is something that you should look at objectively: What would have been left of Croatia and what would the fate of the Croatian people have been? In the 1941-45 period, you should realize that the NDH, as I said at the first assembly of the HDZ, was not just a quisling creation, but an expression of the Croatian people's wish to have their own independent and sovereign state.

But one should also realize that this Croatian people, which as a single entity wanted their independence, seeing that the NDH was collapsing together with the Axis fascist powers... [pauses] In this period, precisely in Croatia, an antifascist movement was already developed to a large extent and this antifascist movement was led by Tito and it was not by chance that a Croat headed this movement.

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This movement led to a Croatia set up by ZAVNOH [Regional Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia], to the liberation of Istria, to the inclusion of Istria in Croatia for the first time in history, and to the liberation of Rijeka, Zadar, the islands, and so on. This antifascist movement enabled the Croatian people to join up with those Western allies and democratic forces that otherwise did not want a Croatia, but a Yugoslavia. It was on this basis that today's Croatia was able to be founded, as I mentioned recently. Had this not happened, Croatia would only have been treated as a country that was on the side of the fascists.

So these circumstances made us realize that we had to go for reconciliation. Objective circumstances had caused the division of Croatia and brought it into mutual conflict with itself. But we also realized that representatives of the Croatian people were also to blame for being in this situation and for being exposed to these hardships and the catastrophic situation to which we were exposed.

In your question you said former communist officials were still to be found in all the spheres of political, military, and social life. Well, your question also implies a complaint against me. Not you, but among the public people say: He was also a communist, a Partisan general, etc. [words indistinct] Some of our public and the international public should gain an insight into the real truth about all this.

Regarding myself: Before the war I was a member of neither the party nor the SKOJ [Yugoslav Communist Youth League]. They accepted me as the son of a prominent Radic supporter. With my father I opted for the antifascist movement, simply in the realization that an NDH on the side of Hitler and Mussolini had no future and would fail. So they accepted me in the Communist Party in about March 1942. And since I am on this topic, I will tell you this because for a long time there have been even some serious people who have been saying Tudjman is responsible for the current existence of the communists. And I also want to tell you this because of the nonsense being uttered by some former prisoners.

While in this Partisan movement, I realized as early as December 1942 that this communist leadership was not what it said it was and that I was among strangers. Ladies and Gentlemen: In December 1942 things got so bad that I put a pistol to my head. Afterwards, I realized this was courage, but also cowardice. So I left my family, my home area, etc. and I realized that circumstances were such that it was up to each individual, each people, to decide what to do in the given conditions to improve things.

So neither before nor afterwards was I part of some communist base, which might oblige me to support the remnants of these communists, and so on. And this is why I am talking about this.

And if you look at, well, precisely because someone said that those who were in the General Staff were better communists—they probably meant me—yes, I was sent to the General Staff as a representative of Croatia, but my contribution to it was *Rat Protiv Rata* [War on War] which even in those days—in other words as far back as 1955—I could not have published in Belgrade, but had to send it to Zagreb. And they attacked me then because of my anti-Marxism and nationalism, etc. My contribution to it, and this was not alien to either Gosnjak [1953-67 Yugoslav defense minister] or Tito, was the idea of an all-people's defense to ensure that as part of the territorial defense each nation, including the Croats, would be given arms. Later, in 1989, these weapons were handed over by the then communist leaders of Croatia to the Yugoslav Army.

In other words, as far as I am concerned, no flexibility towards the remnants of the communist and old system. But at the same time, we were aware that only with the policy of reconciliation, of forgiveness for all those who support the idea of a free and democratic Croatia, could we attain Croatia as it is now and to build it.

Let us now see what the situation is like in political life, primarily. There are former communists in the HDZ, but those who have stayed in the party, the majority party today, are those who have accepted the HDZ program, who, as we said, could find, could help create the HDZ as a center party in Croatia's political life, rallying and uniting those who are in favor of independent and democratic Croatia regardless of whether they were on the left or the right before. In other words, all those people ready to reach one another rather than fight among themselves. Of course, on the other hand, there are those who emerged from the former League of Communists and continued as reformed communists. Clearly, there are similar people in other political parties. This indicates whether a person has accepted the policy that resulted in an independent Croatia or whether they question and oppose it.

As for the army, if I had not had my experience from the Second World War and theoretical knowledge, there would be no Croatia. The Croatian Army and Croatian diplomats, the Croatian state administration could not be created by only political prisoners and political victims. They did not have the technical knowledge and skills indispensable in some spheres. But, believe me, it was hard to find people like that. I had to search for them not only in Croatia, but throughout the world, to involve

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them in all aspects of life in Croatia. In other words, we needed the people from the former socialist, Yugoslav regime, Croats, the majority of whom could in any case hardly wait to place themselves at the disposal of their country and their people. As I said, the majority of them.

And let us turn to the army. If they did not respond, who would have flown Croatian aircraft? Pilots are a bigger problem than planes for even big states. Planes can be easily bought, but the people... Well, who would know how to operate the electronic equipment used by modern armies, etc?

However, they are neither the majority in the Croatian Army nor did they play the main part in it. I assigned duties to them and if they were successful in carrying them out they stayed, if not, they had to leave. And today, the situation in the Croatian Army is such that only 28 percent of officers in the armed forces of the Croatian Army are from the former Yugoslav army. This means that 82 percent are people from our ranks, trained in the war. At the same time, one third of the leading officer cadre are people who lived as emigres, as emigrants abroad. So, where are the grounds to claim that the army, the police—well, you most probably know that when we took over, the situation in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in the police, was such that in some sensitive cases only 30 percent of the police force were Croats, while in the less important ones, for instance street patrols, they amounted to 50 percent and to 70 percent among firefighters. And what is it like today? Are they not, as often happened, in the majority? Well, gentlemen, out of 32,000 people employed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police only 10 percent are from the old system, you see, 10 percent, and they are mostly Croats and only about 1-2 percent are Serbs. This is what the situation is like today.

Among our diplomats, and as you know, in addition to state administration, army, and the ministry [as heard], the diplomatic service is a very important part of our state identity, state administration, etc. Only 22 percent of our diplomats are from the former system. At the same time, another 22 percent are people who used to live abroad as emigrants. So, tell me, where is the argument for your question? Your question reflected a general view that we, that I as person most responsible for everything, have allowed the situation to arise in which those from the former system are being favored in every sense.

But, of course, the situation in the legal service, especially in the judiciary, and in the media, is a little different. Certainly, in the conditions of war—as a result of this policy of reconciliation and because we should not become engaged in any revanchism—this is where most of the old cadres have remained.

And in a way this policy of reconciliation is coming back to us a bit like a boomerang. Resistance to the implementation of this Croatian policy can be seen especially in the media, where those journalists who were on the margins of the communist, socialist Yugoslav, and even unitarist system, are now speaking out [laughs] in the name of democracy, against Croatian freedom and Croatian democracy.

Furthermore, they are slandering Croatian democracy and giving support to those foreign circles that are opposed to an independent Croatia and favored, at all costs, the maintenance of the former Yugoslavia and opposed the creation of an independent Croatia, and who today support the return of Croatia to some kind of ex-Yugoslavia—whether a Euroslavia or an Adriatic-Black Sea confederation, a Balkan confederation, or a southeast European union, etc. These people enjoy the blessings of democracy and freedom, but in the media and in journalism they attack all those who have sincerely accepted this country of theirs as their own state.

They include the most unscrupulous people, but the state has shown itself to be a democratic state, as we had to do this. They publish defamatory attacks on individuals, give away state secrets, damage direct state interests, such as is the case now with the accident involving the U.S. plane, where they said the Croatian authorities were responsible for this, etc.

In this respect, it is clear that there are many remnants, but it is not so much a matter of these remnants, but of the interests of some internal and international circles that are not happy to see an independent Croatia and want to see its status changed.

So the policy of reconciliation, a policy which removed all revanchism, was the precondition for all our victories—the political and wartime victories—and what we have achieved for Croatia in terms of bringing Croatia into international life, not only as an internationally recognized country, but as they themselves have assessed, as a regional power that has altered strategic relations in this area, and which has achieved, despite the will of others, its partnership with the greatest world power and also with Europe. Those who would like to have things differently, have no option but to reckon with this Croatia. But there are also those who would prefer to orientate themselves to its (?destruction).

In this sense, of course, it is the task of all of us, and of political prisoners, sufferers, above all, not to allow what we have achieved to be brought into question,

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not to allow instances where from the ranks of political prisoners themselves such irresponsible statements are made because these individuals have not achieved certain ambitions. We have to be frank. The fact that someone has been in prison does not in itself mean, if he has no other qualifications, that he is capable of being at the head of a party, at the head of the state, or in some other job. What happens then is that this state, this democracy is completely abused, when according to the constitutional and legal system it is difficult to find a state with more democratic principles, and it is called fascism by opponents, or totalitarianism, and so on.

What kind of state, in conditions of war, carries out elections four times in five years? And we did not have to carry them out, but we did. The task, then, of the Croatian democratic public, of sensible Croatian people, is not to allow, or to condemn, everything which casts doubt on our own state, which serves in one way or another the aim of the opponents of this independent Croatia, which is to compromise this government, to destabilize it, to call for another government. What are the grounds for not accepting the kind of policy which led to the creation of Croatian independence and Croatia's position in the world, for wanting something else? The answer: Why? How?

Political prisoners should not be marginalized, rather if there really are people who are objectively neglected in any respect, if they have the capacity, they should be involved. In particular, their children and grandchildren should not be marginalized, but should have priority, but priority in the sense of if they are equals, but not that they should be given it if they are not capable. Is that not a question of fate?

[Vucemil] Mr. President, when we talk about reconciliation, we cannot avoid the plans for building the focus for reconciliation in Jasenovac. Some foreign and domestic circles attack the very idea. What is your position on this question? Recently the Assembly has also been debating state holidays. There was a heated debate on whether the victims of Communism can celebrate the day of antifascism, and the question was raised of the victims of Bleiburg. On the other hand, Croatia, as a successor to the former Yugoslavia, also won its rights through the antifascist struggle. How can these two positions be reconciled?

[Tudjman] It is one of the essential issues regarding the policy of reconciliation, the policy responsible for our Croatian freedom, Croatian democracy, Croatian state. Certain circles and individuals in Croatia and abroad are opposed to this idea. I think that we have many reasons to realize this idea, to transform Jasenovac into a memorial for all war victims.

Why? Because not only victims of fascism are in Jasenovac. After 1945, after the NDH Jasenovac camp, it was the site of a camp run by the Communist authorities between 1945 and 1948. What is needed is to determine the real number of people killed there during the NDH and after the war. The public is probably aware that according to my studies no more than 40,000 people were killed there during the NDH. This is a huge number, if 4,000 were killed and not... [pauses] It is known that 28,000 people were registered upon entering Jasenovac. Not all of them were killed, a significant number survived. However, some people were not registered. Therefore, as far as I am concerned the figure should not grow higher than that number. However, the number of those others should also be determined—it was also a camp for those who returned from Bleiburg and others imprisoned by the Communist authorities.

Therefore, Jasenovac in its present shape does not represent a place which the Croatian nation could accept because others suffered as well. If we want reconciliation, if we achieved the Croatian freedom and democracy through reconciliation, than we have to in Jasenovac... [pauses] Not to mingle the bones of the victims of fascism and Communism, but in order to determine the number of victims of fascism, the NDH, racial laws. However, we also have to determine the number of victims of Communism. We also have to transfer the bones from the pits we have to that place. At the same time, we should also find a separate place there for all those killed during the Homeland War. My idea is the victims of fascism, the Homeland war—we can mark their names because we know who they are, with crosses or headstones—and the victims. [sentence as heard]

In this way, Jasenovac can become a place devoted to all victims of war, a warning to the Croatian people not to allow situations from the past—the state of division and internecine conflict—to occur again. We should reconcile the dead as we have reconciled the living and their children and grandchildren so they can... [pauses]

Rankovic wanted to organize a major Partisan antifascist movement commemoration of the socialist revolution in Jasenovac in 1966—for the 25th anniversary. The idea was to engrave a stone setting out that 600,000 to 900,000 people were killed there. The only thing in dispute was whether it was to be 600,000 or 900,000 engraved on the stone. At that time I made a contribution—I do not want to go into details—to see that this idea was not realized. Before the replacement

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of Rankovic in 1966, Tito at that time refused to allow this major commemoration at Jasenovac to go ahead, and there never was such a commemoration because he knew that this was an exaggeration.

Regarding the memorial itself, Rankovic ordered the veterans' association—I believe that Marko Belinc could say [words indistinct] if one recalls this. Rankovic ordered that the memorial be by Bogdanovic, in other words by a Serb sculptor, but there were Croatian sculptors and Partisans who wanted to do this work. Vanja Rados told me about this personally and about his designs, but some others [words indistinct] had to be a Serb who could explain that the Croats have always been genocidal people, etc.

So we who are in the know, know how it came into being. So let this monument stand for the victims of fascism. I myself ordered that in this war care should be taken to see that the monument was not destroyed, because this would again have been to our detriment. But in addition to it, in other areas, we will erect monuments to the Homeland War and the victims of Communism. So let this be a place where each Croatian individual—and I believe I would not be exaggerating to say that there is not a single Croatian family from World War II to today that has not made a sacrifice in one way or another [sentence incomplete as heard].

So the idea was to turn it into a memorial area for all victims, and for each one separately, with the commitment to really establish the real number of victims and pay tribute to all these victims.

But this reminds me of something Franco said in Spain: Both the Falangists and the Communists fought for Spain under their separate flags. It is clear that in World War II there were... [pauses] all those who were in the NDH authorities were for Croatia purely out of feelings for Croatia. It is clear that among them there were a small number of politically and ideologically attuned fascists or Nazis. And at the same time it was part of the Axis community, and it had to implement Axis policies, and Hitler's racial laws.

They wanted their state, failing to see that Hitler's Europe had no future. Why was Pavelic on the Axis side? After Radic was murdered in the Belgrade parliament, he escaped abroad and could not seek asylum or support in France, England, or America. Therefore, [laughing] he could get it in Italy, Germany, or Hungary which supported him.

It is true that there were no Nazi or explicitly fascist parties when he became the leader of the NDH. However, it is true that they implemented those racial laws, because they had to implement them with Hitler and Mussolini as their sponsors. Therefore, Jasenovac is a fact which we can not erase from Croatian history. Accompanied by Serb exaggerations, it is a constant burden for us on the international scene.

However, it is very sad that even now certain deputies in the Croatian parliament and certain fellow political prisoners have a very biased opinion regarding all those who belonged to the Croat left during the antifascist movement. It is not true that all those Croats who joined the Partisans and the antifascist movement were anti-Croats and supported Serbia, Yugoslavia. This is a historical misunderstanding of circumstances in which the Croatian nation had to develop.

Furthermore, despite all the evils that Communism brought to the Croatian nation, one should remember that from 1920 onwards Croatian Communists were the ones who spread the idea and the program of the Croatian nation's right to self-determination and the realization of that self-determination—the creation of an independent state, a Soviet Croatia, through a revolution, if necessary.

Apart from the Party of the Rights, all other... [pauses], the HSS, as the principal Croatian party, was pacifist and supported a Yugoslav framework. Therefore, the Communists fought for the Croatian nation's right to self-determination, to break up the Yugoslav prison of nations by revolutionary means, if necessary. The Communists and the nationalist Ustashas in Yugoslav prisons became friends and cooperated along these lines.

When a deputy now says, and he is not alone, that all [Croatian] Communists supported Yugoslavia, Greater Serbia, that they were against Croatia etc., it is a great historic lie and something which is in the way of the realization of this idea of reconciliation. It is a denial of the fact that through this antifascist movement which possessed a Croat element... [pauses] Naturally, the movement also had an international dimension, particularly the Serb part of the movement which was in favor of Yugoslavia, not in favor of Croatia, etc.

All in all, at the beginning of the 20's... [pauses] We had the Cvijic brothers, Kamilo Horvatin, [Miroslav] Krleza, [August] Cesarec, etc.

But, of course, we certainly need to remember the Bleiburg victims and the victims of the Via Dolorosa. While fully recognizing these events, we should commemorate neither 22 June nor 15 May lest we exacerbate things. These events should remind us of the situation we were in; such things should never happen again. As a result, we will be commemorating 5 August, the Day of Croatian Thanksgiving, and of Croatian victory, as we have called it.

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So it is h[illegible] that we have the synthesis of this policy of reconciliation and the security of the Croatian people and the Croatian state, which no one can threaten any more, provided we are aware of everything we have been through and the way in which we achieved our freedom and democracy. So that is how I see things. I believe that we who have lived through much of this are in the best position to make the biggest contribution. We have had to think through this and implement everything in practice. We should realize that we are not entirely alone in our efforts.

Let us recall the North American Civil War. The South and the North—or the North and the South—were at war. But they reached a point where Lincoln, who was in the North, and General Lee, who was in the South, later held similar celebrations. It came to pass that they buried 4,000, I think, Southerners near Gettysburg and 3,000 Northerners. They were buried in the same place. This was a devastating time, what with the fighting and killing, etc. But in creating the United States they survived this, and it was only on the basis of this realization of the need for reconciliation that they were able to further build up America.

And let us be clear about this today: there are still differences and misunderstandings between the North and the South. To be sure, this takes on a different form, in terms of racial tensions between whites and blacks, etc. This is going on. But basically the United States was able to survive and be what it is—on the basis of the idea of reconciliation and the idea that people from the North and from the South should respect each other rather than destroy each other and deny each other's existence.

So these commemorations and holidays... [pauses] the 5 August, when Knin was liberated, is not so much a day for us to offer our thanks to the victims, because we have 15 other (?days for this), but the day of the definitive victory of the Croatian state.

I can tell you here that before and after [Operation] Flash, there were those close to me who doubted we could do this. Even the best equipped foreign services and their representatives—including those who are not entirely against us—came to us and warned us not to go ahead with the liberation of Knin on 4 August. They said this would provoke a war, the spreading of the war, the entry of Yugoslavia, the entry of Russia. Apart from this, in their assessment we were not capable of doing this and did not have the forces.

So some people close to me, some of those who cooperate closely with me, some were hesitant. They were hesitant to such an extent that one or two of them were saying that if we were to fail we would be left with no option but to buy a piece of cloth and have a bullet put through our head.

But, you see, we succeeded. And everything we accomplished—from Maslenica to the cancellation of the mandate of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and the carrying out of Operations Flash, Storm, Mistral, and Summer in western Bosnia, etc.—we did on the basis of our own evaluation of the situation, on the basis of our own decisions, despite what others said.

But the liberation itself, in other words that day, 5 August, when the Croatian flag flew above Knin, signified the definitive victory of the idea of the Croatian state and the strength of the Croatian people. Foreign powers could no longer threaten this state unless we ourselves were to bring this state into question.

So this is my answer to your question on these holidays. We will commemorate everything that we should commemorate, but we will imbue each commemoration with meanings which are in the interests of Croatian freedom, the Croatian people and the future of the Croatian state.

Croatia: Interview With President Tudjman; Part II

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[Second and final part of studio interview with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman by correspondents of POLITICKI ZATVORENIK, Croatian Radio and Television, HINA, VECERNIJ LIST, and VJESNIK, in Zagreb on 20 April—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zeljko Rajic, Croatian Television] The struggle for Croatia throughout history has been waged by people who have had differing notions of what form the Croatian state should take. Some of them ended their days in foreign countries, where they were also buried. Some people believe that the mortal remains of Bruno Busic, Vlatko Macek, and Josip Broz Tito, to give concrete examples, should be buried in Croatia. In your opinion, are they justified in holding such views?

[Tudjman] Yes. I do not know why you have left out Pavelic [leader of the Croatian fascist puppet state in World War II]. After all, both reconciliation and recognition should be granted to those who deserve it. I am in favor of the bones of every Croatian person being laid to rest on Croatian soil.

For the sake of those who lived for Croatia... [changes thought] If we were able to create Croatia on the idea of reconciliation, the reconciliation of the ideas of all those you have mentioned and the reconciliation of living

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people, then why not allow their bones to be returned to this country? But in doing this, there should be no scope granted for making political capital out of this, particularly any unjustified political capital.

So, bring Vlatko Macek back to his country. And say that Vlatko Macek, after the death of Radic and during Radic's time, was one of the vice presidents, perhaps not the most prominent, but after the death of Radic, from 1928 to 1941, we cannot criticize his policies at all. He was one of the most consistent Croatian politicians, but a politician who personally at that time did not go beyond the self-pacifying idea and the Yugoslav idea.

So he had merits, but there is a question mark over his attitude on 27 March 1941, when they carried out the putsch in Belgrade—not so much because of relations with the Axis powers, as because of disagreement over granting autonomy to Croats in the Croatian Banovina [region]. Had he proclaimed the Republic of Croatia at that time, the fate of Croatia would probably have been different. Or had he in 1941 offered the leadership of the Croatian state to the Germans, had he done this or had some of his colleagues done this, then the fate of Croatia, and everything which has taken place since World War II, could have been different.

But his idea—the notion that while the big powers fought it out among themselves, the smaller players still had a place at the table—led to the hitherto largest political party losing out and failing to play a role. This gave scope to the communists on the one hand, and Pavelic's party on the other to play the roles they played.

So, yes, return Macek, give him recognition for what he did, but also assess him properly. After all, Macek ultimately went abroad, to the United States. So he was absent from the political scene in the country from 1941 to 1945, and later he disappeared from the political scene abroad in the years between 1945 and—when did he die?—1964 or 1965. It was 1964, yes? That was 20 years that he did nothing, despite all his experience and contacts which he could have used to unify Croatian emigrants.

So he has some merits in historical terms, but one needs also to look at the nature of the impact he had on political events after his positive period.

Tito—history will certainly record him as one of the most important figures on an international scale of World War II. Tito's clash with Stalin in 1948 was a world phenomenon. Until then, no one in the Eastern Bloc dared voice any criticism of Stalin. At a time when there was a danger of communism sweeping across all of Europe and having a very great influence on Third World countries, of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, at that time that clash was so important that it was supported by the Western world. However, what is interesting is why the Western world supported Tito. Again, we have to recognize that it is because on the one hand, he offered resistance to Stalin, broke the unity of the monolith of the Soviet bloc, and on the other, because Tito also renewed Yugoslavia in World War II and with the resistance which he offered, with a federal system, he maintained that Yugoslavia. But among these same circles in the West there are those against this Croatia and against Tudjman because we are supposedly the main culprits for the breakup of Yugoslavia. [laughs]

So, you see how these relations are very complex. Nevertheless, it is quite certain that Tito, both in the framework of World War II, with the realization of the antifascist movement, with the fact that he was, as is now clear to the Assembly as well, largely to blame for Bleiburg, although he personally did not give the orders for everything that happened there—but it is true that his responsibility cannot be denied—but in the domestic sphere, he not only settled accounts with everything that was important for the NDH [Independent State of Croatia], his settling of accounts on Serb land with everything Chetnik and to do with Greater Serbia was no less iron-fisted—that was in 1945—with their dynasty, their diplomats, their army, and their influence in the world, with which we still have to deal today, in a way. [sentence as heard] In the domestic sphere, therefore, with his communist ideas, he did want to make that Yugoslav Federation some kind of equal community.

He was a Croat who was in a way conditioned by his relations, I know that personally. In 1945, he told Widmar, Josip Widmar, the Slovene writer and academician, president of the Slovene state, or whatever he was at that time, he told him: Go to Zagreb, get Krleza [Croatian writer], and take him to Slovenia so that my people do not kill him. [laughs] So these were relations which... [changes thought] He thought as a communist, but at the same time, he had a Croatian attitude, as in the case I mentioned, and concerning me in 1945 and 1972.

I will tell you openly that some 35 years ago, I did not agree with Krleza when he claimed that Tito was the most successful Croatian politician of our times. I have to admit that I have later in life, right up to the present, become increasingly convinced that this world in which we live, both Europe and the whole world, is not well disposed to an independent Croatia. I am increasingly coming to the view that there is a large degree of truth in this judgement. Besides this, wherever, in the United Nations and wherever we representatives of Croatia appear—in Asia, in Africa—they ask about Tito, and when we say that Tito was a Croat and that is why

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he carried out... [changes thought] He was one of the prominent leaders of the Third World, then they more readily accept us as an independent Croatia, and so on.

So why not return Tito to Kumrovec, where he originated?

As for Pavelic: He did not leave the country as a fascist after the murder of Radic, but, being a radical Croatian nationalist, had no option but to rely on the Axis powers. But at the same time, it should be said that just as his idea to create a Croatian state contained positive aspects, so it should also be realized that in implementing this policy, he made terrible mistakes.

In December 1941, he had no more important plan than to order the arrest of prominent HSS [Croatian Peasant Party] members—180 of them in Croatia. And they had a good reputation among the Croatian people. To be sure, the communists made the same mistake in 1945 and 1946 when they also ordered the arrest and even murder of HSS members. It is interesting that my father fell victim both in 1941 and in 1946 to precisely such irrational and unreasonable policies.

In 1941, Macek proved to be a disappointment and failed to lead the Croatian state, which was created by the Axis powers. Had he done so, that Croatia would not have had to declare war on the Soviet Union. After all, Franco did not declare war on the Soviet Union. But Pavelic declared war not only on the Soviet Union, but on the United States and Canada.

Later, when he saw that the Soviet Union was obviously losing the war, after 1942, he was in a position to get out and leave for Argentina, where he later went, and he would probably have created a different situation [as heard]. However, he stayed on until the end, and was even induced to kill his closest, most faithful colleagues, Bogic and Lorkovic, and he led the Croatian army and people to Bleiburg, and then saved himself, etc.

So yes, we should recognize that Pavelic's ideas about the Croatian state were positive, but that he made such bad mistakes that had there not been that other side, there would have been no Croatian state.

As for Bruno Busic, he was a representative of this generation and of my ideas and I took him on as a colleague in the institute. He was one of the few people who realized that we could only achieve Croatian freedom through reconciliation. Between ourselves, I maintained contact with him and even met him abroad in Spain, Sweden, when I was travelling around Europe not on a Yugoslav socialist passport, but on a false passport. So he was one of those young people who wanted to bring this idea into disunited political emigre circles, which had been infiltrated by UDBA [Yugoslav post-World War II internal state security service] in all possible ways, but did not manage to do so. It is maybe precisely because of this that he was quickly removed, because this idea bothered them. And obviously, such a deceased Kruno Busic deserves to be in Croatia.

I do not know whether I still owe you something in response to your question. All in all, for correct conclusions to be reached on the very tough and convoluted Croatian history, all the dead ought to be given correct and realistic assessments, but also, everything should be done for the idea of overcoming old political and ideological differences to bear fruit as soon as possible, not to allow what was detrimental for the Croatian nation in any respect to reoccur in any form. I believe that without the great majority of the Croatian people having accepted the idea of reconciliation, we would not have achieved all this; it also constitutes a guarantee that we do not have to worry about the vociferousness of those who are trying to prevent that idea, and to bring into question Croatia's independence, which many of them are against.

Many of them are against it to such a degree that everything that I have said recently at the session of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] main committee about DEHOS [Democratic Croatian Opposition—coalition of opposition parties], not because of DEHOS, but because of those who stand behind it, because of their intentions [as heard]. When they were unmasked, they continued in other forms, with the same goals about which I spoke on that occasion.

It is almost unprecedented in international relations that even certain ministers get involved in advocating such ideas and in rallying parties in order to topple a democratically elected government. The time will come when we shall speak about that. It is regrettable that many opposition politicians are not aware of this, and it is even more regrettable that those who know it should still have the gall to take part in this.

[POLITICKI ZATVORENIK editor Andrija Vucemil] When we talk about the association of political prisoners, after research was conducted among a large number of our members, we have established that our members are quite old. Because of the circumstances in which they lived and because of what they went through, they could not get adequate jobs, get better salaries and pensions. They now live on the very verge of poverty. At the same time, there have been rumors in the public, in the streets and cafes, about misappropriation and stealing that have taken place in the process of privatization. What have you personally and the Croatian Government done in this respect? Our members are very interested in this.

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[Tudjman] The position of political prisoners and their families is unenviable. This comes as the result of circumstances—leaving the socialist Yugoslav framework behind us, fighting the war. The other day, I attended a military exercise in defense of our Adriatic area, our sovereignty in that area; two grenades were fired. One grenade costs over 6 million kunas. How much do we spend on our army, diplomacy, how much does it cost to create a state?

Not only political prisoners, but all Croatian people, including myself, are, in their own way—our salaries.. [sentence unfinished as heard]. A medium-paid office employee somewhere abroad earns as much as a minister or the president of the republic here. We could not earmark more money for the social welfare system. We had to provide care for our 400,000 refugees and for no fewer refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina. We had to create our army, diplomacy, and so on.

Despite all that, and despite the political miracle that we have managed to create and preserve an independent Croatian state [sentence as heard]. As to the sort of circumstances in which we did it, let us recall that until the end of 1991, we did not have any friends in Europe and further afield who were ready to fight for the survival of Croatia, but to the contrary, they were eager to see it disappear. Important general consulates were moving out of Zagreb at that time. A friend of mine had among those important people a friend in Vienna. He asked me if he might go then, at the beginning of October 1991, if he might go to see what was happening. He went, and this well-informed man told him: Everything will be over in Croatia by Christmas. I am advising you as a friend to take your children abroad, as Croatia will be paying for this for the next 15 years.

On the third and fourth of the month, he was in Vienna; on the seventh, they bombarded the Presidential Palace to decapitate Croatia; then Vukovar happened; and so on. In addition to a political miracle that in such circumstances when all of Europe and the world were in favor of the continuation of Yugoslavia and of not seeing Croatia gain independence, we created it. But in addition to politically, militarily... [sentence unfinished as heard]

Let us be realistic—we have achieved miracles also in the economic sphere. Regardless of the current situation in which the political prisoners and state administration are discontent, people in Croatia live better than in any other former socialist country, apart from the Czech Republic and Slovenia. We have no inflation, we have our stable currency, the kuna. They also told me—not that, not that—I said: yes [as heard]. What we can, we shall do.

Not only that we have no inflation, but gentlemen, in February, the central Swiss bank, i.e., the main Swiss bank—I do not want to be misinterpreted—the UBS, whatever they call it—published a brochure on Croatia. Croatia has won peace; Croatia is the country which by its geopolitical position belongs to central Europe. Croatia has such a stable, democratic system and has achieved so much in the economic sphere that it represents one of the most prosperous countries in Europe.

Even if I had given it to some of you here or to some experts or nonexperts to write it, it would not have been written in a better way. I still do not know who wrote it. These are objective conclusions that despite the war and everything else, we have built foundations also in the economic sphere with which we can achieve successful economic and cultural development and an improvement in living standards. One ought not to forget that unemployment and recession also exist in Canada, America, and Germany. I received our people from Germany today.

It is now up to us to secure further development in Croatia. Yes, there is knavery, there is misappropriation. But in the psychological war that was planned and conducted not only by Belgrade but also by some European and world centers against an independent Croatia, let us see what was successful and what was unsuccessful. Above all, the successful element was the slogan: HDZ with Tudjman is the party of dangerous intentions. It was successful. All other parties joined a coalition in 1990, including the ruling League of Communists. The slogan that this party was a party of dangerous intentions which wanted to create an independent Croatia, as they called it, an Ustashe Croatia, was effective, was it not? It partly influenced public opinion and led to the creation of the coalition, and so on.

What happened later? Later, we had people saying: The Herzegovina lobby is a threat to Croatia and it is controlled by Tudjman's government, and so this is a problem for Croatia. And in part, this was effective. But people forgot that the Herzegovinians, owing to historical circumstances—because they had been scattered around Croatia and the world—were among the first to support an independent Croatia and fought everywhere, from Vukovar to Dubrovnik. Later, we helped the Herzegovinians defend not only Croat areas in western Herzegovina and central Bosnia, but also in this way, we tried to save Bosnia-Herzegovina at a time when the Muslims were not yet ready for defense.

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When they said to me: Why are you exacerbating relations with the Yugoslav Army because we will [words indistinct]. So, you see, this was the second thing.

The third thing people were saying was that Croatian policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina was very damaging. This had no little significance in the psychological war. And even today, there are many people on the Croatian political scene, and others, who do not understand that this policy of ours toward Bosnia-Herzegovina was the only policy that was in keeping with Croatian interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the interests of the Croatian people and with the interests of the West.

And finally, we had the theory that everything in Croatia is a fraud. Take Tudjman's family, for example, they say. Please, go ahead and proclaim my daughter the richest woman in Europe [laughs]; she sells goods to a [word indistinct] [laughs]. So they attacked the HDZ, Tudjman's family, and they said everything was a fraud and nothing but a fraud, and that this was in the interests of the HDZ and the people in power.

Let us be realistic: The switch from a socialist system to a free market system was an unprecedented task and challenge for mankind. And in this respect, we in Croatia have achieved even greater success than in virtually any former socialist country. Almost half of industry is now privately run. There was no point during the war in which we experienced any shortages—not even of such sensitive commodities as gasoline.

But the road to a free market from that socialism was not a road strewn with flowers, but an arduous road. Naturally, in this period of transition, it was to a large extent those people who were—for good or bad reasons—in business positions, in management, in enterprises, etc, who were successful. But there was no other option. Some people bought companies at prices lower than what they were actually worth. But our constitutional commitments required that we go for the free-market system, and we said at one time: We will have to give away enterprises even for nothing, or for two dinars, to satisfy formal niceties, but the purchaser's obligation would be to continue production so that people are employed, etc.

In this sense, there were cases of fraud, but fewer, I maintain, than in other countries. Some people who have grown rich here in Croatia brought their capital—1 million or 2 million or 6 million, I do not know—what they had saved cultivating roses or whatever, or running cafes abroad. They brought this money back to Croatia and grew rich. So they had know-how, some capital, some possibilities. Let us be realistic: when we committed ourselves to a free-market system, in other words, to a capitalist economy, you must realize that you cannot have a rich Croatia without rich Croats.

It is another matter that we should not have allowed and must not allow anyone to make money unlawfully, nor should one person be permitted to, and not another. Everyone must have equal conditions and they must all fulfill their obligations—customs, taxation, and so on.

During the war, when I had to devote 20 hours out of every 24 to the battlefields, the war, diplomacy, it is clear that we could not pay attention to this as well, at least not to the extent that we should have done. Nevertheless, I maintain that in spite of this, there is less fraud, less abuse than in other socialist countries. Throughout that time in Croatia, there was no theft of national property or transfer of capital abroad to foreign banks. On the contrary, our people returned. That did not happen in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Russia, and so on.

More than a year ago, we said, particularly in my report to the Assembly, in the review of last year, I said we must resolutely embark now on devoting attention to the removal of all fraud and cases of crime, and we are doing so. [words indistinct] We began, since we are talking about this now, we were very firm when this occurred in the case of Croatian Radio-Television. We were also firm when this happened at the Sisak oil refinery. Regardless of the fact that they said to me: but there are people there who have helped the HDZ. I said, precisely because of that! There is the example of (?ACI), examples which are already being investigated—some fraud in Varazdin in state reserves, and so on. We are proceeding resolutely to remove all cases of this.

They wavered for a long time. It was during the war that they told me that NOVI LIST had not fulfilled its legal obligations with regard to tax and customs, and so on. Once I did say, in war circumstances: well, let's finish the war first; but as soon as the war finished, we said: Let us now get down to getting rid of all these cases that are known and not known, so that we really behave like a law-governed state. I do not think there is any hesitation here. It is one thing to say that it is all fraud—that is part of that psychological war against the independent, sovereign state of Croatia, and it is another matter, that we will do everything to solve the problem. However, we do have some resistance in the legal services, the legal authorities, and so on, which we have inherited, where affairs which the Ministry of Internal Affairs has already uncovered lie for months or even years in some lawyer's drawer. Clearly, we must handle this more firmly. One thing is sure, that there is no hesitation, in that Croatia must be a law-governed

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state and that no one can be exempt, no on can have concessions or not have to fulfill customs, taxation, or any other obligations toward the state on account of some party affiliation.

But this is the task not only for the Ministry of Interior. I have already said what our Ministry of Interior is like—they would not be so successful if people from the old system were not part of it, people who are competent. I have already said how many of them there are.

You know the results achieved recently: the discovery of a group of foreign terrorists—imagine if the terrorists had succeeded in accomplishing what they came for, in killing or blowing a house up—we would not have had any tourists from Opatija to Du' ovnik. Then, they [Ministry of Interior] succeeded in discovering a drug-smuggling ring.

This is all to say that we do have in our executive bodies... [changes thought] We are working on it and we do succeed. Where things stagger is at the level of the courts, at the legal level, and we have to correct this. But surely this government, headed by me, will deal with this. If we can deal with everything else, we can deal with this.

[Smiljana Skugor, HINA] We are in the sixth year of Croatian statehood. But we are aware that many did not want an independent Croatia and that they are using every opportunity to blacken its name both here and abroad. The most recent case is that of the so-called Zagreb crisis. What is desired in blowing up this case is to harm the Croatian state. Do you think that even today there are those in the Croatian national corps who wish to overthrow the state and who, following instructions from certain political or quasi-political circles, wish to draw Croatia into a new Yugoslavia, or whatever its name might be?

[Tudjman] You used a heavy phrase in your question—that they want to overthrow the state. I would not perhaps go to such lengths. Even those who are against an independent Croatia would like to retain some sort of a Croatian state in which they would have the power. They would then be satisfied, just as many were satisfied about restricted sovereignty for Croatia, as in the socialist federation. But it is absolutely certain that on the domestic scene we are faced with a group of people who had a such good life in the former socialist federation and in communism and they will never live better than that again. This is something we have to reckon with.

But the important thing is this: Why is it that certain international circles want at any cost to retain Croatia in the former ex-Yugoslavia [as heard], in a Euro-Slavia, a Balkan, Adriatic, Black Sea confederation, or a union of southeastern Europe? Why? Because of strategic and geopolitical reasons which some European states and forces [words indistinct] have mutual disputes and mutual trust or lack of it, and because of which many would like Croatia to remain in this region—as it is more developed and they could rely on it more than on some other countries, etc.

Many of our people on the political scene are unable to see this main problem and in this sense they are calling into question independent Croatia.

We must respond as to why it is not recognized that the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] gained a majority in Zagreb as well. When a party in Europe gains a 36.5 percent majority it is a desirable victory. And the HDZ gained this majority in Zagreb, and it is owing to this party most of all—surely we agree—that we have Croatian freedom, Croatian democracy, and the Croatian state. Why are people against cooperation with this party, and instead the most unlikely parties are uniting into this seven-headed coalition, from the extreme Left to the extreme Right? What are their motives? Why can they not accept cooperation with [word indistinct]? Lately, however, some have seen how risky this can be and they are afraid.... When the Christian Democratic Party [HKDS] of Mr. (?Keglevic) came and offered cooperation with the HDZ—and it is sure a party which, despite its small membership, keeps recruiting Christian Democrats from European circles—saying that 90 percent of the program, I do not know whether he said it publicly, but he said it during the talks. [sentence as received] So there are in fact parties which feel that the Croatian state could be called into question if the majority party is destabilized and compromised in such a way as to lead to destabilization, first in Zagreb and then everywhere else.

Apart from the Christian Democrats there is the Conservative Party in Split. Despite its small membership it has more influence than the former Democratic Action, etc. There are also the Democrats from Medjimurje, etc. There are also people from the HSS [Croatian Peasants Party]. Many responsible people said they were in favor of permanent cooperation with the HDZ then withdrew the offer. Some of their people on the ground, in some counties, municipalities, and towns were for cooperation, but some were saying they were for cooperation but at the same time they were against working together. [as heard]

The problem, therefore, lies in the interest of certain foreign circles. I have already said that it is almost unprecedented, and we must speak out on this publicly at some point when the time comes—because in politics

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the question of timing is most important—that some party people, party leaders, are prepared to cooperate with some foreign partners and institutions, and even some ministers, but not with the democratically elected representatives of the government and state in Croatia. We will have to broach this question and explain it.

We must not allow, of course, the efficiency of the state authorities to be brought into question.

For this reason, and in line with my constitutional obligation to ensure the efficiency and unity of the state authorities, I did not allow the nomination by the party which had won the majority in Zagreb to be ignored. I did not allow the creation of something which would be destructive for the efficiency of the state authorities.

If we want to resolve all the problems which have been mentioned, to root out abuse, crime—both local and foreign—then the state authorities have to be enabled to carry out these tasks.

And in this sense it is especially for the media and the public... [pauses] I have already mentioned how it can be explained that those newspapers, those media, those individuals are taking the brunt which support the democratically expressed will of the majority of the Croatian people, which support Croatian freedom, Croatian democracy, the Croatian state formed in very unfavorable war conditions in the country and unfavorable international conditions. [as heard]

And why do we have such a situation that those newspapers, dailies or weeklies or biweeklies, which are against this Croatian state have at their disposal the means to pay enormous fees and printing and publishing, and we, who have fought to create the army, the police, the diplomatic service, that we can hardly provide for a normal cultural weekly or daily to be published?

It is time we spoke about these issues and we shall have to discuss them increasingly and do away with such a situation where honest people who could hardly wait, together with the majority of the Croatian people, for their state, their freedom and democracy, that these people are exposed to mockery or attempts to thwart their efforts.

Such is our situation, yet I am not worried. I believe in the future of the Croatian people and its state. I have many reasons for that and many ordinary people, from the elderly and ordinary peasants or fishermen or real intellectuals to the youth—I have received so many letters and had so many conversations which help me to believe so.

Let us be aware of the conditions—national and international—in which we live, of what we have achieved, and let us be proud of what we have achieved. Let us have role models but let us also be aware that we have made our contribution to the world and to the European democracy. Our contribution is not lesser than that of many other peoples. Many do not have such monuments [spomenici] or such achievements which we can be proud of despite the fact that we have problems which we have to resolve. After all, which people and which state does not have them, either social, or political, or other.

We are at the key point where we shall either establish ourselves, and we will establish ourselves as a modern democratic state—we have enough experience I spoke about at the beginning that we shall not allow Vienna, Novo Mesto, Bleiburg, Jasenovac to happen again. After Knin, never again.

[Zoltan Kabok, Croatian Radio] In Croatia there are public newspapers which openly attack all state officials without arguments, invoking the law-governed state and freedom of the press. However, if observations are made about irregularities in their operations they say this is an attack on the freedom of the press and seek intervention from outside. What are your views on the freedom of the media in Croatia, and where do we stand on this issue in comparison with Europe?

[Tudjman] I have partly already answered your question. There can never be enough freedom. There can never be enough democracy. But freedom and democracy imply responsibility. Personal responsibility, responsibility to the community to which we belong. I believe that in this respect we have not too little democracy, but too much anarchy. In this sense our society has to mature and find ways to prevent such attacks both on individuals and on the interests of the state. What has been written against the interests of the state, for no reason, the desire to bring down certain people, is practically unprecedented in a democratic country.

Let us be self-critical, but let us also be aware that we have created a democratic system, that we have held elections. Many asked why do you need a referendum, why do you need elections, why not go straight for direct elections for president, why go for more parliamentary elections, and so on. We did all this, more than in other countries, and we permitted such a degree of democracy which, as I said, has too much anarchy and we have to find ways of putting a stop to those cases which are really not compatible even with good taste or manners, not only political but simply normal civility.

[Darko Djuretek, VECERNJI LIST] What do you, Mr. President, as a historian, think about the foundation of

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an institution or establishment which would systematically work on information gathering and the study of testimonials from those who suffered for the state of Croatia? There is also the problem of the former prisons of Sveti Grgur and Goli Otok, where after the closure of the prisons the former government wanted to eliminate all trace of them. Do you support the idea of allowing the buildings to be used by former political prisoners who would organize various events there and thereby assist in not allowing this to be forgotten?

[Tudjman] In reply to your first question: I do not think we should have to set up special institutions. But these should be part of an existing historical institute, my former institute, which I wanted to turn into precisely such an institution—one which would tackle all problems of national history.

Certainly in this context, on the road to creating the Croatian state, and for the purpose of establishing the identities of all those who were killed in the past and in the most recent history, we most certainly should improve research into how Croats were killed in the past, and especially in the more recent past.

So I would be in favor of obliging the political prisoners' association to go along to this institute with the aim of getting one or two people to deal systematically with an issue so that we might obtain some concrete and real data. After all, to create a new, fresh institution you need other services as well, etc, so it is better to include them. Apart from this, these findings should be incorporated into other historical research, etc. They should not be shunted off on different tracks.

And now to the question of Sveti Grgur and Goli Otok... [pauses] Yes?

[Unidentified voice] and Gradiska.

[Tudjman] ...and Gradiska. You see I am in favor of leaving lasting monuments recalling what we have experienced. So we should have monuments in Gradiska, Lepoglava, and Pozega and all those places to commemorate what happened and what the significance of this was. Not only this. I have told our people in the government that when carrying out reconstruction work in each devastated place, village or town, from Vukovar to Prevlaka, in each place we should erect something which will remain a lasting memorial to what we have lived through—for the purposes of remembrance and in order not to allow such things to be repeated.

When mentioning Goli Otok, you see, it is also time to tell the full truth about Goli Otok, about the suffering of each individual, but so that we might see the essential nature of Goli Otok and what role all this played in those days from 1948 to 1951 or 1953. You see, both as a participant and a politician, I can say that everyone who had been on Goli Otok was a victim and had suffered. Many among them because of the ideas they advocated until the end.

From the Croatian standpoint, it would be difficult to say that all those who were in Goli Otok because they adhered to ideas were there in the interest of Croatian freedom, of Croatian independence.

What is the gist of the matter? Do you know who in former Yugoslavia were the most numerous in choosing Stalin, Informbiro?—Montenegrins, Bosnian Serbs, and Serbs from Serbia. Why? Because they were not satisfied with Tito's federalism—firstly. And secondly, because they wanted at all costs to subordinate themselves to the Russian motherland and Stalin—everything he said was sacred.

The smallest number of Informbiro followers was among the Croatian communists, because the idea of independence of the Socialist Federal Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc was inherent in the resistance to Informbiro and Stalin. In order to enable this, Tito had to allow more equal federal relations within Yugoslavia. At a certain point, there was a move towards accelerated creation of kolkhoz, soon afterwards, to abolish kolkhoz, and there was democratization of social life under the leadership of KPJ [Communist party of Yugoslavia] which was drunk on its victory and thus even deviated from its democratic proclamations during the war.

Still it was important that both in the political life as well as in military—a most interesting point as some of the generals chose Informbiro—the followers of Informbiro were from the ranks of Montenegrins, Serbs in Bosnia, and Serbs in Serbia proper, in a smaller extent Croats and Slovenians. Still, the Communist rule in Croatia has exploited such a situation and persecuted the followers of Informbiro, imposing on some people the sins of which they were not guilty; it was done in order to settle accounts with them and so on.

And so, in defining the position on Goli Otok we cannot just glorify it as if it was... [pauses] Because there were things which were not in the interest of Croatia of that time and not even in its future interests. Well, what about it now? Something should be done with Goli Otok. In any case we should erect a monument there to the victims. But Goli Otok itself should have an economic purpose. If we consider the other problems we have—both economic, cultural, etc.—we should not maintain this (?myth). Anyway, there was suffering in other places as well. As we have mentioned earlier,

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the memorial area of Jasenovac where we really should make all efforts to assemble all victims.

Every period in history... [pauses] All peoples have some monuments from different epochs. I have already said in the parliament that we should erect a monument to Croatian freedom in the capital of Croatia, something which would stay for posterity.

I am in favor of establishing the truth in an objective way and leaving the monument there, but the purpose of it—whether the Association of Political Prisoners can join in this way or not—this is a question we should think about.

[Andrija Vucemil] Mr. President, another question for POLITICKI ZATVORENIK. At the beginning of June, or more precisely on 8 June, the Fifth International Congress of Political Prisoners and Victims of Communism will be held in Opatija. Croatia is hosting the congress. What would you—as a former political prisoner and a victim of communism—say to participants of the congress and the international public. It is certainly in our interest that you say something.

[Tudjman] I would just make a summary of everything we have discussed today. Victims of comm .nism among the Croatian people, and all other peoples... We must not forget, but we have to be aware that these victims were in a way unavoidable and an expression of circumstances. They contributed to winning the fight for freedom and social justice. They were not the only victims, there were also victims on the other side.

We should build a society, a society within our people, which would prevent future victimization for ideological reasons.

During the Second World War, in fact between the First and the Second World War, in particular during the period of great economic crisis from 1929 onwards, Europe and the world were ruled by great ideas and ideologies—communism on one hand, and fascism on the other.

Society was in a crisis. Despite all its democratic conditions, society was in a crisis and that is why it was possible for communism to appear and gain a victory in the Soviet Union and during the Second World War in other countries too, and nazism and fascism in Italy.

These were, in a way, world phenomena where victims could not be avoided. At the time there was a possibility for one of these ideas to rule, to be imposed to the world. Because of the nuclear weapons nowadays there is no such possibility that one power imposes its rule in the name of one idea.

But assembling at such gatherings, in this case of the victims of communism, but clearly we must not forget the victims of fascism, we should (?bear in mind) the idea that mankind, in the course of its development, realized that it must not be a slave to one idea, like communism or nazism, and that we should create the life for individuals and peoples of coexistence of different ideas, different political opinions. Even nowadays we often need some illusions again, but we should not neglect our national sovereignty and national state for the sake of the European Union or world community.

There have already been European unions, European communities, from the Roman Empire to the Habsburg Monarchy, Napoleon's, Hitler's, and so on, and today there are similar aspirations, yet peoples exist.

Only a free individual can make his contribution to his people and society and only a free sovereign people can make its contribution to the international community.

So at all these gatherings which want to honor the victims whom certain movements sacrificed, we should still realize that it had happened in the given international circumstances, which are different today. But today we should not allow new illusions either, anything that would lead to new victims. However, we should bear in mind that there can never exist a world without contrasts. The only question is how to deal with them so that relations can be as bearable as possible, society as rich as possible, as cultured as possible.

Problems, of one kind or another, will always exist. It is especially important that we, as one of the oldest European peoples with a young sovereign state, solve problems successfully and do not allow old disputes to return and bring about the situation in which everything we have lived through would reoccur.

Croatia: Comment: Tudjman Interview Offers 'Vague Explanations'

AU2604164096 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 23 Apr 96 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov Colic: "Delayed Charges"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The most interesting and unusual attitudes of the Croatian president, as expressed in his long interview, are these: So far a best opinion of Tito and worst of Pavelic; bitterness toward the judiciary and certain media; uncontrolled comment on some foreign ministers (most likely Kinkel) and their inappropriate kindness to the wrong persons; and a conciliatory attitude toward the opposition, but perhaps even more

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uncompromising toward the majority of political opponents who claim that supporting the HDZ [the Croatian Democratic Community] is the best way to remove the disgrace of communism. The interview contains a number of beautiful statements from a modern political leader (belief in the future without ideological victims, compliments to tolerance and understanding, the dream of a prosperous society). However, it also contains a series of bitter and harsh words from a disappointed small politician, which are apt to cause in too many people an uneasy feeling and fear, instead of a general approval of values advocated by the president in his agreeable idea of all-Croatian reconciliation without retaliation or revanchism, and with clear political duties.

Cynics will promptly point out that the same day HINA released this interview, given to the media that had proved reliable (THE POLITICAL PRISONER, HINA, HRT, VJESNIK, VECERNJI LIST), the information was released that the Municipal State Prosecutor's Office in Zagreb had accepted the proposed indictment against the editor in chief of NACIONAL because of the controversial article on the alleged disadvantages of Dubrovnik Airport. Other people would point out that the English popular press (THE SUNDAY TIMES, THE OBSERVER), on the occasion of the celebration of the 70th birthday of the Queen Elizabeth II, published texts alleging that the Queen was "haunted by the ghosts of the past," or was such a bad manager that she would have had to resign in any company that suffered the kinds of things her family suffers all the time.

Different countries have different traditions, and therefore different ideas of publicity, immunity, democracy, and sovereignty. In this particular transitional political time in Croatia, the president seems to have decided to create balance by becoming stricter on one side (media, judges, plots) and more liberal on the other, the historical and ideological one. He even claimed that Supilo and Trumbic had created a foundation for the present independent Croatia by choosing the first Yugoslavia, and Tito and the prominent Croatian communists had done so by choosing to continue the second Yugoslavia (whatever it was like), thus making it possible, in the long run, for Croatia to be created in the democratic West as a completely independent, sovereign state. Tudman claimed that Tito, whom he allegedly met only occasionnaly and on a superficial basis, had rescued him several times to be a counterbalance to the idea of Greater Serbia. Analyzing his political and military relations to communism, he even revealed that he had attempted to take his own life in 1942 because of general utter disappointment.

As we can see, this stand by Tudjman as a party politician has mainly been used to deliver a lesson to those Croatian victims who feel deprived in the distribution of honor and power, especially when it comes to the untouchable former communists. Undoubtedly, every reasonable person will accept Tudjman's explanation that many matters never could have been initiated, let alone successfully dealt with, without people of knowledge, experience, and technical ability in issues as complicated as military skills and diplomacy. Therefore, it is even more strange that Franjo Tudjman does not recognize the same professional skills in the media market, where it is most profitable to write—if his opinion is taken literally—against "this Croatian state," as "real" weekly and daily newspapers hardly manage to be published—even with abundant help from the government.

Nobody has ever managed to become absolutely necessary in a trade by removing the unpleasant competition. The "good" magazines are most likely to be bothered by the original value of Tudjman's dream of the all-Croatian reconciliation, as they—in our political reality—are the most tireless fabricators of ever more dangerous enemies. Speaking of that, a distinction should finally be made between the usual ideological accusations (like red, yugo-nostalgic, hireling) and really dirty, immoral, base, and groundless allegations in the Croatian press, although the latter reach less than 10 percent of the population despite the various approaches, which really makes Croatia a country of exclusive electronic miracles.

However, the President of Croatia seems to have found some time—after the war—to efficiently pay attention to such issues, giving very vague explanations on: how his party managed to win the elections in Zagreb without winning them, why immortal foreign friendships are lost, why the posthumous unification of Jasenovac is abnegated, why Croatia has remained a model of democracy (in its own eyes mainly). Therefore it is this newspaper's turn now, although it had been marked before as political candy in some future moral, economic, and legal straightening of accounts. And now you can charge them with whatever you like, as somebody said.

Croatia: Commentary Views Slavonia Reintegration

AU2704181096 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 20 Apr 96 pp 12-13

[Commentary by Branko Vrbosic: "The Fourth Migration of the Serbs?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The occupied part of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem is not "hermetically closed" anymore! Even according to the Serbs who live there, it is not the RSK [Republic of Serb Krajina]

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anymore, nor the Srijem-Baranja Region—it is "the region of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem, an integral part of the Republic of Croatia." That is how things are on the "eastern side," for the time being, and the free part of Croatia has never had any doubts about the integrity of Croatian territory all the way to the Danube River.

This optimistic attitude toward the process of peaceful reintegration is ultimately proven not only by the statements of Croatian or world politicians, but by the actions of the present Serb (para)authorities. After only three months of the UNTAES [the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] mission, the local politics and rhetoric have undergone considerable changes, and the ruling clan has definitely been revealed as a group of individuals whom Milosevic assigned the leading part in preserving the winnings of the agression on that Croatian region. A promising material situation awaits those "leaders" in Serbia, and the people they led are left on their own. Should we be surprised by the almost mass exodus of Serbs from eastern Croatia, which began in April?

Requests of Serbs

The panic that began among the Serbs after the Erdut Agreement was signed (12 November 1995) calmed down very quickly. However, there have been daily changes ever since 15 January 1996, when UN Security Council Resolution 1037—which creates the formal prerequisite conditions for the reintegration of the Croatian East—was adopted. Let us present a number of Serbian documents.

The "executive council of the association of Serb refugees and displaced persons for the region of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem, the Vukovar branch, which protects the interests of all Serb refugees and displaced persons from the Republic of Croatia and the RSK" held a session in early February. They concluded that the "Serbs are ready to return to their homes, to the places where they lived...because they cannot give that up." However, they had conditions for their return: alteration of the Croatian Constitution and regulations, regaining the status of a constitutional nation; equal rights in language, letter, education, and media; termination of all trials; abolition and amnesty for all; removal of Croatian symbols like the kuna (currency) and names of streets; participation in administration; a return according to the principle of reciprocity—everyone returning to their homes... Their final statement was: "We accept all negotiations on the solution for both nations. We do not accept that we are rebel Serbs—we are a nation that fought against secession." Their conclusions were extended at other gatherings, and in Beli Manastir they stated that they wanted to return to their homes, but only after the international community removed the present Croatian authorities.

They Want a Serb Dinar!

On 29 February "a coordination of local communities" sent a letter to Serbian President Milosevic and other Yugoslav-Serb leaders. They stressed that "deep down, they believe that not everything is lost, and that there must be a way to change the course of events... The people do not want to be under the rule of Ustashas, under the Ustasha dagger... That is our vow, and our children's vow, too. We want Serbian authorities to obey, and our army, and our Serbian dinar—nothing more and nothing less. Otherwise, we can only be passive bystanders in the future tragic fate of the Serbian nation. Is this not the eve of the fourth great migration of the Serbs?" They objected to the "discordant team of negotiators," and how they had to hear "the same story from the 'master of the region' after every negotiation: That this is Croatian territory, and everything has been settled in Belgrade."

The Borovo complex paper wrote very bitterly about Belgrade: "They are trying, through institutions of legal authorities, to extract Borovo's property in Serbia." The paper said that the Lasta Company stole buses from the RSK and laid off their drivers, and that the Borovo executives are not recognized as equal in Serbia. The Bosnian Serbs who had taken up residence in Croatia have already mourned themselves, and everything ends with commentaries named "The Erdut Agreement Irrevocably Divides the Serbs: A Signature That Tastes Like Deceit," or "What Awaits Us: Staying or Leaving."

Not a Word About the RSK Anymore

By the end of March, things seemed to be considerably calmer. For instance, the same association during their annual session on 31 March called themselves "the association of Serb refugees and displaced persons for the region of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem." Not a word about the RSK anymore, they put it very clearly that the region is a part of the Republic of Croatia. Their declaration said: "Despite their negative historical experience regarding living with the Croats, the Serbs are ready to return to their homes..." Their conditions were far more flexible this time, and they said that the condition for peaceful reintegration is the restitution of the constitutional rights of the Serbs. They also wanted the international community to "ensure the equality of the Serbian and Croatian nation in the Croatian territory, regarding their political, legislative, economic, social, and cultural rights," and to "enable

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the Serbs to decide on the way they want to live with the Croatian people."

All those statements were made by people who did not participate in the authorities directly. However, a day before Easter, according to the Julian calendar, Borislav Drzajic spoke openly for the first time, and admitted: "Whether we want it or not, after the UNTAES mandate is completed the Srijem-Baranja region will become an integral part of Croatia. Every individual should then have the right to choose where they will live and what they will do with their possessions. Nobody will be stopped from leaving for Serbia. The border control has been formed only because of cases of stealing other people's possessions and taking those to the FRY and the Republic of Serbia." (!) He confirmed that forests were chopped down in the most barbaric way, but omitted the fact that he had "protected" a part of his possessions by taking those to Serbia. He also avoided the issue of Deletovci and who profits by selling the oil—Deletovci having been converted into "private property."

Conversation That Costs More Than an Average Salary

Thus we saw the first Serbian steps toward the peaceful reintegration, made after three months of UNTAES. However, the truth about the future of the occupied territory has reached the entire population behind the iron curtain. The "authorities" came up with the idea of charging more than a month's salary for a telephone conversation "abroad," but it was in vain. Speaking of that, the average monthly salary of the 3,500 (?) people employed in Borovo is approximately 200 dinars (50 DM), and—as their newspapers put it—"after the transport is paid, the remaining sum is approximate to what the unemployed receive."

Common people react in various ways. Although some people who wanted to leave the area were even murdered, it did not stop nightly migrations (people usually move away machinery equipment and furniture). Two weeks ago, one night saw 500 persons moving away, but the following day the UNHCR talked them into going back, and the "authorities" of the Srijem-Baranja region prohibited the taking of movables to Serbia. However, according to the latest information, the process goes on. For instance, Serbs are moving away from Miklusevci in great numbers, taking with them the belongings of Croats and remaining Ruthenians, which prompted the head of the government's Temporary Administrative Authorities, Ivica Vrkic, to ask General Klein to intervene.

Crying Over Lost Things

The hermetically closed area is obviously opening. A group of Serb women who had taken up residence in Baranja recently visited Osijek and, having come back, openly cried—in front of TV cameras—because of all the things they had carelessly left. Nobody is surprised anymore by the question that Serbs from the occupied Croatian East ask most often: "Am I on the list of war criminals? If not, how am I going to get my documents?" As we can see, the process of peaceful reintegration goes on unceasingly, but these little signs of progress cannot convince anyone that the Serb population in that region is yearning to recognize Croatia as their homeland. Most of them will probably never sincerely do so, but they will anyway, as it is the only dignified way to peacefully get over the evil of the war they took part in so willingly.

Croatia: Town of Vrginmost Renamed Gvozd

LD2904175896 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At today's session in Vrginmost, the assembly of Sisak-Moslavina county unanimously decided to change the town's name to Gvozd. The name was taken from a nearby hill where the last king from the national dynasty, Petar Svacic, was killed in battle in 1097. [passage omitted]

Croatia: VJESNIK Staff Protests 'Unlawful' Dismissals

AU2604150796 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Slavica Lukic: "Dismissals Are Unlawful"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—If they really fire part of the VJESNIK staff, the management of this newspaper will violate the Law on Work. In Article 106 of the Law it is said that a dismissal for economic reasons is justified only if the employer cannot transfer the surplus employee to some other position within the firm. It is difficult to believe in the explanation issued by the management that the number of employees will be reduced for economic reasons, because VJESNIK has recently hired eight new people. This was stated by VJESNIK's columnist Aleksandar Milosevic, chairman of the trade union of journalists with the newspaper, at a news conference held on 24 April.

The current VJESNIK management, representatives of the trade union claim, has violated the collective agreement that the employees of VJESNIK signed with the management in 1993. VJESNIK's editorial board was the first one in Croatia that managed to conclude a collective agreement with their employers at the company

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level, which was supposed to last four years. Milosevic claims that the current management of VJESNIK, headed by Juro Ivancic, has put the collective agreement out of force and has adopted its Statute on Work, which it is now following. When the dismissals were announced in VJESNIK, the Trade Union of Journalists asked the Ministry of Work and Welfare to state its opinion. The Ministry confirmed that the collective agreement signed by VJESNIK's journalists in 1993 was still in force, and that the new management did not have any right to ignore it.

None of the 150 employees in VJESNIK knows how many dismissals will be handed down. According to Milosevic, so far none of the employees has officially been dismissed. However, it is certain that five employees—journalists Franjo Kiseljak and Suzana Kocijan and editors Marika Toth, Jadranka Lukacic, and Nikola Balen—have been informed by the management that they will be dismissed. Chairman of the trade union Milosevic claims that executive Damir Regovic told him that 17 employees would be dismissed, while Chief Editor Nenad Ivankovic suggested that the number might go up to 50. "When I asked the head of management, Jure Ivancic, who had compiled the list of dismissals, and following which criteria, he did not want to answer me. When I warned him that he could not fire Marika Toth because she is a trade union activist and enjoys immunity, he answered: 'We can do whatever we want!,'" Milosevic said.

One of the employees who have been verbally informed of their dismissal, editor Marika Toth, points out that in the course of her 20-year work experience she has worked as a journalist and an editor, feels she is qualified to perform other jobs in addition to that of editor, and wants to work further. Neither she nor anybody else in VJESNIK understands the criteria applied to dismiss some people and take others into the editorial board. Toth has sent a message to the editorial board of VJESNIK—which claims that journalists' resistance to such drastic measures reflects the mentality of the former self-government system—that their way of introducing capitalism reflects their ignorance.

Stipe Jolic said that the Trade Union of Journalists of Croatia has extended full support to the petition signed by correspondents from the Assembly, as a sign of protest against dismissals in VJESNIK. This, he claims, is the first public and encouraging sign of solidarity among journalists.

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FYROM: Commentary Welcomes Accord With FRY

AU2904165196 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 29 Apr 96 p 3

[Commentary by Zoran Petrov: "The Hot Line Is Being Frozen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia normalized bilateral relations at an ambassadorial level on 8 April. The two countries's foreign ministers, Ljubomir Frckovski and Milan Milutinovic, signed the agreement regulating relations and promoting cooperation between the two states in Belgrade, which outlines future contacts. In addition to the most important aspect of this document—the mutual recognition of independent states—paragraph two of this Agreement is also of great importance, which reads as follows: "The two sides will form a joint diplomatic and expert commission in 30 days from the day of the signing of the agreement. This commission will prepare a proposal for an international agreement, in which the common border will be defined in words and will be completed with maps on which the common state border will be drawn. The two sides will then sign the proposed international agreement."

According to this, the deadline is 8 May for the diplomatic and expert groups from Macedonia and FRY to meet and set out the conditions for an official international agreement. We have found out that the Macedonian commission will be headed by a representative of the Foreign Ministry, most probably Deputy Minister Branko Stojanovski, who was also the government's spokesman in presenting the basic principles of the agreement to the Assembly's commissions over the last few days. According to some reports, representatives of the Ministries of Defense and the Interior will also join the commission. As they will be engaged in field work to map out the whole border, it is being assumed that the process will not be a short one. In any case, the most important thing is that the process has finally started and an end has been put to the dispute that at some moments dangerously threatened relations between the two countries.

Different Interpretations of the Maps

The total length of all four state borders of the Republic of Macedonia is 849 kilometers. The longest one is with Greece at 262 kilometers, then it is 231 with FRY, 191 with Albania, and the shortest is with Bulgaria at 165 kilometers. While the mapping of the border with the other neighboring countries was done in the past (with Greece in 1913, Bulgaria in 1919, and Albania in 1926), and therefore these borders are not subject to any dispute and are fully marked, that of the Macedonian-Yugoslav border in some places has not yet been completed owing to some "disputed" parts.

In effect, the border became a problem for our northern neighbor immediately after the introduction of the UN sanctions and the relatively consistent Macedonian respect for them. The seemingly simple question was revitalized in September 1993 when a question was raised in FRY's Assembly as follows: "Do the disputed regions that Macedonia controls, but which belong to Serbia, amount to an area of 2,184 hectares?" The answer of the Yugoslav Government at that time was that, according to its documentation, part of the border between the Vitina Municipality (in the FRY) and Kumanovo (Macedonia) had not been defined on the ground or laid out in other technical documentation since liberation. However, there were some uncleared zones in other regions as well, the Yugoslav Government claimed.

Immediately after this, there followed some verbal "agreements" made between Krste Crvenkovski and Fadil Hoxa and a number of politicians in former Yugoslavia that some regions should be given to Macedonia. But in fact, the Serbian side was generally aiming for three disputed places on the border with Macedonia: the village of Tanusevci, Mt. Kopinjaca, and the Tetovo village of Jazince, as well as some pastureland in Gora on Mt. Sara, which were claimed as belonging to Kosovo.

Data began to be fabricated on the borders from the time of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes [immediately after World War I], at a time when territorial divisions were based on other territorial and ethnic principles (regional units ruled by bans [governors]) with the aim of demonstrating that it was an administrative and not a state border that separated the two countries.

The actual data from the huge mass of documents on this problem indicate that just after liberation, this separation started and created numerous problems on the ground, most of which were a result of the criteria (the geographical linking of a settlement to a center, the national affiliation of the citizens, or their wish to belong to a certain region, and economic affiliation of villages to the nearest town). The clearest examples are of the St. Prohor Pcinski monastery, which was on Macedonian territory on the maps that were produced immediately after World War II, but it soon passed to Serbia under mysterious circumstances. In any case, this question was settled between 1952 and 1954, when a full land registry was carried out, according to which the

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separation between the republics was clearly defined. Later measurements concluded the actual situation and there were no complaints. This is why in August 1993, we formed a border commission, but it never did any work because the other side was not ready for it.

Threats and Provocations

Instead of overcoming the problems politically and diplomatically, Belgrade's authorities soon revealed their reasons for "denying" the border with Macedonia. A whole series of border incidents and provocations began. Of the many incidents, we will here mention the seizure of a Macedonian border patrol near the Kumanovo village of Lojane on 17 November 1993. FRY Army Headquarters explained that the Macedonian patrol had been on Serbian territory. Fortunately, the incident ended without any major consequences and the Macedonian officers were released after eight hours of detention, although the truth was that the Serbian troops had intruded 350 meters into Macedonian territory.

In the last two months of 1993 nine major border provocations occurred, which were all caused by our northern neighbor's army. Then a three-man Macedonian police patrol was seized on 2 April 1994 in the Mecka-Kumanovo district. Although a protest was sent to FRY the same day, their troops penetrated into Macedonian territory two days later and seized two UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] members.

At the same time, the Serbian side was carrying out "untypical military activities" and Belgrade's media were saying that there were around 50,000 heavily armed troops dug in on the disputed 140 kilometers border line. Ultimately, Macedonia's patience was tested to its limit toward the middle of June 1994 when a group of Serbian soldiers were deployed on the Straza point, near Cupino Brdo in the Kriva Palanka Municipality. It had finally became clear that there was no valid justification for this in terms of disputed border points, but that it was a classical occupation of foreign territory. The Macedonian side responded on 17 June and Vlado Popovski, the minister of defense at that time, said that the "Macedonian Army, having evaluated the character and the danger of tolerating this activity, has undertaken measures to expel these FRY soldiers." This resolute Macedonian step, although it was not disclosed at that time, was carried out in a military manner, that is, Macedonian Army special units were sent in. We are familiar with the outcome: Fortunately, the Serbian troops left Cupino Brdo without resorting to arms.

Time will show that this was the turning point in lowering the tension on the Macedonian-Yugoslav border and last year there were no incidents of this kind.

This recapitulation of all these events on the state border between Macedonia and FRY are principally intended to indicate the extreme importance of the agreement on mutual recognition of the two states. It is a basket of problems that has its own history in creating major tension and misunderstandings between the two neighboring countries and it sometimes threatened to lead to the most radical situations. Naturally, this does not mean that the present readiness of the two sides for a definite "mapping out" of the interstate border will go smoothly and without any problems, but the most important thing is that they will be sitting together and discussing matters.

FYROM: Rise of Ethnic Albanian PDPA Analyzed

AU2904184796 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 29 Apr 96 p 8

[Commentary by P. Dimitrovski: "Stitches Break, Buttons Remain"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The barometer of the Albanian political parties here has been displaying high pressure for some time now. The homogenization at the time of the national euphoria passed a long time ago and the separation process that followed the new democratic changes is still attracting attention. This is not because of the separation itself, but because of the how it is being implemented and its consequences. It is quite normal because it is reflected in the interethnic and overall domestic political relations.

"Excursions" and Elections

The stitches on the jointly made ethnic suit have come undone and there are only a few buttons left. The common positions of the parties of Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] are the so-called university in Mala Recica and the Rule Book of the Macedonian Assembly. There is probably also the constant communication with Albanian politicians in the neighborhood and its influence and role in the formation of its own political views. All the rest constitute the reasons for the stitches coming undone: the rights of the Albanians, their fulfillment or otherwise, and the methods for reaching the desired goals.

The latest ripples started with the replacements in the ranks of the Assembly benches. The "excursions" of the Albanian members of parliament started when they changed parties and made small pauses on the bus station in the interim, that is, they did not belong to any party and acted independently. As things stand now, the final results are 10 PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] seats in parliament, with one extra one following the

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by-election in Constituency 102, which has not been officialized yet, and seven seats for the PDPA-NDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians-People's Democratic Party] coalition. If we disregard the fact that the electorate has been let down, that the party and personal political marketing is based on a voluntary evaluation of the situation, the new parliamentary composition forces certain conclusions. First, the PDPA has in a short time become a serious and powerful opponent to the PDP, the party from which it broke away, as well as a strong parliamentarian opposition player. Second, the problem about the moderate and radical Albanian members of parliament has been definitely solved.

The recent by-election in Skopje's Constituency 102 in a way represented the present mood of the Albanians and acted as a mirror of success or failure in the previous showdown between the two most powerful parties, which largely reflect the Albanian electorate. At the previous by-election in Constituency 114, the PDPA candidate won more votes than the PDP, which shows that this party's policies, which are based on radical premises, are continually gaining ground among the Albanian population. The moderates have been pushed into the backseat. The PDP's participation in the executive was regarded as a sin and the claims that this party "has not done anything for the resolution" and that it even "freezes the Albanian question in Macedonia" were often heard during the election campaign. The price paid was in votes.

Although the victory in Constituency 102, even if not yet official, came as a relief for the PDP, it cannot provide it with total satisfaction. This win, as well as the one after the regular parliamentary elections a year ago, can become a bitter pill, if some findings that emerged at the PDPA-NDP coalition's news conference prove to be true, such as that the coalition's candidate won 63 percent of the Albanian vote and the PDP only won thanks to non-Albanian voters. A big price is usually paid when one is enjoying an easy victory.

Revitalization and Activation

It is normal that an electorate's disposition can change. However, it is strange that there is a revitalization and activation of Albanian radical extremists. The higher flight of the "hawks" or the lower flight of the "doves" comes as a result of the total number of Albanian votes at the by-elections in the two constituencies. However, additional analyses are necessary to be able to see the reasons for this.

Nevertheless, no analysis is necessary to note that the formation of Albanian public opinion in Macedonia owe much to the media in Tirana and Pristina. Lately, we have been able to see remarks, allegations, and fabrications coming from radical forces in all the Albanian communities. The recent "Edmond Addemi case" [Albanian from Tetovo who said the ethnic Albanian university was unnecessary] might be a result of all this.

Scoring political gains do not necessarily come from a fair fight, but rather from concealed brutality and uncivilized manners in settling accounts with the adversary. It would be unfortunate and extremely dangerous if physical attacks became the norm in proving one's "Albanianship." It would be unfortunate and extremely dangerous if conditioning or rejecting dialogue and cooperation are preferred to tolerance, persistence, and readiness for compromises in building up interethnic relations and confidence.

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Poland: Foreign Minister on Results of Visit to U.S.

WS2904141796 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 29 Apr 96 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Dariusz Rosati by Krystyna Szelestowska; place and date not given: "A Phone Call From Lake"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"Shortly before my departure from the United States, on Friday [26 April], Anthony Lake phoned me and said: 'President Clinton will be very pleased to meet with President Kwasniewski in the United States within the next few months,'" TRYBUNA was told by Dariusz Rosati at the Okecie Airport in Warsaw on Saturday. "The date of the visit will be set through diplomatic channels."*

When we conducted an interview with Minister Rosati on the results of his visit to the United States, this was the first subject we asked him about because some journalists wrote that President Kwasniewski's visit would be postponed due to Jozef Oleksy's case.

[Szelestowska] Minister, is this true?

[Rosati] That is nonsense. The visit could not be postponed because no date had been set. We brought up this subject, and the final reply was the statement you have just quoted. Anthony Lake, the U.S. president's adviser on national security issues, called me after getting in touch with Bill Clinton.

[Szelestowska] Does this mean that President Kwasniewski's visit will take place before the November elections in the United States?

[Rosati] Yes. Let me add that President Kwasniewski will not meet with the U.S. President on his way to Atlanta or on his way back home. It will be a separate visit.

[Szelestowska] How do you evaluate the talks you held in Washington? It had been your first visit since you assumed the office of foreign minister.

[Rosati] I believe the talks were very successful, despite the fact that I failed to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who got stuck on a peace mission in the Middle East. However, I did talk with other people at the Department of State: Strobe Talbott, Mr. Christopher's deputy; National Security Adviser Lake; and Defense Secretary William Perry. All of my interlocutors in Washington definitely confirmed the stand the U.S. Administration took earlier on NATO expansion.

[Szelestowska] However, President Yeltsin announced after a recent meeting with Clinton in Moscow that he received a promise from the Americans that the process of expanding NATO would not be stepped up; we understood that this process would be slowed down...

[Rosati] I asked about an interpretation of this statement by President Yeltsin, and we heard that it had not been agreed with President Clinton, who denied it as much as it was appropriate for him to do so. It was stated unequivocally and firmly in Washington that the stance taken by Warren Christopher in Prague a month ago would remain the primary guideline for U.S. policy on NATO. (Christopher said in Prague that NATO had committed itself to admitting new member states, and this cannot mean that new democracies would remain in the waiting room forever—a note by Krystyna Szelestowska)

[Szelestowska] What about specific dates?

[Rosati] There is some hesitation in the administration on this issue. However, the period during which the alliance will decide whom to admit and when to do this extends from December of this year until June of next year. I believe that, due to the presidential elections in December [as published], the administration does not want to tie its hands right now. After the elections in the United States, it will be possible to press for the the December date.

[Szelestowska] You held meetings at the U.S. Congress. Did you get the impression that we can count on support for our membership when it finally comes to the ratification of our admission?

[Rosati] I talked with Bob Dole, leader of the Republican majority in the Senate and its unofficial candidate in the coming presidential elections. I also spoke with many congressmen and senators of both parties. All of them, with one exception in the person of Sam Nunn, supported the admission of Poland to NATO and stated that this should occur very soon, adding that measures must be taken to speed up the process. Sam Nunn believes that Poland should first join the EU and only then NATO. He admits, though, that his opinion is supported by a minority. After all my talks—let me add that I also spoke with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee—I got the impression that there is already considerable support in the U.S. Congress for our membership in the alliance.

[Szelestowska] Is it true that, while introducing you at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which is a very prestigious institution, Zbigniew Brzezinski said the following: I assure you, gentlemen, that the high level of the heads of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been maintained?

[Rosati] Yes, that is true. He did say something like that. I believe this was a good meeting, just like the two other

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lectures on our vision of security in Europe. During my visit, I also held many meetings that were part of the so-called public diplomacy, which involved lectures and meetings at the largest opinion-forming editorial offices, such as THE WASHINGTON POST, THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, and BUSINESS WEEK, as well as the press of the Polonia and Jewish communities.

[Szelestowska] Did anyone bring up the issue of the Oleksy case in those talks?

[Rosati] The Oleksy case was not brought up. However, a certain concern was expressed over whether it would not give rise to some sort of witch hunt, some kind of act of retaliation or revenge. The same goes for the recent changes in television. Some people expressed fears that the new television leadership might carry out a cadre purge. It was hinted to me that such actions would be badly received in America.

[Szelestowska] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Daily Reveals Names of Prime Minister's Advisers

WS2504122896 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Malgorzata Subotic: "The Team of the Prime Minister's Advisers; From Baszkiewicz to Toeplitz"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Most of the names of the people who are to make up the team of Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's advisers and consultants are already known; the team will consist of a few dozen people. Andrzej Barcikowski, head of the team of the prime minister's advisers, is hoping that the body, which consists of people who are experts in various fields and who have various political views, will become a group of direct advisers to the prime minister. He also believes that the team will make it easier to look at the state not only from the point of view of the various ministries, but also from other perspectives.*

Contrary to earlier statements by Andrzej Barcikowski, the team of consultants is to consist of more than 40 persons, not 20 to 30. So far, the head of the prime minister's advisers has revealed 23 names to RZECZPOSPOLITA. They are the following:

—Jan Baszkiewicz, historian

—Andrzej Drawicz, adviser to the previous prime minister on Eastern issues

—Jerzy Gluszynski, director of the Pentor polling agency

—Stanislaw Gebethner, expert on constitutional law

—Ryszard Harhala, director of the Stalexport company

—Michal Komar, chairman of the Union of Press Publishers and editor in chief of SZTANDAR MLODYCH

—Boguslaw Kot, president of Bank Inicjatyw Gospodarczych

—Stefan Kurowski, economist and former adviser to, among others, some right-wing parties

—Leon Kurowski, economist at the Scientific Council of the Finance Institute

—Kazimierz Kutz, film director

—Dominik Ludwiczak, farmer and activist of the Polish Peasant Party

—Witold Nieciunski, expert on social policies at the University of Warsaw

—Leslaw Paga, former chairman of the Securities Commission, and currently director of Deloitte and Touche

—Krzysztof Piotrowski, director of the Szczecin Shipyard

—Zdzislaw Sadowski, economist

—Stanislaw Owsiak, expert on public finances at the Economic Academy in Krakow

—Krzysztof T. Toeplitz, journalist

—Wladyslaw Szymanski, economist of the Main School of Commerce and adviser to former Prime Minister Pawlak

—Jolanta Supinska, expert on social policies at the University of Warsaw

—Witold Zaraska, director of the Exbud construction company

—Tadeusz Zielinski, former spokesman for civil rights

—Marek Kotanski; Kotanski cooperated with Cimoszewicz when he held the post of deputy prime minister in the Pawlak Cabinet

—Michal Rutkowski, expert of the World Bank who deals with, among other things, pension systems and their reform

According to Andrzej Barcikowski, no one whom he asked for cooperation with Prime Minister Cimoszewicz has refused. There are still a dozen or so people whom he would like to ask to be the prime minister's advisers but has not contacted yet. The group of advisers will not work "as a team," which means that a meeting of all of the advisers will be held once, at most. Members of this

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team are to have the status of social consultants, but they will receive the usual remuneration for preparing expert reports.

The head of the prime minister's advisers revealed that four of the people who had agreed to act as advisers asked that their names not be made public. As Barcikowski put it, these incognito advisers want to remain away from the limelight for various reasons; some of them held important offices in the Solidarity governments, so they are familiar with the governing mechanisms. Barcikowski neither confirmed nor denied that, among the incognito advisers, are people linked to the Freedom Union.

Andrzej Barcikowski was appointed to be head of the team of advisers to the prime minister on 15 March.

Poland: Olszewski's ROP To Present 'Accord With Poland'

WS3004133996 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 29 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Wojciech Saramonowicz: "ROP Wants an Accord With Poland"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The postcommunist coalition has already exhausted its political possibilities. Poland will lose more time if this configuration remains," Jan Olszewski, leader of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP], announced yesterday.

According to him, this is proved by the fact that "the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] has failed to revalorize pensions for the fourth quarter of 1995, and the government has decided not to implement the self-government reform"; other proofs are "the disorder in the security services, as well as the covering up of the Oleksy case and the probable abandonment of the reform of the central economic bodies and the social security system."

Therefore, ROP will announce its "Accord With Poland" in 25 towns and cities at the same time on 3 May.

"In 20 points, we will present a program of Polish moral and civilizational reconstruction; this program will represent a real alternative to the current inefficient government of the postcommunists," says ROP spokesman Jacek Kurski.

"This idea is parallel to the 'Contract With America' that helped the Republicans win election to Congress two years ago. However, this is merely an analogy. All of the postulates concern our reality," the ROP spokesman explains.

Here are some of the things ROP proposes:

—stimulating the economy by decreasing taxes;

—curbing inflation;

—fairly dividing the national income;

—setting up state-guaranteed retirement pension funds (money for this purpose is to come from "the most profitable branches of the economy, such as telecommunications and the petrochemical sector");

—introducing a family-oriented tax system (the more children, the smaller the tax);

—giving more powers to the territorial self-government;

—stimulating the housing industry through low-interest loans for young couples.

The party is also planning to "carry out a project of economic vetting," to fight crime and to ensure external security to Poland. It is also announcing a new constitution, one that would "live up to the second millennium of the Polish state."

Olszewski once again criticized the activity of Belarusian President Olyeksandr Lukashenka, who is "turning Belarus into a Russian province governed with the help of the old, communist models" by banning demonstrations and by allowing the people's militia and the security services to brutally attack participants in demonstrations.

Poland: Politicians on Possibility of Dismissing GS Head

WS3004065096 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 27-28 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Luiza Zalewska: "The Army. The Future of the First Soldier of the Polish Republic; How Long Will the SLD Tolerate General Wilecki?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputies of the coalition want to examine as soon as possible whether the principle of civilian control over the Armed Forces is being observed. "The conclusions will be quite obvious: it is necessary to replace the armored unit officers (a group of generals who are graduates of the armored school, including Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki—editor's note)," we learned from the initiator of this idea, who wanted to remain anonymous.

He is collecting signatures supporting this motion; he would like the session of the defense commission, scheduled for early May, to include a discussion on the implementation of resolutions adopted after, among others, the Drawsko affair. Some of them have not been put into effect (for example, a resolution on a division of powers within the ministry between the civilians and

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military officers). According to various people, this has been impossible primarily due to the uncompromising approach adopted by the General Staff.

The deputy who is collecting signatures of representatives of various deputies' clubs assures us that their chairmen do not know anything about this initiative. "The initiative will be better received if it comes from the bottom," our interlocutor claims. "Then the president will have to go along with our commission."

The decision to recall the chief of the General Staff rests primarily with Aleksander Kwasniewski. In recent days, Wilecki's adversaries have been giving the impression that they are preparing grounds for this decision. The first to make a statement on Wilecki was Danuta Waniek: "I do not really trust the present chief of the General Staff; this is due to the fact that his relations with the previous president were too close," she said.

A day later Wilecki retorted: "I do not really like insipid widows, and I do not care what a person who is not my Constitutional superior thinks of me. The former deputy minister did not and does not know anything about the military."

In line with unofficial information, both of them withdrew their sharp statements. However, on 25 April, National Security Office head Jerzy Milewski joined the discussion: "Gen. Wilecki is not fulfilling this function as fully as it might be fulfilled," he declared.

At the beginning, signals came from the Presidential Chancellery that Wilecki would be dismissed in April. For some time now, there has been talk that he will keep his office for another couple of weeks. However, the dispute is becoming increasingly acrimonious; the National Defense Ministry [MON] is accusing the General Staff of not showing any flexibility in the work on the introduction of executive acts to the law on the defense minister. The generals reject nearly every single proposal that comes from the civilian branch regarding the statute of MON. "Someone is placing this dispute at the edge of a knife; this person should go," Jerzy Szmajdzinski (Democratic Left Alliance—SLD) comments, explaining: "If someone does not like something, he should have the civil courage to say this in public and resign."

We asked whether after Kwasniewski won the presidential elections Wilecki did not declare that he fully accepted the principles of civilian control over the Armed Forces. "Wilecki did not declare anything. The only thing he said was: 'The king is dead, long live the king!'" the SLD leader recalled.

Poland: Review of Government Projects for Promoting Exports

WS2604145196 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (EKONOMIA I RYNEK supplement) in Polish 23 Apr 96 p 11

[Article by Jedrzej Bielecki: "Export at the Risk of Growing Taxes. Minister Buchacz Questions Scenario Presented in 'Package 2000'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The scenario of balancing the Polish foreign trade turnover up to the year 1998 and sustaining the 10 percent [annual] growth of exports throughout the next five years—presented in Package 2000—is absolutely unrealistic, maintains Jacek Buchacz, minister of foreign economic cooperation. According to him, far more realistic are prognoses that, up to the end of this century, the trade deficit will exceed $10 billion. To prevent that, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation [MWGzZ] has prepared a comprehensive program for supporting exports, especially those directed toward countries of the former Soviet Union. If it is carried out, in two years' time the dynamics of the growth of exports will be higher than that of imports, asserts Jacek Buchacz. The MWGzZ program is being announced while Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko is taking part in the International Monetary Fund meeting in Washington, D.C.*

In the opinion of Minister Jacek Buchacz, his department appreciated the role of foreign trade for the economic development of the country from the very beginning of the transformation process. Among the instruments that have aided the development of the growth of exports, the minister mentioned, among others, the Corporation for Export Credit Insurance [KUKE], tax allowances for proexport investments, the return of duties and the VAT [value-added tax] for the import of investment parts and reexport, and the liberalization of foreign exchange regulations. Because of these factors, it has been possible to, among others things, increase the amount of exports per capita from $390 in 1991 to almost $600 last year. Still, the share of exports in the creation of Polish national income amounts to no more than 18.5 percent, (in the Netherlands it is over 50 percent and in Germany over 30 percent) and the amount of per capita exports in the Czech Republic is twice that in Poland.

Buchacz maintains that he does not intend to restrain the existing instruments of export promotion—including KUKE, the range of activities of which is to be expanded due to some legal changes that are being prepared by the government. This corporation, which is managed as a commercial enterprise and remains strongly influenced by the Ministry of Finance, provides

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insurance for only 1 percent of contracts (including only one contract made on the territory of the former Soviet Union). That is why the head of the MWGzZ counts, primarily, on creating a new system that would aid exports, and, for the time being, would be subordinate only to him.

The basis of this system is to be formed by the Polish Insurance Fund, whose property (260-270 million zlotys in the form of minority shares in foreign trade companies quoted on the exchange still owned by the State Treasury), will be used, in accordance with an agreement signed on 15 April of this year, to create the Investments and Exports Security Fund [FPIE]. The latter structure would still have an open form and would act as a "membership guarantee fund." It could be contributed to by companies participating in the program and interested in the penetration of export markets. In the first phase, the PFG's funds would be the source of the FPIE guarantees, but, gradually, due to the mechanism that would act as a flywheel, the money coming from the companies would grow in importance.

Apart from launching guarantees, the FPIE is to invest its capital in ventures that would aid the development of foreign trade. The agreement of 15 April was participated in by Bank Staropolski, whose experts are to be responsible for the technical side of the program. In the opinion of Jacek Buchacz, Bank Staropolski has been chosen to participate in the program after numerous financial institutions (such as Prosper Bank and Glob Bank) had presented excessive terms, regarding—primarily—their financial support of these investments. Currently, 60 percent of the shares of Bank Staropolski belong to the MWGzZ, and the amount is to grow to 80 percent, or even 100 percent—if it is allowed by the General Savings Bank—National Bank [PKO BP]. Then, according to Jacek Buchacz, no one will be able to suspect that private persons or companies are indirectly using the State Treasury's funds.

[Minister] Buchacz's ambition is allow the Central European Free Trade Association [CEFTA] countries and the former Soviet Union countries to form guarantee and security institutions patterned upon Polish solutions. To achieve that, the MWGzZ has created a new institution called the International Guarantee Corporation. According to Jacek Buchacz, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia have already declared their readiness to pay $100 million for this purpose. There is also talk about a takeover by Polish investors of majority shares of bank properties located east of the Bug River. The most advanced negotiations are carried on with Ukraine, whose central bank has already issued an agreement for Poland's takeover of a majority block of shares of the KIG Bank in Kharkov (for 2.5 million ECU). The Polish Government has also been asked to present its concepts for the development of similar guarantee and security institutions—which could contribute to the development of trade in Central Europe—during the CEFTA summit in Bratislava (to take place 5-6 June).

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Romania: Foreign Minister Sees 'Chances' for Hungary Treaty

AU2904201596 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 27 Apr 96 p 3

[MTI report: "Clarified Romanian, Hungarian Basic Treaty Viewpoints"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, despite the delay in the talks, there are still chances for the signing of a Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty, and the long negotiations are necessary because "this is the first time that the two countries are speaking openly and are not sweeping anything under the table."

According to Melescanu, regarding the basic treaty, the two countries have now reached a stage where "alternative solutions must be worked out on a political level for the remaining issues." In his extensive interview granted to this week's issue of the Hungarian-language weekly ERDELYI NAPLO published in Nagyvarad [Oradea], Melescanu points out the following: "It is an outstandingly positive element of the negotiations that we have clarified our viewpoints regarding the future prospects of cooperation between Romania and Hungary. It is also obvious that the talks held so far have had a positive effect on our relations." Without this, we "could not have met so often and no presidential and prime ministerial talks would have been held. The fact that, among our neighbors, Hungary is our most important economic partner and we have close relations in other areas too shows the right direction."

Speaking about Proposal 1201 of the Council of Europe and the lack of a decision on how to incorporate this proposal in the basic treaty, Melescanu said that both countries accept it, just like "the other 1,200 proposals." The Romanian side regards this proposal as a general direction which "every country applies according to its internal legislation, democratization, civil society development, and economic possibilities, in a way to guarantee such rights to everyone, including the minorities. The question here is how its stipulations are reflected in the basic treaty rather than its acceptance or refusal. The language of an international treaty must be very precise, because we accept obligations that must be observed." Answering a question on comparing the planned Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty with the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty, Melescanu declared the following: "From the outset, we have excluded the possibility of having ambiguous stipulations in the basic treaty, stipulations that the sides will interpret according to their own views later. Therefore, the negotiations continue." Melescanu added that "every country has the right to make supplementary statements, but these statements do not have any legal effect on the given text."

The domestic political situation in Romania and Romania's international image took up a major part of the aforementioned interview. Answering observations on extremist views and parties, Melescanu said that similar phenomena can also be seen in Hungary. "I hope you followed with attention our friend Turdeanu's speeches on television, a person you call Torgyan [Smallholders Party chairman], who is probably of Romanian origin and, I presume, you are much more concerned than we are at his manifestations. In this period of time, extremist principles and views have come to the fore quite often in the political life of the countries in this region. Take, for example, Csurka's [Hungarian Justice and Life Party chairman] manifestations in Hungary." At the same time, Melescanu admitted that "not the most confidence-inspiring parties supported the Vacaroiu cabinet in Romania."

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Slovenia: Editorial Suggests Improving Image With NATO

AU3004131896 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0500 GMT 30 Apr 96

[Commentary by Edo Zitnik—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Solana will not bring any big news to Slovenia. His main purpose is to find out how great is the general interest of the candidates for NATO membership, how much the candidates have actually done toward it so far, and how much they are still willing to do. On the basis of concrete experiences with the individual countries, NATO is supposed to gradually form a group of countries by the end of the year that could be the first to count on full membership. However, this is merely the official version of the story about NATO enlargement, which Solana will repeat in Ljubljana. An unofficial story has been in circulation for at least half year that, of course, did not leak into public by coincidence. The only serious candidates for the first circle of expansion are supposedly Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Just like in the case of EU expansion, these countries would take it upon themselves to be the guinea pigs. Only on the basis of the experiences with them will NATO decide, if at all, for the possible second round of expansion.

Slovenia's fundamental task at the moment should, therefore, be to try and join the convoy of the chosen three. Even if this historic experiment does not succeed entirely, the first new members will remain precisely that.

The visit by NATO Secretary General Solana, who already knows our country, although we should harbor any illusions that he is willing to do anything more than for others, is the right opportunity for this. If we did not wish to prove ourselves with a more active participation in IFOR [Implementation Force] and if the beginning of our so-called individual dialogue with NATO was not exactly what NATO had hoped for, then we can perhaps improve the initial impression in the direct talks with Solana.

We should bear in mind that the facts that we are small and strategically uninteresting, that we do not border on Russia, and we were not in the Warsaw Pact are simply not enough. NATO is not the United Nations. NATO is a military and political organization in which concrete actions count a lot more than diplomatic superfluity.

Slovenia: Italian Daily Cites Holbrooke in Commentary

AU2904121596 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 26 Apr 96 p 32

[Article by Lojze Kante: "'Balkan Virus in Ljubljana'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gorizia—Trieste poured some cold water on the optimism regarding Slovenia's integration with the European Union that was expressed in Rome yesterday. It appears that the results of the Sunday elections, at which three municipal right-wing hawks won their tickets for the chamber of representatives in Rome, contributed to the cooling of the atmosphere in the transborder cooperation of the province. The Trieste daily [IL PICCOLO] has not carried a front-page editorial in six columns with an accompanying commentary sporting such a critical view of the Slovene attitudes toward Europe in years.

The author, Mauro Manzin, found the initial support for his critical portrayal of the present situation in our country in the interview with the former U.S. negotiator in Bosnia, Richard Holbrooke, for the PANORAMA weekly. He entitled his article "Unreliable Slovenia" and, in the subhead, emphasized that the Pentagon feared the escalation of the dispute between Slovenia and Italy and was, for that reason, monitoring the intransigence on both sides very carefully while the has CIA listed Slovenia as a country with an increased risk. According to the paper's interpretation of the interview, Europe is incapable of normalizing relations without U.S. help. The danger of renewed escalation of the Cold War has not disappeared and the Iron Curtain is falling again only a few kilometers away from the center of Trieste.

The author later describes the events in the Slovene parliament in the past few weeks in great detail and tries to prove that the State Chamber deputies did not accept Solana's compromise proposal [for EU associate membership]. The first vote, whereby foreigners who have resided in Slovenia for three years would get priority in purchasing real estate, was annulled by the second vote, which required that the government legally prevent foreigners from purchasing real estate in the 10-km belt along the border. This means that the option-takers will not be able to reclaim or purchase their abandoned real estate. Prime Minister Drnovsek ended up in a difficult situation because he had promised the European Union that he would harmonize the real estate legislation with their standards. Apart from the parliament, he also has problems with the growing nationalism of the up-and-coming Jansa's Social Democrats.

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Although an undersecretary in the Rome foreign ministry has already stated that Slovenia will negotiate on the EU entry with Brussels from now onward, the author believes that Foreign Minister Agnelli will demand a written Slovene promise of an appropriate harmonization of the real estate legislation.

Manzin is convinced that Ljubljana and Rome will not use tanks to resolve the mutual disputes and that the observations of the U.S. diplomat could be exaggerated. However, according to Manzin, the "Balkan virus" is penetrating into the core of the Slovene parliament. The mutually exclusive voting in the past few weeks is in accord with the EU regulations. Brussels is not Belgrade, and whoever does not abide by its rules must step aside, the author concludes. According to Mazin, Slovenia shows the symptoms of a political disease, of which monolithic communism has left deep traces. A government that does not have the support of the parliament is illegitimate. Trust is good, but, bearing in mind the Balkan syndrome, which, according to the author in today's IL PICCOLO, grips the parliament in Ljubljana, mistrust is better at the moment.

Slovenia: No-Confidence Vote Could Divide Coalition

AU2604144996 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 26 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Gregor Golobic, secretary general of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS], today repeated for Radio Slovenia that the LDS would break off the coalition agreement with the Christian Democrats if their deputies support the no-confidence vote in Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler.

He emphasized that the government, which also comprises the Christian Democrats, forwarded its position on the interpellation to the parliament.

Hilda Tovsak, secretary general of the Christian Democrats, reacted to this statement by the coalition partner at today's regular news conference. This party's executive committee insists on the position that they support the no-confidence vote. At the same time Tovsak voiced surprise over not being invited to discuss this issue with the coalition partner.

Slovenia: No-Confidence Vote in Thaler Previewed

AU3004111996 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Chamber will not be able to avoid a parliamentary motion on Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler at its [2] May session. The session will also decide the survival of the government coalition. A question arises whether—now that the United List [ZLSD] has left—the Liberal Democracy [LDS] will remove the Christian Democrats [SKD] from the coalition and rule by itself until the autumn elections. Here is a commentary by Sandi Frelih:

[Begin recording] Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek would probably have had it easier today if the United List had listened to the appeal by France Bucar during a recent parliamentary debate on foreigners' property rights that the ZLSD return to the coalition. If this had happened, he would have been spared the deliberation whether and how the LDS can rule by itself until the autumn elections. Namely, there is no other option in sight at present as all other parties have publicly rejected participation in the government, while the two coalition partners are on opposite sides regarding the parliamentary motion.

The SKD and its president, Peterle, have repeated on numerous occasions, and have also publicized their position on their Internet pages, that its deputies would support the parliamentary motion on the foreign minister. The chance of a vote being avoided is practically nil. The prime minister says he does not intend to sacrifice the minister but intends to defend him. He also adds: It would be unusual if the coalition partner failed to support a cabinet minister. This would place the survival of the coalition seriously in question. The LDS secretary general is even more resolute. If this happens, they will break off the coalition agreement.

The Christian Democrats, who throughout their participation in the coalition constantly repeated the refrain—we must be in it, there is still plenty to be done, there are major projects ahead of us—are now on tenterhooks, and by breaking their promises they are steadily losing credibility. The vote on the motion is secret. Experience shows, however, that the parties can always find a way to supervise the way ballots are cast. That is why the only thing that matters in bringing about any sort of change of position in the seemingly intractable coalition conflict is merely the price of the decision.

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Federal

FRY: Parties Prepare for Elections in Bosnia

AU2904170696 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 29 Apr 96 p 7

[Unattributed report: "Picking Up Votes Even Across the Drina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The majority of the major parties in the FRY will not be running in the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections. According to the BETA news agency, some of them have nonetheless formed "fraternal" parties in the Serb Republic, which will be taking part in the elections.

Of the Serbian and Montenegrin parliamentary parties, the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], led by Vojislav Seselj, will take part in the Serb Republic elections. This party believes it is the second largest party in the Serb Republic, just after the Serb Democratic Party [SDS].

Zoran Djindjic's Democratic Party [DS] and the National Party of Montenegro will be supporting sister parties, while Vojislav Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia will be supporting a party with "congenial orientations," which is supposed to be registered soon.

The independent participation in the elections in the Serb Republic has been announced by some nonparliamentary parties, such as Mirko Jovic's Serbian National Renewal [SNO] and the Party of Serbian Unity [SSJ] led by Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan. The Yugoslav United Left will be running in all the elections in Bosnia.

The Serbian Renewal Movement, whose chairman is Vuk Draskovic, will be taking part in the elections in both entities in Bosnia "only when all the necessary preconditions are created for it," party spokesman Ivan Kovacevic told BETA.

He assessed that "for the time being, not even the minimal conditions have been met for the conducting of democratic, fair, and honest elections, either in the Serb Republic or in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The DS, according to its spokesman Slobodan Vuksanovic, will be supporting the "fraternal" DS of the Serb Republic, whose bodies will decide later whether to run in the elections independently or in a coalition.

Zelidrag Nikcevic, spokesman for the National Party of Montenegro, told BETA that the party would not be directly taking part in the elections in the Serb Republic, because a separate party, the National Party of the Serb Republic, had been founded there.

The People's Congregational Party, led by Slobodan Rakitic, will not be running in the elections in the Serb Republic "for they do not want to further complicate what are already the most complicated elections in the history of mankind," but it will support "national, democratic, and patriotic parties clustering around the SDS," that, according to Rakitic, "created, defended, and succeeded in defending the Serb Republic."

SNO leader Mirko Jovic said that his party would be running in the parliamentary elections in the Serb Republic, while in the presidential elections it would be giving its unconditional support to Radovan Karadzic, whose concept and policy is supported by the SNO.

[Box, p 7]

Radivoje Lazarevic, chairman of the Executive Board of New Democracy [ND], said that this party would not be participating in the elections in the Serb Republic. He pointed out that the ND was now oriented toward the domestic political scene and future elections in Serbia.

The Liberal Alliance of Montenegro will not be taking part in the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections, because that would mean interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign and independent state, chairman Slavko Perovic stated.

[Box, p 7]

SSJ leader Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan told BETA that his party was very strong in the Serb Republic and it would be running independently in the elections there.

"We had intended to support the ruling SDS, but after its coalition with the Radicals, we have given up that idea," Raznatovic said.

FRY: Red Cross Official Says Over 12,000 Serbs Still Missing

AU2904125496 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 27 Apr 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Fate of 12,000 Serbs Unknown"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Branko Popovic, manager of the Service for Missing Persons with the Red Cross of Yugoslavia, has stated that on service lists there are more than 12,000 missing persons from the Serb Republic, whose fate is still unknown.

This has been stated by Popovic in Trebinje, who also pointed out that all attempts so far to find out more about the fate of those people have had no results.

According to Popovic, the search is still ongoing for 905 persons from the FRY, who were reported missing in the course of the war.

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FRY: National Bank Head on Maintaining Dinar Rate

AU2604123196 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 19 Apr 96 p 18

[Interview with Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, by Tatjana Mandic in Belgrade; date not given: "Dinar Forever—If There Is No Catastrophe"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Mandic] Three years ago you were considered the savior of the country. As the author of the economic miracle, since you managed to save the money of current Yugoslavia from one of the worst inflations in the world. At what point are you now? Can you maintain the current rate of the Dinar [Yugoslav currency unit], are you not afraid of a new inflation?

[Avramovic] The decision of our policy, and also my own, is that the current value of the Yugoslav Dinar must remain forever, unless some kind of catastrophe happens. For Yugoslavia this is a basic issue, otherwise capital will begin to flow out of it, we will find ourselves in insecurity, and again deal with hyperinflation. I will do everything to support this. This is what the first and second program of the economic reform are like. We have already achieved a great deal with them. [passage omitted]

Aid Is Necessary

[Mandic] The negotiations with the International Monetary Fund [IMF] have been lagging behind because of politics. What will you do?

[Avramovic] There is no doubt that we need the aid of international institutions, especially financial ones. We need direct and indirect aid. Direct aid because the Yugoslav economy needs to be renewed, whether this deals with the infrastructure, or direct investments, that is, working capital. But without international approval it is impossible to get large amounts of money anywhere. Our experiences with all the delegations that have visited the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] in these days have confirmed this. There will be no money without an agreement with the IMF. We therefore do not have much of a chance for evasion. We will either become part of the developed world or Angola. But since I do not believe that the world would be happy if we were to change into Angola, there therefore is no other possibility but to come to an agreement with the IMF.

[Mandic] However, someone is nevertheless obstructing you in all this. You yourself admitted that you do not understand such stubborn perseverance regarding the continuity of the FRY with the SFRY [Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia]. You have threatened that you will turn off the valves in the money mint on Topcider. Will you persevere with this?

[Avramovic] I hope that the current discussions in Yugoslavia on this matter will not slow down our inclusion in the mentioned international institutions. There are many extremes in discussions, especially when dealing with legal affairs. Otherwise, it seems to me that in Dayton they recognized the political continuity of the FRY in such a way, that it can call itself Yugoslavia, and that it can succeed its place in the United Nations and other political organizations. The first recognitions of Yugoslavia have come, and it was altogether accepted that continuity does not also mean succession, but that the economic part will need to be separated from it, and that it would have to be discussed among ourselves. Already in 1992 we agreed to take over 36.5 percent of the wealth and debt of the former SFRY. Why has the question of continuity become so important, so mysterious?

On a Different Basis

[Mandic] Slovene economists wish a renewal of cooperation, of course on a different basis, as economists of an independent state. However, there have not yet been any responses to such suggestions from either the economic institutions or the Yugoslavs authorities. What is your opinion on this matter?

[Avramovic] The vitalization of cooperation is desired by both the Slovene as well as the Serb economists. This deals with an already traditional cooperation. I would not like to use the word complementarity, because I find it ugly. The issue deals with traditional connections, and I am convinced that there are no reasons or obstacles because of which we could not renew them as soon as possible, for the benefit of both sides. This applies to trade, finances, tourism, travel (from Kopaonik to the Piran Bay), everything you want. For me, everything that happened was something stupid, but it did happen. However, I am also convinced that it is possible to again take care of everything without [encountering] larger problems, of course on the basis of the independent states. [passage omitted]

We Can Trade in Foreign Currencies as Well

The fact that we still have not regulated the issue of mutual payment transactions should also be no problem. We can trade in foreign currencies. However, if we, the governors of the central banks of the former Yugoslavia meet after all, and decide to cooperate, then the first thing that we will do will be to regulate the payment transactions and to open up accounts at the central

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banks. We will be able to balance everything through these accounts. This is what we would begin with, and later we could agree upon overall compensations. However, there should be no larger problems regarding simple payment transactions. [passage omitted]

Regarding the debts, and regarding the separate repayment of debt to the commercial banks, upon which Slovenia agreed with them, and the law suit, which was, because of this, filed by the FRY, I can only say the following: the entire matter is unfortunate. I will do everything so that we can take care of this issue with mutual understanding and so that neither side loses anything. We will get in touch with the competent bank and we will discuss everything with it, since it is all connected with our claims and other matters. Everything overlaps. There also was some foolishness in this area, but I am convinced that it will be easier in the future. The meeting of the governors of the central banks of former Yugoslav republics is still an open possibility.

Heaven for Lawyers

I cannot agree with my government on two issues: on joining the IMF and on the normalization of relations with the central banks of the central banks of former Yugoslav republics, now independent states, when dealing with claims, gold, and suchlike. Those who are slowing this down are Kosta Mihajlovic and some commission on the succession of the wealth of the former SFRY. They both explain that you cannot divide anything until it is all over. In the meantime, we are all losing money; it remains in Switzerland, and in the end will be taken by the lawyers, if we are not smart. I resolutely stand by my points of view.

[Mandic] It can be heard that the NBJ [National Bank of Yugoslavia] will get a new governor, some are also mentioning names (for example Borka Vucic, a banker in Cyprus). Will you be strong enough to remain governor?

[Avramovic] I will stay on for another three years. I will not give up, although I have never argued as much as I do now, because of these points of view of mine; not even with my wife (he always mentions his wife—editor's note). I will persevere until the end. They cannot change me just like that. They can disagree with my restrictive monetary policy, but whether I will resign or not is my business. Unless they catch me sleeping with someone or I have done something criminal. I am convinced that, according to the law, they cannot change me, and that is why I will persevere until the end. In this optimistic tone Dragoslav Avramovic, the governor of the NBJ, ended the interview with our newspaper.

FRY: Naval Forces Seen as Having 'Strategic Significance'

AU2904145796 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Apr 96 pp 6-7

[Article by Bosko Antic: "A Barrier on the Open Sea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The sea links countries and people, but it can also threaten a country's security, because it is a convenient medium for the armed forces of the great powers, which are the powers of domination [nosioci] in certain regions. The coastal area of countries that have access to the sea is threatened by interbranch [intervidovski] forces that are able to operate from the sea (ships), from beneath the sea (submarines), from the air (aircraft from ships and from land), and from land (in coastal directions). The offensive component has been developed in all the navies of the great powers and countries that have the doctrine of attacking foreign territories. In this component, the marine units form the main force for conquering the coast and for moving operations deeper into the territory.

As a result of all this, much importance is attached to the problem of defending the coastal area. With small navies, or small countries, the dilemma that constantly appears is that of which forces to use to defend the coastal area. Usually, the naval orientation dominates the land orientation. What is understood by naval orientation is the possession of an appropriate navy, which, with the cooperation and support of the other [military] branches, will be capable of protecting and defending the coast, including the territorial waters, which are an inseparable part of a country.

Naval Forces

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] is a coastal country with a coastline of 260.2 km. This is considerably less than the coastline of the former Yugoslavia. This is where the reflections and dilemmas regarding the defense of the coast and the need for appropriate, primarily naval, forces in the formation of the Army of Yugoslavia arise. However, there is no dilemma about the need for a navy among those who know the problems of coastal defense and naval warfare. The role and task of the navy are of strategic significance in the overall defense of a country. No one in the world still measures the need for a navy by the length of the coastline, nor the navy's value [vrednost] by the number of ships.

The need for a navy is also indicated by a country's position, and the danger that threatens the security of the country from the sea as well as over the sea. A navy's value is indicated by the coordination of the given tasks with its organization and fighting power. Unfortunately,

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some "experts" still apply the methods of the past, when a naval battle was decided by the number of navy ships. And there is no naval [pomorska] nor coastal country in the world without a navy, and there is no country in which the navy is not a special branch of the armed forces, regardless of the number of ships it has, or the number of personnel in relation to the other branches of the army.

For a long time there have not been forces that operate just at sea and only have their own branch's characteristics, since the interbranch features of actions from land, sea, air, and underwater call for interbranch forces that operate in all of the following environments.

These forces are: naval forces (surface ships and submarines), infantry and marine forces (in most cases a part of the navy, whereas in the United States it is a separate branch of the armed forces), and the air force.

The naval forces have the job of protecting the territorial waters, which are an inseparable part of the country: according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, this amounts to 12 miles (22 km). Moreover, every coastal country has the right to an exclusive economic zone of 200 miles (370 km), which the FRY has not proclaimed—the width of the Yugoslav sea does not permit that.

Naval forces are the only forces capable of controlling the territorial waters, and protecting them, especially when the economic zone is in question. As opposed to the forces that operate from land and operate upon targets at sea, they can quickly change their position and shift the focal point of their operations, thus preventing the surprise that could be made by forces that threaten the territorial waters and the coast from the sea and over the sea. Contemporary landing [desant] forces today have the capability to change while moving and direct their operations toward the coast that is least defended.

By engaging in antivessel operations far from the coastline, naval forces disable the opponent's surface ships and submarines from using their maximum strike force and creating an advantage at sea, and thus threatening naval transportation within territorial waters. This would thus prevent their landing forces landing on the shores, forming a bridgehead, and, after fresh forces arrive, transferring their operations deeper into the territory, and linking up with forces operating in coastal directions.

The Basis of Our Navy

The naval forces form the basis of our Navy. They consist of the strike and the coastal naval forces. The strike naval forces are the basic defense strike force on the coastal part of the Yugoslav battleground, and consist of surface military vessels armed with missile antivessel weapons (missile frigates, missile gunboats, missile boats) and submarines, as well as naval raiders [diverzant] and antivessel helicopters. They are the main forces of the offensive operations, and they do this by using the coast (sailing in its shadow), and striking from numerous directions. The other defense forces (the air force and coastal artillery-rocket units) aid them in this by cooperating and enabling the maneuver. This is the way in which the strike forces defend the coast and the territorial waters with their active operations.

The coastal naval forces consist of patrol boats, minelayers and minesweepers, transport and landing-attack vessels, diver units, antisubmarine helicopters, as well as sea rescue units.

An important component of the Navy are the coastal forces, which consist of rocket-artillery units, units for underwater engineering operations, communication units, the coastal service of observing and reporting, as well as the diver units. With the various weapons they have, they have the capability of operating against targets on the open sea as well as on the edge of the coast.

Interbranch Characteristic

Defense at sea and the defense of the coast have exclusively interbranch characteristics. The focal point of defense is the forces of the Navy, which carries out its actions in cooperation with the Air Force and the Army. Only a defense that is understood in a interbranch manner will be successful. However, for it to be successful, it is inevitable to have a balanced relationship between the forces participating in the defense. The defense is carried out with the support of a organized operational base, coastal installations, and the blocking of the sea, the edge of the coast, and the coastal strip in depth.

The defense is organized and carried out on the open sea, in the territorial waters, and in the coastal region. Accordingly, the Navy's zone of responsibility, that is, the defense forces in the coastal part of the Yugoslav battleground, extends beyond the territory of the country. According to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the right to sail the open seas is guaranteed to all countries that abide by the regulations of the Convention. No one has the right to prevent another from sailing, if he himself wishes to make use of this law. The Navy forces must be prepared to secure this right. The focus of the defense is on the most likely direction of threats.

In defending the coast, the naval forces and coastal artillery-rocket units, in cooperation with the air force, and with the support of the defended operational base

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and the observation-reconnaissance system on the battleground, attack the forces of the enemy on the open sea and at the point of access to the coastal region, in order to scatter and weaken their attack force. In the event of an attack in the coastal region, all the forces of the Navy, Air Force and antiaircraft defense, Army, and other defense forces that are in the military action zone are engaged. Decisive losses are caused, which break and destroy the enemy, with the support of already fortified structures, military positions, and the blocking system at sea as well as on land, and with the persistent and decisive defense of certain parts of the coast, and with vigorous attacks and counterattacks, and counterstrikes.

As can be seen, although we are talking of defense, the naval forces operate offensively, and defend the coast with attacks on the open sea as well as in the coastal region.

The main forces of the attacks on the open sea are the naval forces, in cooperation with the air force the coastal artillery-rocket long range units, as well as other coastal forces. The main forces for attacking the enemy in the coastal region are the coastal forces, with the cooperation of the air force. On the coast, the main offensive forces are the units of the Army and the units of the coastal defense, within the limits of their capabilities.

After the breakup of former Yugoslavia and the FRY's coast being reduced to the coastal region of Montenegro, some inexperienced people might have been faced with the dilemma regarding the need for the existence of the Navy, and the possibility of exchanging military vessels for other means of defending the coast. However, the coast is not defended at the edge of the coast, but far out in the open sea. There is no need to write about the speed, surprise, and strength of a strike upon the coast by naval and other forces—that is known to all those who deal with military problems. There are no forces other than military vessels (surface and submarine) that can carry out their operations so far out to sea, control a wide sea area and quickly transfer the focal point of their operation.

Every naval and coastal country defends its sea, because it is a resource that all peoples gravitate toward, and because of which many wars have been waged. Everybody wants to reach the sea to gain the shortest and most effective links with the world. The sea is of strategic significance to every country, so the navy also has to have a strategic significance in the defense of a country, and a strategic level within the Army of Yugoslavia. There are no dilemmas about this and nor should there be, because the value of the sea is not measured by the kilometers of the coastline. Naval power is measured by a country's ability to use the sea in all its dimensions. The strength of a navy is measured by how well its organization is coordinated how its technical equipment corresponds with the tasks it is given in the defense of the country.

[Box, p 7]

The Characteristics of Defense

The basic characteristics of defense on the sea and coast are: the combination of offensive operations of naval, coastal, and airborne forces; extremely persistent defense of the islands and parts of the coast; a high level of dependence of the defense on the effectiveness of the operations of the naval and airborne forces and vice versa; the combination and variety of forces engaged in the defense, and the method of their use; mass blocking on the sea and the coast.

Serbia

Serbia: Minister on Using 'All Means' To Stop Kosovo Attacks

LD3004122596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1051 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Kosovo, Apr. 30 (TANJUG)—Terrorist actions in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija 'will be stopped energetically and with all means,' a Serbian minister has said.

In an interview to Tuesday's edition of the Pristina daily JEDINSTVO, Minister without Portfolio Vekoslav Sosevic said the recent attacks on police and civilians in Kosovo were vicious crimes and evidence that ethnic Albanian separatist leaders resorted to terrorism.

Sosevic said that international factors had made it clear to the ethnic Albanian separatist leaders that there was no question of Kosovo and Metohija seceding from Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Four terrorist attacks were staged in Kosovo last week in which five persons were killed and five injured.

Sosevic said all citizens in Serbia enjoyed the same rights and added that 'all internal issues of dispute can be solved through direct accord on realizing concrete rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution.'

'We can never accept what the separatist movement in Kosovo is striving to achieve. We are ready to discuss all problems, but we will never allow the secession of this part of our republic,' he said.

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Sosevic said the terrorist acts were committed by extremist forces who wanted to disturb the peace in those parts.

'It is neither to the interest of Serbs nor the Albanian national minority,' said Sosevic.

Serbia: SPS Says Kosovo Attacks Carried Out by 'Extremists'

LD2704114496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1059 GMT 27 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zitoradja, April 27 (TANJUG)—A Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) spokesman has said that recent terrorist attacks on Serbian citizens and policemen in the southern province of Kosovo and Metohija were carried out by extremists who wish to break peace in the region.

Spokesman Ivica Dacic told TANJUG after a party meeting in Zitoradja, Serbia, late on Friday that Serbia's strongest party, the SPS, will continue making efforts for national equality in the province, with predominant ethnic Albanian population.

Six Serbs were killed and a number of others injured late on Monday, when terrorist groups carried out five attacks in different parts of the province in a 70-minute interval.

Police is looking for the perpetrators, but suspects that ethnic Albanian extremists launched the attacks in retaliation for the Saturday killing of an ethnic Albanian in Pristina.

The murderer, who said he had fired because he thought the victim was breaking into his car, was immediately caught and an investigation was launched.

Despite the prompt reaction, a series of terrorist attacks on Serb civilians and policemen was carried out two days later, making the peaceful situation in the province, in which a strong ethnic Albanian separatist movement for a greater Albania has been active for years, very volatile.

'International factors agree that Kosovo and Metohija is an inviolable part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia and that it is its internal issue. All internal controversial issues can be solved in direct talks on the realization of concrete rights and freedoms, which are guaranteed under the constitution. This is why I believe that terrorist acts are not in the interest of the Serbian and the Albanian peoples and all citizens of Kosovo and Metohija,' Dacic said.

He expressed belief that the 'awareness of a need for a joint and peaceful life in Kosovo and Metohija, especially after the war in other parts fo the former Yugoslavia, is very strong' and that 'peace will be preserved.'

Serbia: Commentary Warns of 'All-Out War' in Kosovo

AU2904172696 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Apr 96 p 8

[Commentary by Bahri Cani: "Playing With Fire"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Another, the seventh consecutive, tragic murder occurred in Kosovo two days ago. This time a bomb—of course, no one knows who was responsible—blew up an Albanian child herding sheep. Thus, in seven days there have been seven deaths and the same number of wounded. Apart from the murder of Armed Daci, all the other murders remain deeply veiled in secrecy. However, everything points to a well-designed terrorist operation that could lead to much wider and bloodier clashes—even to all-out war, which would be impossible to keep within the borders of Kosovo.

The main question now is who is behind all this. There is no good answer to that and there is unlikely to be one soon. Still, Daci's murder, which could have been an act of madness by a mentally deranged person, infuriated the Albanian masses; they took to the streets for the first time in five years. These protests have so far been peaceful but no one, no one at all, can claim that it will remain that way. Unless the latest murders are solved soon, Rugova and Milosevic, who is still not being directly blamed by the Albanian side for these events, could find themselves facing new bloodshed. They say that the Albanians have had in the past far more serious causes to start an open conflict than the Daci murder. Since 1990, about 30 citizens have been killed annually by the Serbian police. Wars were raging in Croatia and Bosnia, but Kosovo was "preserved."

The Albanian leadership has hitherto always counted on the support of the international community. However, now that the FRY has been recognized, the Albanian citizens, as can be seen from conversations with them, have run out of patience. Many of them are also disappointed with Rugova's policy of peaceful resistance. As for Milosevic's men in Kosovo, they are again, like so many times before, repeating the same mistake. No one from the local authorities has seen fit to visit Daci's family and offer condolences.

It is thought that war would not suit Milosevic because of the normalization of relations with the international

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community and also because of the highly uncertain outcome of the venture. They say that the status quo suits him fine, at least until after the elections, so that he can stay in power.

The gravity of the situation, however, demands political action now. One never knows with local politicians, but one can hope that both sides will understand the complexity of the situation and that their overriding aim will not be to stay in power at any cost, but rather that they will do everything they can to prevent armed incidents and to start a dialogue to extinguish finally the Kosovo fire that has recently started to flare up much more dangerously than ever before.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Bukoshi Calls For 'Urgent' EU Action in Province

AU3004111896 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the Republic of Kosova, has sent a letter to Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli, who holds the EU rotating presidency, to express the concern of the Government of the Republic of Kosova over the dramatic situation in Kosova, which threatens the stability of the entire region.

In his letter, Prime Minister Bukoshi writes that the latest developments are further testimony that the status quo in Kosova cannot continue any longer, while the victims are even children, as in the case of Vushtrri [Vucitrn]. It is clear that anything can happen. The experience has so far has testified that, in a terrorist state such as Serbia, human life has no value. The openly armed Serbs do not hesitate to use arms against undefended Albanians. We have made this fact known to you for years on end, the letter stresses, and we have made efforts to keep the situation under control. We have asked the victims of violence to show self-restraint, but, at this moment, we are forced to take relevant measures to defend ourselves.

Prime Minister Bukoshi invites Mrs. Agnelli to undertake urgent action on Kosova. The international community should give up the double standards and partial viewpoints and recognize the right of Kosova to self-determination. Kosova cannot be considered a lost cause. We will not allow this. However, our peaceful option against aggression needs support.

Bukoshi further stresses that there are several ways to resolve the situation, starting with immediate pressure on Belgrade to stop provocations and the newest wave of terror. Belgrade should send signs that it is interested in dialogue with the Kosova leadership under the supervision of a third party. The lack of effort and common initiative by the international community could be the reason for missing an appropriate opportunity, which may lead to unforeseen consequences.

Bukoshi also makes it clear that, in the face of such actions by Belgrade, no one can justify not using certain measures for preventive action. I am confident of your determination to protect the inviolable rights of the peoples, just as I respect the patience of my people, who have given me the mandate to fight for them, concludes Prime Minister Bukoshi's letter to Susanna Agnelli.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Local Court Sentences Serbs for Killing Croats

AU2804150696 Paris AFP in English 1446 GMT 28 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 28 (AFP)—A Serbian court has convicted three Serbians of killing four Croats in the northern province of Vojvodina, reported the paper VECERNJE NOVOSTI on Sunday.

The court in Sremska Mitrovica, 75 kilometres (47 miles) northwest of Belgrade, sentenced the defendants to prison terms of 15, 10 and three and a half years respectively.

Goran Vukovic, 25, is to serve 15 years for the shooting deaths of three Croats in the village of Kukujevci in June 1993.

Pavle Draskovic, 29, received 10 years for murdering a Croat man in April 1993 in the village of Sot.

The court sentenced Milan Nikolic, 37, to three and a half years for "instigating nationalistic and religious hatred."

Vojvodina: JUL Leader on Rights, 'Unacceptable' Nationalism

LD2504232396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2314 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Senta, Yugoslavia, April 25 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav United Left (JUL) leader Mirjana Markovic said late on Thursday that the bloc took as its point of departure the principle of equality of nations. 'In a society composed of several nations, where there are many minorities, nationalism is unacceptable, it is dangerous and can have tragic consequences,' Markovic said at a JUL convention in Senta, in Serbia's multi-ethnic northern province of Vojvodina.

Senta is a patchwork of nationalities, with a Hungarian majority that has shared with the Serbs 'for generations

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the same sociological environment and developed in a similar direction,' said Markovic, wife of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

For this reason, she added, 'Hungarians in Vojvodina are at home in their own country, just as the Hungarians in Senta are at home in their own town.'

'Therefore, they share equally the right and obligation to work with the others for the benefit of the Yugoslav community and their immediate environment,' stressed the leader of the non-parliamentary leftist bloc. Vojvodina has a population of about two million, with Hungarians accounting for 16.85 percent of this number according to a 1991 census, which makes them the largest single minority in the province which is home to 26 nations, minorities and ethnic groups.

Vojvodina: Ruthenian Rights in Serbia Said 'Highly Respected'

LD2504223596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2208 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, April 25 (TANJUG)—A Serbian ruling socialist party official said Thursday that the Ruthenians' minority rights in Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina and in Serbia as a whole were highly respected, just as those of the other minorities.

The official, Bosko Perosevic, who chairs the party's board for Vojvodina, was speaking in a meeting with a delegation of the Ruthenian cultural literary society, headed by President Mihail Varga.

Ruthenians account for 0.87 percent, or 17,652 of Vojvodina's multi-ethnic population of just over 2,000,000, according to a 1991 census.

A statement quoted Perosevic as saying that respect for the constitutional principles, which guarantee equal rights and freedoms to all citizens, was prerequisite for the further promotion of good inter-ethnic relations, trust and general progress.

The delegation said that the Ruthenian cultural literary society aimed to preserve the Ruthenians' national identity and cultural heritage and saw peace and coexistence with the other nations and ethnic minorities as vital.

The organization has decided to create new cultural institutions—national library, museum and archives, the statement said.

Information in the Ruthenian language was described during the talks as satisfactory on the whole.

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